


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GOD AND MAN

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GOD AND MAN

By **HASTINGS RASHDALL**

D.D., D.C.L., D.Litt., F.B.A.

Sometime Dean of Carlisle

Selected and Edited

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P R E F A C E

THE editors have given the title *God and Man* to their third volume of Rashdall's papers and sermons, because those collected here deal with different aspects of the relation of man to the Creator and bear upon problems which arise in connexion with the Incarnation. No apology is needed for making such a collection. Rashdall's theology was through and through Incarnational. He stood in the line of Robertson of Brighton and F. D. Maurice ; and in his presentation of Christ's work and person carried forward the movement which, in response to modern needs and modern knowledge, seeks to rationalise and moralise the Christian doctrine. It was his intention to write a treatise which should deal at length with the Idea of the Incarnation, but his comparatively early death deprived theology of this work. It is hoped that this loss may be repaired to some small extent by the papers contained in the present volume.

What will always remain Rashdall's theological *opus magnum*¹ had the Atonement for its theme. His treatment of this subject was naturally critical, for he was constantly led to attack doctrines of the Atonement which appeared to him antiquated and immoral. The consequence is that those who know Rashdall as a theologian only from these lectures sometimes suppose that his interests centred in the demolition of theological crudities, and that he had little interest in constructing a tenable theology to put in its place.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Rashdall was one of the few constructive theologians of our age. He was fully alive to the crisis in which the inherited theology was placed by the new discoveries in Natural Science and Biblical Research, and to the need for a new apologetic. Unlike many of his

¹ *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology.* The Bampton Lectures for 1915. First edition, London, 1919.

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contemporaries, he was not content merely with *adjusting* the ancient theology in order to render it reconcilable with the new knowledge. Still less, like the French Modernists, did he go to the other extreme of rejecting dogmatic theology altogether. He aimed at constructing a theology of the Incarnation which should be based on the firm rock of enlightened reason and morality, and at showing that such a theology lay at the root of the Christian religion.

It was natural that Rashdall should have studied carefully the work of others who had attempted the task before him. Through his historical work on the Medieval Universities, he had been brought into intimate touch with the great Scholastic thinkers, and found that he had much in common with the spirit of the thirteenth century. He was attracted by the intellectual freedom and speculative daring of its theologians, and in particular he was drawn to the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas by the stress which it laid upon the supremacy of the intellect. He was aware, of course, of the limitations from which the Scholastics inevitably suffered, but he realised that they succeeded in offering to their age what he wished to offer to the Modern World—a theological system in which the Christian Faith and the best current philosophy were united in perfect harmony. If Rashdall had been asked to name the other period in European culture to which he was most attracted, he would probably have said the eighteenth century. He admired its sanity and its common sense. And from Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* he largely derived his idealistic metaphysic. Both these affinities are exemplified by the historical papers included in this volume.

It was in morality that Rashdall found the ultimate basis of the Christian life. Individual ethical

progress, not pantheistic metaphysical absorption, was the business of human souls. The complete accord between the claims of conscience and the ethics of the Gospel was for him the bed-rock of Christian apologetic. Christ is discovered to be the highest ethical ideal, and the individual shares in the Divine Revelation made in the Incarnate Son of God by following His example. All external rites—which Rashdall, incidentally, always treated with conscientious reverence¹—were subservient to the moral life. The life and death of Christ together constituted the supreme example for the Christian believer, and being “a member of Christ” meant for him primarily the willingness to follow that ideal.

The first duty, therefore, of the believer who has accepted the Christian revelation is to study the life of Christ, and to behold in this concrete example the moral end. Such study will yield principles of universal application. Christ taught, and followed, principles which transcended His precepts,² and for us to live the Christian life means not a mere slavish obedience to these precepts, but to live and act in accordance with those general principles which are reflected in Christ’s teaching and example.

Further, Rashdall had a profound distrust of Mysticism in all its forms. It was only with the turn of the present century that a new value began to be discovered in the writings of the mystics. Through the researches of the Dean of St. Paul’s (Dr. Inge), William James, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, and Evelyn Underhill, it has become generally recognised that the mystics had not had nearly the attention paid to them which was their due. Unfortunately the discovery of these new treasures led many writers to pit mystic experience against reasoned conviction

¹ Cf. the volume of sermons entitled *Christus in Ecclesia* (T. & T. Clark, 1904).

² Cf. the sermon entitled “Principles or Precepts?” in *Principles and Precepts* (Basil Blackwell, 1927).

in religion. Rashdall believed that here was an irreconcilable antithesis, and with his unflinching confidence in Reason he was led to distrust all those who used religious experience as the basis of a new theistic apologetic. His essay entitled "The Validity of Religious Experience" in *Ideas and Ideals*¹ is deserving of careful study in this connexion. His distrust of Mysticism was further increased by the apologetic use made of it by William James in support of Pragmatism—for Rashdall the worst of all heresies. Yet another reason for his distrust of Mysticism was that it seemed to him to imperil the permanence of the individual. He strongly dissented from Hegelianism, because it tended to endanger the reality of the self and to engulf every finite difference in an all-inclusive Absolute. The mystics claimed that through the flight of the Alone to the Alone they could enter the Divine Mind and share the Divine Experience; and this claim seemed to Rashdall incompatible with the demands of individual morality, both here and hereafter.

These considerations throw much light on Rashdall's attitude to the doctrine of the Trinity. He constantly reiterated his conviction—several instances occur in the present volume—that a Trinitarian doctrine of Three Persons, using the word *Person* in a sense identical with its modern meaning, implied a society of three independent self-conscious Beings, that is, a tritheistic view of the Godhead. As against Sabellianism, he contended for the *permanence* of the distinctions within the Godhead; but by reason of his doctrine that selves are always mutually exclusive he was unable to accept a doctrine of the mutual interpenetration of three separate Divine Personalities, such as has appealed to many theologians.

For the production of this trilogy of Rashdall's

¹ Published by Basil Blackwell, 1928.

occasional writings, the editors have had a vast amount of material from which to draw. They have had at their disposal something like a thousand sermons and a hundred papers, by far the greater part of which material still remains unpublished. Much of the writing and preaching of Rashdall was occasioned by events and controversies which have by this time been forgotten. It is the characteristic of a truly philosophic mind to be able to bring wide principles to bear on the needs of the moment, and herein Rashdall was eminently successful. He was an untiring controversialist, because he found controversy to be one of the best ways in which to reach truth. The result is that some of Rashdall's best papers were orientated too much on past controversies to justify their being reprinted to-day. In other cases, there were controversial papers that seemed too valuable to omit, and yet it was clear that large sections of them would have occasioned little interest at the present time. The editors have not hesitated to eliminate these controversial passages where it could be done without modification of the argument. After all it was the principles that lay behind these controversies for which Rashdall was really concerned. Of Rashdall, it might be said, as of "the judicious Hooker," that he was not so anxious to prove his opponents wrong as to show why they were wrong. In an age such as the present when systematic thinkers who aim at a philosophic and rational defence of the Christian religion, are few, those who have set their hand to this task are deserving of serious attention.

Most of the essays in the present volume have been printed, at least in substance, before, but we have received a number of requests expressing a desire to have some of them in a more accessible form. The first is reprinted from the collective volume *Contentio Veritatis* by kind permission of the

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publisher, John Murray. Nos. II, III, IV and X have appeared in the *Modern Churchman*. The University of London Press has generously consented to the republication of No. V from *King's College Lectures on Immortality*, edited by Professor W. R. Matthews. Nos. VI and VII are from the *Economic Review* by permission of its editor, the Rev. John Carter. The somewhat technical essay on Nicholas of Ultricuria appeared originally in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, of which Society Rashdall was for some years President ; for this essay the editors of this collection are indebted to the authorities of the Aristotelian Society. The concluding essay is from *Jesus Human and Divine* which was published in 1922 ; for this they have to thank the publishers, Messrs. Andrew Melrose.

H. D. A. MAJOR.

F. L. CROSS.

Oxford,

March, 1930.

THE ULTIMATE BASIS OF THEISM

I. INTRODUCTION

THEISM¹ is not the whole of Christianity, but Theism of the Christian type is a very large and important part of it. It is, I believe, more and more coming to be true that men's attitude towards Christianity is determined mainly by their attitude towards Theism. That this is so is due partly to a change in what they mean by Theism, partly to a change in their interpretation of Christianity.² At the present day minds capable of religious feeling naturally turn towards Christianity, conceived as a religion of enthusiastic loyalty towards the Person and the ethical ideal of the historical Jesus, with sympathy and yearning. The human side of Christianity is readily accepted. But to many minds it is just the view of the nature

¹ [Theism is the belief that God is the ultimate ground of all things and is the source of all things other than Himself and sustains a personal relation to His creatures.]—EDD.

² A Deism of the eighteenth-century type might be, and often was, entirely divorced from the Christian attitude towards God. Such a Deism was compatible with an almost entire extinction of the religious emotions, a morality which found no contact with religion except in the form of purely external "sanctions," and which sometimes dispensed even with the sanctions, so that belief in a future life disappeared altogether. Its view of the relation between God and the world made worship an absurdity, or at least a superfluity; its cold and critical temper was content to regard the great historical religions in general, and Christianity in particular, as artificially invented impostures, or at least as the creations of an irrational "enthusiasm." On the other hand, while Christianity was regarded either as a supernaturally authenticated guarantee of "Natural Religion," or as a supernaturally authenticated appendix of rigid and admittedly unintelligible dogma, it was clear that the distinctively Christian elements of Religion might easily be sloughed off and leave the underlying Deism just where it was before.

These remarks are meant to apply to the type of thought combated by Bishop Butler in the *Analogy*. But Deism was a word vaguely used, and was often applied by opponents to latitudinarian Churchmen like Archbishop Tillotson. To many even of the avowed "Deists" the preceding description would be quite inapplicable. Their Deism often amounted to Theism in the sense of this Essay, though their empirical Philosophy led them to exaggerate the separateness of God from the universe.

of God which Christianity presupposes that creates intellectual difficulties. Once a Theism of the Christian type has been accepted, the way is prepared for the ascription of a unique position in the religious history of the world to Him who was at once the first great teacher of that Theism, and the supreme embodiment of the ethical ideal which has historically been associated with it. I do not mean to say that there remain no difficulties and perplexities either in the traditional dogmas about the Person of Christ or about the miraculous element in the narratives of his life. I do not mean to say that there does not remain an important difference between a Unitarianism or Christian Theism of the modern type and a Catholicism or Trinitarianism of the kind which seeks to place itself in harmony with modern modes of thought. But I do believe that the difference between what one may vaguely call an inside attitude and an outside attitude (whether sympathetic or unsympathetic) towards the Christian Faith is coming more and more to depend upon the view that is taken of Theism. Especially is this the case with minds which have passed through the discipline of Philosophy, and with whom (for the most part) the alternative to Christian Theism is not a blank Materialism, or a confident Agnosticism, but a Theism of a vague, impersonal type, exhibiting every shade of thought and feeling intermediate between a very real belief that the ultimate principle of things is spiritual and a Pantheism which for every religious and ethical purpose is indistinguishable from the purest Naturalism.

I propose in the following pages to try, in a systematic but necessarily very brief and imperfect manner, to suggest what is implied in the Theism presupposed by Christianity; and this may best be done by indicating the grounds on which, as I believe, such a Theism rests. And here we are at once met by a difficulty. The strongest argument for Theism

is, in its fully developed form, a metaphysical argument. To some minds this will be thought to amount to an admission that such a Theism can never be the religion of the modern world. How, it may be said, is Christianity to be accepted by the world in general, if it is impossible to be a Christian on any rational grounds without first being a metaphysician? Does not this involve, as a necessary consequence, that Christianity must be possible only on the one hand for a small circle of professed metaphysical students, and on the other for those who are content to accept their religion on authority? We need not shrink from the admission that for large numbers of people almost wholly, and for nearly all to some extent, religious belief must rest upon authority, though it will never rest entirely upon authority. For people will not accept upon authority what does not meet the needs of their own moral and rational nature; and the fact that a creed does meet their needs is, as far as it goes, an argument. And it were much to be desired that some metaphysical training should be diffused among a much larger number of people than now enjoy it, especially among those who are concerned with the teaching of Religion in a sceptical age. A certain elementary course of metaphysical reading might well be recommended to all well-educated people who feel the need of getting at the real grounds upon which religious belief must rest, and might be still more widely recommended had our philosophers learnt how to imitate the lucidity of the old English philosophical Classics without reproducing their metaphysical mistakes. But the main reply to the objection above indicated is that there is no absolute line of demarcation between the kind of arguments upon which theistic belief is based in thoughtful men who have never studied formal metaphysics and the arguments of the professed metaphysician. All men who think about things in general are metaphysicians more or

less. The plain man who has never opened a book of geometry, or even of arithmetic, has nevertheless some ideas about space and quantity or number, and those ideas are mathematical ideas. And so, the metaphysician is simply the man who thinks out the problems about which all who think about things in general have thought to some extent, who thinks them out in a more thorough and systematic manner than other people, and who has acquainted himself with the best that has been thought and written about such subjects by others.

I believe therefore that I shall best serve my purpose by not shrinking from the attempt to express, in the most popular and untechnical way that is possible, what I believe the Theistic argument comes to when it is fully thought out. It must be admitted that to acquire the metaphysical attitude of mind, to see clearly what the ultimate metaphysical question means, and fully to grasp any possible answer to it, generally requires a rather long course of gradual habituation. But I trust that some who may not be prepared to accept the particular line of argument which will be here offered in its full extent, may nevertheless be able to accept it sufficiently to acquiesce in the religious or theological part of my conclusion. If that should be so, it will not mean that they have substituted some false or merely plausible grounds of belief for the true ones, or allowed their creed to be dictated by authority or emotion or prejudice. For, as has been suggested, the common-sense arguments for theistic belief are, as I believe, only the metaphysical arguments imperfectly thought out. It is needless to say that such a statement of my argument as is possible within the limits of this book will fail to satisfy the professed metaphysician. It is not so much, however, in the statement of an argument as in the reply to objections that it is difficult to combine metaphysical thoroughness and accuracy with general

intelligibility. I must therefore appeal to the benevolence of the metaphysical reader (if such there should be), and ask him to believe that I am not unaware of the existence of many possible objections which I am obliged to pass over, and that I have no desire to slur over or minimise them.

I may add that there is nothing in the argument which pretends to be in any way new. The greater part of it is simply the common property of all thorough-going Idealists. If in some parts of the argument I adopt a position which will not commend itself to all genuinely theistic Idealists, I venture to hope that my differences from them will be for the most part a difference of emphasis rather than a fundamental difference of principle. It will be unnecessary to specify my obligations to the acknowledged masters to whose inspiration is due anything in these pages that merits attention.

II. A SHORT STATEMENT OF THE IDEALISTIC ARGUMENT FOR THEISM

To the "plain man" it usually appears self-evident that matter is a thing which exists "in itself," which could conceivably be supposed to exist even if no consciousness existed or ever had existed in the world. He may, indeed, if he is a Theist, disbelieve that matter does exist or ever has, as a matter of actual fact, existed without mind; he may even go so far as to say that it is unthinkable that matter should in the first instance have come into existence without mind, or that the Mind which brought it into existence should cease to exist; but, if all mind in the Universe could be supposed to be suddenly extinguished, there would appear to him nothing essentially absurd or self-contradictory in the idea that matter would go on existing all the same. That is the notion which lies at the root of all difficulties about Theism. The denial of this view of things is

what is meant by Idealism: and Idealism is, as I believe, the necessary basis of Theism for minds which want to get to the bottom of things.

The line of thought which leads to the adoption of this view may best be mastered by a perusal of Bishop Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*. However much Bishop Berkeley's argument requires to be corrected by the criticism of that later form of Idealism which begins with Kant, his writings remain the classical expression of the view which all genuine Idealists agree in accepting as the basis of a true theory of the Universe—the view that “matter” or “things” exist only in mind or “for” mind, that the idea of matter without mind is an unthinkable absurdity. I will here attempt only a very brief résumé of Bishop Berkeley's line of thought, advising the reader not previously acquainted with metaphysics to read Berkeley for himself, if he wishes to understand it thoroughly, and to meet with a fuller answer to the objections which will inevitably occur to him.¹

The plain man (and the most accomplished non-metaphysical man of science will probably for the present purpose be only too eager to place himself on the side of the plain man) declares to us that matter exists “in itself,” and that it is “in itself” exactly what he thinks it to be. He sees before him a tree, and he tells us that the tree is just what it appears to him to be. Very well, the tree appears to him green. “Is the tree green in itself?” “Yes,” says the first thought of the plain man, “of course the tree is really green in itself.” “Then supposing no being endowed with an eye had ever existed in the world, supposing no spiritual being had ever felt or seen what we feel and see when we look upon a wood in

¹ A more mature statement of his view is contained in the *Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*. To the reader who wishes to appreciate the advance which modern Idealism has made upon Berkeley without grappling with the difficulties of Kant, Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysics* may be commended.

early summer, the tree would still be green? ” Here probably our plain friend will begin to hesitate ; but, if he has a tincture of science, he will probably murmur something about rays of light or waves of ether, some of which are absorbed by the tree and others thrown back into space—rays which are there all the same whether they actually strike a living optic nerve or not. And then we shall have to point out that waves of ether are one thing ; the idea of “ green ” is something quite different. A man blind from his birth may know all about waves and ether and optic nerves ; he may pass a brilliant examination in the science of optics, but he has no idea of what the seeing man means by a sensation of green. And then probably our plain man will be ready to confess that the colour and the sound and the smell of external objects do not (in strictness of speech) exist in the bodies, but are effects produced by the bodies upon mind ; the ideas of “ secondary qualities ” (as Locke called them) exist only in the mind, but the “ primary qualities ”—the size, the shape, the solidity of things—these, he will still insist, are in the things ; and the “ secondary qualities ” are really certain modifications of the primary qualities (i.e. of the arrangement of the ultimate particles of matter) which produce the ideas of colour, sound, etc., in my mind. The primary qualities are in the things : but how do I know they are there ? When I say that the paper before me is square, all that I can really mean is that the white appearance in my mind is of this shape, and that if I touch it I shall likewise find my tactual impressions arranged in a certain way. When I say that it is thin, I can mean only that on holding it up edgeways the edge is seen or felt to be thin. When I say it is solid, I mean that I cannot see or touch the table underneath it without removing it or making a hole in it. “ Then do you mean,” it may be objected, “ that the paper has no existence when I leave the room ? ” Certainly

not, for in the first place I can still think of it, and by being thought of by me, it has (Berkeley would say) "entered my mind and become an idea"¹; and when I so think it, I can only think of it as something which I should see and feel under certain conditions—if I came back into the room and no one had removed it. But it would certainly be meaningless to say that it exists if nobody ever had or ever would either see or think of it as being seen. This line of thought may possibly bring our plain man to the admission that what we experience immediately is simply certain feelings, which, when being reflected on, are built up into objects of thought; that, do what we will, we cannot get outside our thoughts. By inference we may, indeed, come to believe that other people also have similar feelings and know similar objects: nay, when we make abstraction of the thinker and concentrate our attention only on the thing thought of—the matter or "content" of the thought, as it is called—we may very probably assert that when you and I both think of this sheet of paper, or of paper in general, we are thinking about *the same thing*. But still the "thing" can only mean what we think of, what we should experience under certain conditions, or what somebody else might think of or experience under certain circumstances.

Our plain man will now perhaps be disposed to admit that *immediately* we are in contact only with ideas, or rather, as Berkeley's critics rightly insist, with "objects of thought"; but he will go on to evade the force of the admission by contending that though primary qualities, no less than secondary, are found on reflection to be known by us simply as objects of our thought, as something inside our minds, yet the things as they are in themselves are

¹ It is true that Berkeley did not sufficiently distinguish this existence for thought, which it has equally whether I am looking at it or merely thinking it, from the actual perception of it when it is present, and prepared the way for Hume's attempt to reduce the memory of a sensation to a "less lively" idea or feeling of the same kind.

really *like* the things that we know, that the primary qualities as they present themselves to my mind are really *like* the primary qualities as they would still be in the things were there no thought or consciousness whatever in the world. To this we may reply in the words of Berkeley: "But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our own thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you think they are not, I appeal to anyone whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest."¹

Another way of illustrating the essentially unmeaning character of saying that things apart from thought are "in themselves" what they are to the thinking mind, is to call attention to the essentially relative character of these primary qualities which we are so apt to think of as existing in the supposed "things in themselves," of which we can give no account except that they are not the same things as those we think. The quality which is most apt to force itself upon us as something which belongs to the things and not to our thought of them is the quality of solidity; and, whatever else solidity may mean, I suppose everyone will admit that the property of occupying space is an essential element in it. Without pressing the question what exactly can

¹ Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 8.

be meant by "occupying," it is enough to take the bare idea of spaciality. "Things in themselves" are, it is contended, in space, and would be still in space though thought were to perish out of the universe. What, then, we must insist, is meant by the "spaciality," the size, the shape, etc., of the things which occupy space? Whatever a thing is in itself, it would still be that thing, one must suppose, whatever became of other things. Therefore my paper would still be square, though all other things in the world were to be annihilated, and the space in which these things were. Yet what would this mean? What would be the meaning of a square foot of space apart from the relation of that square foot to the surrounding space? Or what would the size of my paper mean if there were no things and no space outside it? Or (to confine ourselves to the "thing" itself), the squareness of the thing belongs to the thing itself, it will be urged, not to its relation to other things. But then this "thing" to which I attribute the property of occupying space is made up of parts, and apart from the relation of these parts to each other, what would be the meaning of its being six inches square? "Yes," it may be replied, "it is true that a composite whole like a piece of paper is made up of parts; such a thing is no doubt made what it is by the relations between its parts, but it is the parts that really exist in themselves." "How small a part?" I ask. And then, if the objector knows something of chemistry, he will perhaps tell us that the atom of some chemical element is the real "thing in itself," or some smaller particle, which (according to speculative modern chemistry) goes to the making of the chemical element. *That* would still be what it is apart from all relation to other things. And the atom occupies space? "Certainly." Well, then, if it occupies space, it must have a top and a bottom, a right and a left. Still the being of the space-occupying atom is found to be made up

of relations. We never get rid of the essential relativity of this "solidity," which of all its qualities most decidedly seems to belong to the thing itself. Everywhere we encounter nothing but relations, until we get down to the point without parts and without magnitude, and that surely is not a something which can be conceived of as existing apart from its relations to other points, nor can that which has no magnitude be regarded as a "thing." The very quality then which is most especially supposed to belong to the individual thing as it is in itself turns out to be infected through and through with relativity; this property at least seems to belong not to the thing, but to be made up of relations between things. And is a relation anything apart from the mind which conceives the relation, which holds together the two related terms and apprehends the relation between them? If not, and if space be made up of relations, then space must be "subjective" in the sense of being made by mind, of having existence only relatively to the apprehending subject or mind. And the subjectivity of space carries with it the subjectivity of everything in space.

"Yes, but you can't have relations apart from something to relate; the relation of the things may only exist for the mind that puts them together, but there must be something there to be related." Not "there," I must reply, for we have admitted that the *thereness* of the thing was part of its relatedness—meaningless apart from its relation to other things or points in space. What is the solidity of a thing apart from the relation between its parts and its relations to other things? "Well," it may be replied, "it resists you when you press it; it is something that you can touch, that hurts you when you stumble upon it, and so on." Yes, but here we are back again at feelings which it was admitted could not be apart from some subject which feels.

Feelings and relations ¹ are all that we can find in things, however long we think about them. We may no doubt think about a thing which we have never touched or seen, or had any kind of sensible experience of, but that merely means that we know what it would be found to be like if we or some other mind were to come into such contact with it. Berkeley was no doubt wrong in failing to distinguish adequately between an "idea" in the sense of the present image or sensation and an "idea" in the sense of some quality which can be thought of when the feeling is gone; but then after all the quality we think of is only a thought of what the feeling would be like if we did experience it.² If nobody ever did experience or ever could experience any one particular sensation which is called green, the judgment "trees are green" would be false or meaningless. Feelings actual or possible—feelings actually experienced or idealised by thought, and relations between such actual or idealised feelings—besides these there is nothing in "things." If anyone still insists that this is not all, let him tell us what more he wants in his "things." If he cannot tell us of any property that belongs to the things whose self-existence he so passionately asserts, the assertion must surely be meaningless. If it means anything to him, he can surely tell us what it is: and when he tells us something about things that cannot be easily shown to be either a feeling or a

¹ I fully recognise that *pure* feeling, feeling without relation, is a mere abstraction, as much so as relation without something to relate.

² It is perfectly true that our thought of a quality is an abstract universal which is never actually the same as, and never *perfectly* reproduces what I or anyone else has ever experienced in actual present perception, but still it is an attempt to reproduce it. What we experience is never merely blue in general, but the judgment that the thing has such and such a quality is only true because and in so far as the thing actually produces the feeling which we struggle to reproduce in thought. The metaphysicians who have insisted on this point with most penetration never seem adequately to grapple with the question, "What is there really in common between the actual perception and the universal idealised *content*?"—what in short a "content" really is. But such questions need not be answered for our present purpose.

quality meaningless apart from what is actually felt, or a relation, his assertion will have a meaning and may be discussed. Till then, we shall assume that everything we know, everything we can intelligibly assert to exist must be either a feeling or feelable quality or a relation or some combination of the two. Feelings cannot exist apart from a feeling consciousness, relations can only exist for a relating intelligence. The "esse" of things is *for* mind. But of course the things thought or felt cannot exist apart from the mind which thinks and feels. I cannot stay to dwell upon either the really difficult problems, or the fanciful and over-subtle ones, which may be raised as to the "reality" of the mind or self. It will be enough to assume that in a sense sufficient for every purpose of the following argument, those who have accepted the contention that there are no things apart from mind will be prepared to admit the existence of the mind itself. We must not, of course, take the mind out of all relation to the objects of its thought. It may reasonably enough be contended that mind apart from thing, "subject" apart from "object," is as unintelligible as matter or thing apart from mind. But when we are clear that by "object" or "thing" we only mean that which the mind thinks or feels, and that no independence or self-existence can be attributed to the thing, the distinction between "mind" and "thing" becomes merely a distinction within the mind. The mind undoubtedly does distinguish itself from the things which it thinks, but that does not show that the things which it thinks have any existence apart from the thought which thinks them or from some other spirit's thought. I am not my toothache, and yet nobody thinks that my toothache has any existence apart from me. "The mind"—the subject, to speak in more technical language—has no existence apart from some object or other, but that object may be in ultimate analysis simply a state or

experience of the subject or of some other subject.

And this last point brings me to an objection which will probably be occurring to the reader. "Do you really mean," I may be asked, "that the world is as much merely a state of mind as my toothache? Are you not breaking down all distinction between subjective and objective, between fancy and fact, between reality and delusion?" A complete and adequate answer to this question would involve a system of Philosophy, and as a basis for it a system of Logic. But within the limits now at my disposal an answer may be suggested under three heads.

(a) There is always a difference between the idea in my head and an objective fact. Even when I confine myself to my own sensations, there is a difference between the sensation considered simply as such and the judgment that I have a sensation. The feeling—the toothache, it may be—is purely mine, and nobody else's. It exists only while it is felt; it did not exist yesterday, and will not exist to-morrow. But the judgment that I have a toothache is a statement of objective truth. That is true for me, and it is true for all the world. Anyone who, though he feels nothing of my toothache, judges or thinks that I have not got a toothache is in error. No wishes, no thinking away of that toothache on my part or anyone else's part will cause it to be any the less a fact; it is part of the truth about things; anyone who does not know that that toothache has been felt does not know all that there is to know. And the fact that I should have a toothache to-day always was true, and the fact that I have had toothache will always remain true, long after my aches have ceased and my tooth has mingled with the dust. My toothache, in short, is subjective; the fact that I have a toothache is objective. There would still be a difference between subjective and objective, though I were the only consciousness in the universe. My perceptions as such are subjective,

but the fact that I have them, and the laws which determine the conditions under which I shall have such and such a perception, are objective.

(b) On the basis of this distinction it becomes plain that, even supposing I were the only consciousness in the universe, there would still be a distinction between fact and fancy, between an idea in my head and an objective fact. I may have an idea that I shall have no toothache, but that idea—if by idea is meant a piece of knowledge as knowledge—is false, as I discover to my cost when to-morrow comes, and with it the toothache. Of course, considered as an “idea in my head,” as a piece of experience, as a “psychological event,” that idea of mine has a reality of its own, but it is not the same reality as the toothache. What I judge is false; the fact that I judge is as much a fact as toothache. My delusions and my toothache are both of them realities in their way, but they are different realities. Hence, even supposing there were no other consciousness in the universe than his own, there would be a very real and important distinction between the snakes that a man merely imagines in a fit of *delirium tremens* and an *anguis in herba*. The snakes that people his disordered imagination do not bite; the snakes that waylay his path in Africa do. The chimæra has an existence of its own in the world of art and literature and primitive imagination; and that world is a part of the whole world of reality, but it has a very different place from that occupied by lions and tigers.¹

(c) So far I have assumed my consciousness to be the only one in the universe. I will not now go into the question of the intellectual process by which we come to believe that there are other minds than ours in the world. I assume that in some way we have become aware of that fact. And when we are aware

¹ Of course I here treat snakes and lions simply as objects of experience, apart altogether from their consciousness.

of that fact, the most simple and obvious distinction between fact and fancy, imagination and reality, between subjective and objective, comes to this : we call "subjective" that which I only perceive, "objective" that which (under certain conditions) others will perceive also. Thought always deals (i.e. true thought *does* deal, and all thought *purports* to deal) with objective truths ; but then, it is all-important to remember, truths are not realities. They would not be true unless somebody at some time or other actually experienced or felt something. Thus in its way my toothache is an objective fact. But we call it subjective because it is only I that feel it. Equally so with the snake seen in *delirium tremens* ; that snake is a very formidable reality to the delirious person. But he is in error only when he supposes that his snake has an "objective reality," when he thinks that other people see what he sees, or when he supposes that what can be seen by him can also be touched or eaten by himself or others.

(d) One more point may be necessary, and this must be merely glanced at, though in a metaphysical treatise it would occupy much ground. The common distinction between subjective and objective, between my private experience and the world of things, turns partly upon the fact that the world of things occupies space ; my subjective experiences do not. No doubt my physical pains are localised—probably even the most spiritual of my emotions ; but they are not "things," partly because the experience which I have at that point of space is one which others cannot have there, partly because the feeling is not the feeling of touch and of resisted pressure which is implied by the true object or thing. And, though the presence of an object in space means ultimately that I and others do and will continue to have experiences of touch at a certain point of space, the notion of space itself is not a feeling. Space is

the creation of thought ; the idea of a permanent object "occupying" space, consisting of parts existing side by side simultaneously, cannot be resolved into any series of merely subjective feelings succeeding one another in my or anybody else's mind. The idea of space and the correlative conception of extended substance is a creation of thought, and has the "objectivity" belonging to thought. The world of things in space therefore—unlike my pleasures, pains, and emotions—is a world which is the same for all ; but still it exists for mind and not outside mind, and it would not be real at all if that which we think did not reveal itself in actual experience under certain conditions to some actually feeling conscience. The back of the moon is real, though nobody (it may be) has seen it or climbed its mountains, because it exists for thought now ; but that thought would be shown not to be a thought of reality, a true thought, if somebody got round to the back of it and failed to experience the sensations of touch and sight which we believe he would experience.

The attempt to distinguish between thought and reality has brought us to a difficulty. We have been compelled to admit the reality of the things which no eye of man has seen and no hand has touched, because under certain circumstances they would be seen or thought ; if that be so, they exist only when they are actually thought of. But, it may be said, does not this make Science a delusion ? Geology tells us that the earth was once a mass of molten matter, and before that of gaseous matter. When no mind of man or animal was in existence to feel that intolerable heat, or even to think of it, in what consisted the reality of that world which science reveals to us ? Can it be said that it was a real world *then* because we infer its existence *now* ? Does the world of the past begin to exist when its past existence first dawned upon the mind of an eighteenth-

century geologist? What of all the undiscovered facts about the universe, of all the truth which is waiting to be discovered, but is not yet discovered? Does that existence consist in a perpetual potentiality? Can a potentiality exist by itself? According to the view we have hitherto taken, the world was once, in a sense, all potentiality! What is meant by potential existence? A thing which *is* one thing actually may be potentially something else, i.e. it will turn into something else under certain conditions. The egg is potentially a chicken, but can there be such a thing as a potential chicken which is yet actually nothing! What sort of existence is this—an existence which *is not* anything, but might be something under certain circumstances? Have we not affirmed the existence of something which we admit to be a nonentity? And then if the world was once nothing except potentially, how can it ever have become an actuality? Can that which is not produce, give birth to, cause that which is? Can the ground or cause of the existent be found in the non-existent, of the real in the unreal? These questions surely need only to be propounded to be answered in the negative. If we have seen reason to believe that nothing really exists except mind and that which exists for mind, it is clearly not *our* minds that have always existed; it is clearly not the case that what you or I know and feel has reality, while that of which *we* have no sort of knowledge or experience has none. If therefore that which is not experienced or even thought of by any human consciousness is to have any existence at all, there must be a Mind for which all things exist always: we must say that the fiery mass of the pre-animal solar system existed always in a universal Mind, and that in his Mind there exists to-day whatever stars the astronomer's telescope has not yet sighted. Such a Universal Mind it is that we mean when we speak of God.

The existence of God is thus shown to be an absolute necessity of thought. It is not "proved" in the sense of being demonstrated in the way that one particular truth of science can be demonstrated as logically flowing from some other particular truth. Nor does it appear to me at least that the existence of God is self-evident in the sense in which the axioms of mathematics are self-evident. But it is a belief which is necessary to explain our experience. It is found on reflection to be necessarily implied or involved in all our experience.

We cannot understand the world of which we form a part except upon this assumption of a Universal Mind, for which, or in which, all that exists. Such is the line of thought which presents itself to some of us as the one absolutely convincing and logically irrefragable argument for establishing the existence of God. And yet I know that so strange are these metaphysical conceptions until one has become familiarised with them by slow habituation, that very acute minds may wholly fail to make the admission on which all turns—that "things" can only exist for mind. Are we to admit that no one can rationally believe in the existence of God until he can be brought to make this admission? Far from it. It is highly probable that some of my readers who may fail to accept the metaphysical theory known as Idealism, who may fail to be convinced that things exist *only* for mind, may yet be led by the argument we have gone through to reflect how great is the assumption that matter can exist without mind, and they may find in this line of thought some reinforcement of the common-sense conviction that mind cannot ultimately be simply the product of blind, unthinking matter—that however real or self-existent matter may be when once in existence, it cannot have existed entirely by itself, and must have originally owed its existence and the orderly laws by which it is governed to mind. The

metaphysical argument is after all only a fuller and more explicit development of what is implied in the commonplace conviction of the mass of men that the world must have had a Creator, and of others who, though they may find difficulties in the idea of an absolute beginning of matter, cannot conceive of matter except as perpetually dominated and controlled by mind. Such persons may find their conviction strengthened by the following considerations.

Let us return to the main thread of our argument. All things must exist *for* God, must be eternally present in the mind of God. But what do we mean by "present"? What do we mean by the thought of God? It is best frankly to confess at once that we do not know. It is common with writers of the Hegelian School (or rather with that right wing of the Hegelian School which really believes in the existence of a divine Consciousness, and not in a mere deity of abstract "categories"¹) to assume that the knowledge of God is simply the same as our knowledge of things when we think of them apart from present perception, except that our knowledge is in part while God's knowledge is of the whole. They never seem to realise how absolutely a reference to actual perception is implied in all our knowledge. I can think of the greenness of the tree, but that word "green" would mean nothing to me apart from what I have once seen. I may generalise the idea of green, and make abstraction of much that was actually contained in each particular perception. What I saw was either light green or dark green: what I think is simply green. My idea of green in general excludes the difference between light green and dark green; if so, it is of course an idea of something which I could not possibly see, for the

¹ The Hegelian tendency to mistake the abstract form or categories of self-consciousness, firstly for the self and then for God or Reality as a whole, has been powerfully criticised by Mr. Herbert Bradley, and by Prof. Pringle-Pattison (Seth) in his *Hegelianism and Personality*.

seen green must be either light or dark or medium. Or you may say that (if I know *all* about green) my idea of green would include all these alternatives ; it is the idea of a colour which may be light or dark or medium, and which must be one of them. But still it is meaningless apart from what I have actually experienced ; and, when I think of it, the notion is meaningless, apart from what I or some other being might experience. And experiences which I have not had I can only think of by some more or less vague analogy to what I have experienced. I can suppose a pain intenser than I have ever felt, but such conceptions mean to me very little indeed, though the knowledge may be quite enough to guide action. It is the same even with those elements of our experience which we are right in referring not to sense, but to thought. My idea of space in general, or of a triangle in general, is not derived from mere sense, but it presupposes sensible experience, and is meaningless apart from it. I may think of a triangle in general which is not either a large triangle or a small one, but such thoughts are abstractions, not realities. Triangularity is simply the name for the shape, alike in all, of the triangular things which I have seen or felt, or might feel and think. The shape is not real apart from the things which have that shape, and the things are perceivable only by sensation. Everywhere the reality of the objects which we know has more or less immediate reference to the facts of perception. And therefore it is meaningless to ascribe a knowledge of the various thoughts of qualities which in us are derived from present perceptions to a consciousness which never has had, or will have, those perceptions. We may conceive obscurely God as knowing what things look like to us who see, though He sees not. But that does not remove the difficulty as to how a consciousness which does not feel can know what it is to feel. I offer no solution of the difficulty ; I only protest that the

idea of a purely thinking consciousness conveys no intelligible meaning to us. We can only think of the divine Consciousness by the analogy of our own. Such conceptions must necessarily be inadequate, but we do not make them less inadequate by attributing to God only the more abstract elements in our thoughts and eliminating altogether the actual experiences which give our thoughts all their meaning. It may be that the divine Consciousness is less unlike our thinking activity than it is unlike our present perceptions. It may be that the difference between actual present perceptions and the thought of what may be perceived does not exist at all in God ; certainly we cannot suppose that the difference for God can be the same as it is for us, if only because present perception is with us localised in a bodily organ. We can only say that the same line of thought which leads us to believe that the world which we know fragmentarily—with a knowledge that comes and goes, and always has its origin and starting-point in present perception or feeling—does exist somehow in the Consciousness of God, involves also the inference that in God's Consciousness there must be feeling also as well as thought, or something analogous to feeling as well as something analogous to thought.

At this point it will be well to stop and take account of the conclusions to which we have been so far led. We have tried to make it plain that the existence of God is a necessity of thought. But what, from our present point of view, does " God " mean. So far it merely means a Spirit who knows, and in some sense experiences, all reality. The present argument leads us up to the idea of a Spirit who knows all that is real, without whom nothing that is known could exist—except, indeed, the spirits or selves whose relation to the divine we have not as yet examined. A divine mind, but not a divine will. For all that appears so far, we might remain with the

conclusion that God's relation to the world is the same as ours, except that our knowledge is only in part. We might say that the divine Mind makes nature, but only in the sense in which human minds make nature. There is nothing in this argument to suggest that God is the cause of Nature, that the events of the world's history are guided by his will, or fulfil his purposes. And here some Idealists stop. How impotent and valueless for any practical purpose such a Theism is apt to be, if we do not subtly import into it religious ideas and associations which really come from another source, I need hardly stay to point out. For aught that appears to the contrary, this Idealist Deity might well be thought of as good, and yet the world to which by some unintelligible but inevitable necessity He finds himself linked be very bad, and going from bad to worse. And what after all can we mean by calling a will-less deity "good"? What possible grounds of hope or of aspiration can there be in such an idea? What emotion could he inspire, what worship could he merit? Such a deity, occupying the position of *otium cum dignitate* ascribed to the gods of Epicurus, would be as little worshipful as a category or an Equator. The argument by itself can prove little that is of value for religion or for morality: but it forms nevertheless the necessary starting-point for a Theism which may be worth more. If we are to carry on the argument, we must start afresh, and face the problem of Causation.

III. THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSALITY

When we were asking the plain man to say what he meant by the "thing" which he insisted must be *there* whether he felt it or not, there was one element in his consciousness to which we did not do justice. At bottom his refusal to be satisfied with any explanation of the thing that treated it only as a

state or phase of his own consciousness, lay in his conviction that the cause or source of the feelings which he experienced did not lie in himself. Of some of his experiences he does find the cause in himself. He is conscious of being the cause of his own actions, that is to say, he is conscious of determining his own volitions,¹ and within certain limits (determined by physical facts not under his own control) he finds that these volitions produce effects in the world of his experience. He wills to eat, and (if his organism be in a healthy state and the food within his reach) the eating follows. But where no such volition has been exercised, the experiences that happen to him are not, he feels, caused by himself; many of them are unforeseen, many of them are unwelcome. *He* does not cause them: yet his reason tells him that they must have a cause. No doubt when he insists that the cause of his experience must lie *there*, outside himself, in the space which is occupied by the perceived object, he is forgetting that this very space is part of the experience for which he seeks an explanation. The fact that the impact of one thing upon another in space is followed by changes in that other thing makes it seem natural to explain the appearance of a phænomenon in his experience as due to the impact of an external thing upon his mind. But things are outside one another; they are not outside the mind: the mind is not an object in space. Hence he has no right to say that the cause of my perceiving a tree must lie *outside* my physical organism, and *in* the tree. The space-occupyingness of the tree is as much part of the phænomenon of which I want the explanation as any other quality in the object as perceived or thought of by me. But a cause for my there and then seeing and touching the tree there must be. It is a

¹ Nothing that follows necessarily involves what is commonly called the Freewill or Indeterminist theory. The argument is satisfied if we accept the fact of "Self-determination" in that sense which is quite compatible with a non-materialistic Determinism.

necessity of thought to suppose that nothing which has a beginning can be without a cause why it should begin to be.

Primitive man was disposed to account for all the changes of nature, or at least for any change involving motion not obviously accounted for by external impact, as due to spiritual beings like himself. He was conscious of being a cause : his reason demanded a cause other than himself for movement which he did not cause : he naturally inferred that the cause of phænomena must be found in the same sort of cause outside him.

With the progress of knowledge, however, men came to observe a certain regular order and succession in their involuntary experiences. One region of nature after another was removed from the domain of those things of which there seemed to be no other explanation than the passions or caprices of individuals like himself, and was reduced to the sphere of regular law or uniformity. The observed uniformity of nature involved changes in men's ideas about nature : (1) The discovery that all changes in nature are interconnected and interdependent, that the world is a whole, all the parts of which are mutually interdependent, made it impossible to explain it as the result of independent, jarring, and mutually hostile wills. If the universe was to be referred to minds, science made it evident that it must be referred to a single mind. (2) The idea of caprice, irregularity, unaccountability which clung to the older form of anthropomorphism, was replaced by the idea of order, plan, design. If nature was referred to a mind, it was a rational mind : it was in man's reason rather than in his desires and caprices that men came to find whatever analogy they still assumed between man and the universal cause. The same growing knowledge which destroyed the idea of a multitude of jarring personalities substituted the idea of a single rational plan for the conception of

many inconsistent, mutable caprices. The purposes of nature, for those to whom nature still seemed to imply a purpose, became one purpose.

For many minds the observed regularity of nature, carrying with it the power of prediction and the power of limited control over nature, has come to be so intimately associated with the idea of Causality that it has substituted itself for that idea itself. The phænomenal conditions under which an observed phænomenon is found to occur are commonly spoken of as the cause of that phænomenon. Some have even brought themselves to believe that it is self-evident that nature must be uniform; to such persons the idea of interference with the observed course of nature by a spiritual agency, finite or infinite, seems not only gratuitous and contrary to experience, but an *a priori* absurdity or unthinkability, like the idea of two straight lines enclosing a space. Of course, the fact that nature is observed to be uniform supplies a strong presumption that the ultimate cause of nature does work uniformly; probable arguments are always based upon partial knowledge. All the knowledge we have of the Cause goes to show that that Cause is uniform in its working: hence the probability that it will always be found to work uniformly is enormously more probable than the contrary supposition. But I certainly find no difficulty in thinking that A might follow B a hundred times, and not follow it the hundred and first time. Mere succession is not causation. A succession which does not explain itself when it happens once is not any more intelligible when it happens a hundred times. The actual uniformity of nature is as much in need of explanation as a conceivable irregularity. The uniformity of nature (in Lotze's language) is a necessary postulate of all scientific reasoning; it is no necessity of thought.

The idea of uniform succession among phænomena

does not satisfy my idea of Causality. What would satisfy it? We observed before that there is one kind of causality of which we are immediately conscious, i.e. the causality of our own wills. It is sometimes said that the idea of causality is got from our own experience of volition: and to this mode of statement it is rightly objected that no experience of succession could put the idea of Causality into a mind which lacked the concept. A mere observation of mental determination followed by an observed motion of limbs could never transform the idea of succession into the idea of Causality.¹ The idea of Causality is, indeed, an *a priori* category of thought. We are by nature capable of asking the question "Why?" No experience could make us believe that something happened without some reason why it should happen. What, then, is implied in this idea of Causality? It seems to involve two elements: (1) the idea of force or power; (2) the idea of final cause. If the idea of power be objected to as vague, it is impossible to give a definition or explanation of an ultimate idea: but perhaps for some minds it may seem a preferable mode of statement if I say that the ground or explanation of anything that happens must be found in something which already exists. Events must have their ground in reality. "*Ex nihilo nihil fit.*" We cannot believe that something should suddenly appear if nothing existed before; or that something should appear which has no connexion with what was in existence already. To put the matter in yet another way, we necessarily believe that the present state of a thing is connected with its past states: the explanation of the present must be found in the past,

¹ This is only an objection to the attempt to get the idea of "Causality" out of "experience" understood in the sense of the Sensationalistic Empiricist. The position that we are immediately conscious of exercising activity seems to be practically indistinguishable from the position that the idea of Causality is logically *a priori*, but that we become aware of it only in our consciousness of volition. For a psychological defence of the view here assumed—that we are conscious of exercising activity—the reader may be referred to Dr. Stout's *Analytical Psychology*, especially Book II, chap. i.

or rather in something which persists through past and present. But that is not the whole of the explanation. If I am told that A is A because it *was* B, I still may ask why? Why did A become B? and my curiosity is not satisfied until I know the purpose for which A became B. If I find my furniture disturbed during my absence, I ask "why" did this happen. When I discover that X did it, I am partially satisfied, but I still press the question "Why?" And when I am told that X did it by way of a joke, and that X is a kind of being to whom such a joke appears a good or rational end of action, then I am satisfied: then the occurrence is explained. It is this union of power with purpose which satisfies my idea of Causality. And such a union can only be found in a consciousness; it is only in consciousness, so far as we know or can conceive, that a final cause can become an efficient cause, that power and end can meet, that the idea which is found good can pass into an actuality. The idea of Cause is derived from our volition in the sense that all our ideas or concepts are derived from our experience; and it is in all probability, as a matter of psychological fact, a concept which we should not have unless we were willing as well as thinking intelligences. At all events in our experience of volition, and in that experience alone, we are conscious of actually exercising Causality. There alone we find a content for the bare abstract notion of "Cause." The idea of Cause and the idea of Will mutually imply one another. The argument which leads us to look upon God as willing the world's history as well as thinking it may now be exhibited in three stages—

(I) We have the *a priori* conviction—as clear and as strong as our *a priori* conviction that two and two make four and cannot make six—that events cannot happen without a cause, and this idea of Causality implies such a union of power and final Cause as is only found in, and is only intelligible in, a purposeful

or a causative intelligence, i.e. a Will. This fact by itself, even apart from other metaphysical pre-suppositions, supplies a strong argument that the ultimate Reality—the ground or source or cause of all that happens—must be a Rational Will.

(2) A quite different line of argument has already led us up to the conviction that the idea of matter without mind is unintelligible, and that the world must be thought of as perpetually existing in and for a universal Mind or Thought. Our analysis of Causality now leads us to think of this Mind as not only thinking, but as causing the objects of his own thought ; as Will as well as Thought. For, we have seen, mind is the only thing that can really be a cause at all.

(3) If once we have reason to believe that the ultimate reality is spiritual, analogy would lead us (even apart from the Causality argument) to compare it to mind as we know it. We know nothing whatever of thought without will. We can form no idea of such a thing. It is as much an abstraction as colour without surface or sensation apart from time. In all our thinking there is attention, and attention is an act of will. In every waking moment of ours we are thinking, willing, feeling. If therefore on any ground we are led to find the origin of things in a thinking Mind, it is reasonable to infer that that Mind is Will as well as Thought.

It may of course be freely admitted that many characteristics of "willing," as it appears in us, cannot possibly be attributed to God. People sometimes, no doubt, mistake the mere sense of effort, which is largely a matter of muscular contraction, or the choice between alternatives of which even the rejected one is felt to be attractive, for the essence of volition. The essence of volition, for our present purpose, is the conscious origination of changes. However much we insist that human attributes must be applied to God *sensu eminentiori*, there is

every reason for saying that the concept of will, in this sense, must be an essential element of the best conception which we can form of God. To refuse to include this idea in our conception of God is to refuse to think about Him at all ; for the idea of thought without will has simply no meaning whatever for us. The fact that God wills does not, it must be admitted, actually prove *what* He wills, but it will hardly be seriously disputed that if a Universal Thinker be conceived of as willing at all, he must be conceived of as willing all the objects of his thought, i.e. the world.

If the position at which we have arrived be accepted, it will almost inevitably carry with it what is, or at least what ought to be, meant by the Personality of God. There are, no doubt, thinkers who will accept the foregoing argument so far as it tends to establish the "self-consciousness" of God, but will hesitate to attribute to Him personality, because personality seems to carry with it the limitations of human personality. If all that is meant by such scruples is that God cannot be thought of as subject to the same sort of limitations of power and knowledge as human persons, the objection might be met by saying that God must be thought of as super-personal. Indeed, we may say (with Lotze) that the ideal of personality is one which is never fully attained by the human consciousness, and that God is the only being who is in the fullest and completest sense a Person. But the objection to the term person is very likely to spring from an unwillingness to admit any distinction between God and the world. We must therefore say a word as to the relation which the view we have taken contemplates as existing between God and (i) the material world or things, (ii) other spirits.

IV. GOD AND THE WORLD

(i) *God's relation to things.*—It has been contended that the world must be thought of as perpetually existing in some sense in the mind of God. So much is common ground for all genuine Idealists. And it may be admitted that the idea of a subject without an object is an impossible one. In that sense we may say with the late Professor T. H. Green; that “the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world”; and in that sense we may, if we please, think of the world as included in the very being of God. By many of the Schoolmen the world as existing in the mind of God was identified with the Logos, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. But the expression, “the world is necessary to God,” seems to suggest that the world is as independent of God as the objects of *our* thought are independent of our will. It pictures God as perpetually annexed by some unintelligible fate to a world quite alien to his own inner nature as to some Siamese twin from whom He would perchance, but cannot, part. It may even be contended that such a view really exaggerates the distinctness of God from the world, and fails to adhere to that Monism, that tendency to reduce the world to a single principle, in the interest of which it is conceived. The only sense in which Theism is concerned to establish such a distinctness is the sense that this world is what it is by reason of the will of God; so much seems implied in the Hegelian formula that God must be thought of as a being who creates the objects of his own thought if only the term “create” be taken seriously enough. Once admit the idea of Will into our conception of God, and there is an end to all danger of any pantheistic identification between God and the world.

(ii) *The relation between God and other Spirits.*—Whatever may be thought as to the relation of God to time, other spirits at all events have a beginning

in time, and the fact of that beginning must have a cause.¹ Now we know that the appearance of conscious life in the world is dependent upon certain material conditions: every stage in the development of such life is conditioned by the development of certain bodily organisms. When once, therefore, it is admitted that the bodily organisms (like other material things) must be thought of as caused by the Will of God, the admission will carry with it the further proposition that the beginning-to-be of the spirits themselves is also due to that Will. And if we once admit a causative relation between the supreme Spirit and the other spirits, we shall avoid all identification between the spirits and God. No doubt there is a resemblance, an identity of nature between God and all other spiritual existence, especially in the higher stages of its development, such as we do not feel to exist between God and any mere object of thought. There is therefore no objection to saying that a human soul is a "spark" or "emanation of the divine," or a "limited mode of the divine self-consciousness," or that "human thought is due to the partial communication to the human soul of the divine thought." Such formulæ are indeed of great value, inasmuch as they assert that there is a real community of nature between the human soul and the divine, and that our knowledge, though imperfect, is real knowledge, real knowledge of the world as it is and as it appears to God, not some mere unreal phantasmagoria arbitrarily devised to amuse us with an unreal appearance of knowledge, as it has been represented to be by some philosophies. But such expressions must not be used to disguise either the causal dependence of the human soul upon the divine will or the distinctness of God from such souls when once they have appeared. And after all such phrases can hardly be regarded as any great

¹ Since Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* the position that the individual self is timeless has ceased to be necessary to philosophic orthodoxy.

improvement upon the old biblical statement that God "created man in his own image and in his own likeness." And the very gist of this likeness is that every human soul exists "for itself," instead of being (like any mere thing) only the object of another's thought. To speak of a spirit which is for itself as being included in or being part of another or identical with another spirit is to deny all that is meant by the assertion that it is a self or a spirit. And if it be admitted that the human spirit has an existence of its own, not identical with the divine, the admission should remove any lingering scruples about the ascription of Personality to God. It may indeed be admitted that God knows all that goes on in our minds in a way which we do not know the thoughts of other minds, that He in some way overcomes that "impenetrability" which is sometimes supposed to be an essential characteristic of Personality; but that does not amount to the really meaningless assertion that God's existence "includes" the existence of these finite spirits. Such an assertion may have a meaning in the mouths of those to whom God is simply a name for the totality of limited self-consciousnesses together with the world which they know; but it is unintelligible in the mouth of anyone who really believes in God as a self-consciousness which is not *merely* those finite spirits. God may think or feel all that we think or feel; but if He does so, then over and above that feeling or thinking of his, there will remain the thinking or feeling which I call myself. Two spirits, thinking or feeling alike will be for ever two and not one. These remarks are not made with any desire to detract from the intimacy of the communion which we may suppose to exist between the divine mind and the human; but communion implies the existence of two spirits, and is destroyed when the union between them passes into identity. To speak of the human heart craving for such a union with God as to

destroy personal distinctness is perhaps a natural exaggeration of religious poetry or religious rhetoric, but when it is adopted as a statement of literal fact, Philosophy breaks down the barrier which separates sober thinking from pure Mysticism.

To some minds the admission that God is not the human soul of which nevertheless He is the cause may seem to carry with it the position that God is "limited" or "finite." In that sense of the word "limited" in which the being of anything is said to be limited by being distinct from something else, by not being that other thing, in that sense I should most certainly admit that God is finite inasmuch as He is not man. The Infinite in the sense of some philosophers means simply that which admits of no negative predicate, which is everything and of which we cannot say that there is anything that is not it. But the words "limited" or "finite" in the language of theology or religion usually carry with them the sense of imperfection or disparagement. God is not limited by his creatures if by that is meant that He is constrained, confined, impeded by something outside Himself, since the appearance and the continued existence of these spirits is due to his will: they spring from his own being. We may, if we like, say that they are still *within* Him inasmuch as they are still the object of his thought, or that their thoughts are fully known to Him; but such language is unnatural and misleading, inasmuch as it almost inevitably suggests the idea *either* that God is no more than they *or* that each finite spirit is *merely* a part of, an effluence from, a fleeting and unsubstantial phase of God. It is a pity that language which naturally suggests such pantheistic developments should often be played with by those who have no real sympathy with them. Even by speaking of God as "the Infinite" theologians have often involved themselves in such non-theistic lines of thought; but the term may be accepted in the sense

that there is nothing which exists independently of the will of God : whatever limitation is implied in the existence of other spirits is a self-limitation, not an arbitrary self-limitation but one which necessarily springs from the nature and character of God.

V. THE MORAL CHARACTER OF GOD

So far our conception of God has been based upon purely metaphysical considerations : we have left out of account the moral considerations. Cardinal Newman has declared that for the existence of God he wants no other argument than the fact of the existence of Conscience. It is perhaps difficult to construct an argument for the existence of God which resolutely makes abstraction of all not purely ethical considerations. The very idea of Morality would, indeed, be unintelligible when taken wholly apart from the other activities of that single Self, of which Conscience is but one aspect or manifestation. But certain it is that the existence of Conscience is among all the facts of consciousness the one which most imperiously demands the idea of God for its explanation. The existence of Conscience supplies one of the great arguments for supposing *that* God exists : it supplies the sole grounds for saying anything about his character or purposes. We have already seen that even metaphysical arguments for his existence owe something to the Practical Reason, since the merely intellectual understanding of volition was found to involve the idea of *end* or *purpose* or *final cause* ; and we should know nothing about final causes but for the consciousness of ourselves as exerting causality with a view to an end which we desire or pronounce good.¹ The judgment that a thing is good, or possesses value, is the judgment of

¹ I do not mean that to desire and to pronounce good are the same thing. All desire, when reflected on, suggests the idea of final cause, but that demand of Reason for a final cause is only *fully* satisfied by the desire which the moral consciousness approves.

Practical Reason, or what is popularly called Conscience.

But now let us confine ourselves to what may be inferred from the existence of this Practical Reason. It is undeniable that our moral judgments are in themselves quite independent of all theological or metaphysical considerations. When I pronounce that a certain end is intrinsically good, and that therefore the action which tends to bring it about is intrinsically right, my words have a meaning which is intelligible (if it is not *fully* intelligible) apart from all beliefs or disbeliefs as to the ultimate origin, constitution, or destiny of the universe. Such judgments of value may be pronounced, have been pronounced, are constantly being pronounced, and acted upon by people who have no positive belief, or a positive disbelief, in God and a future life. And good men, in proportion to their goodness, will certainly continue to act on such judgments, whatever becomes of their speculative beliefs. But all the same it is not difficult to show that that which they mean cannot be fully justified without the assumption that the ultimate Reality is spiritual. When I say "this is good" (e.g. this or that person's happiness) I do not mean merely that I happen to like it. It may be something which can only be attained by sacrifice or loss on my part: if that is the case, I feel that I ought to take that step, though it brings me no pleasure. I do not merely mean that the end is one which I should like to be realised. For other people might not like the end or object achieved. Both statements would be true—that I like it and that X does not like it; neither of us would be wrong in his assertion. But that is not what I mean by saying "it is good." My judgment is "objective." I mean that if somebody else judges differently, one or both of us is wrong. This does not imply a claim to personal infallibility on my part; quite the contrary. The very essence of my conviction is that

things are right or wrong quite independently of my judging them to be so, quite independently of my likings or dislikings. When I say "happiness is good," or "this particular kind of happiness is good," I mean that anyone who thinks it not good makes a mistake, just as much as when he says that two and two make five. That is what I mean, but, of course, I may be wrong. People may make mistakes in their moral judgments just as they may make mistakes in doing a sum of simple arithmetic. When a man does a sum of addition, and pronounces that the answer is so and so, he does not merely mean "I have made the answer so and so," his judgment claims to be universally true, true objectively, true for all actual or possible intelligences. And when he says "this is right," he equally implies an objective assertion: the essence of his assertion would be gone if he were to suppose that "right" meant simply the course of action which happens to commend itself to him.

Moral truth or falsity then is objective. And yet we know that as a matter of fact our human moral ideas have slowly evolved. We believe that cruelty to animals is wrong; yet there was a time when no human being saw anything wrong in cruelty to animals. And even among educated, civilised, reputedly moral adults, there are grave differences of moral judgment. There are degrees of moral insight just as there are degrees of musical appreciation; and even between the most sensitive consciences there are differences of moral ideal, just as there are some differences of musical taste among the most musical. Every man in making a moral judgment claims universality for it; that is part of his meaning, and yet no one can seriously believe that his particular moral ideal is an absolutely true one, that his moral consciousness is the absolutely flawless mirror of the absolute moral truth. What is morally good always was morally good and always will be

so;¹ so much is implied in every moral judgment. But when and where does this absolute rightness exist? What sort of reality has this rightness or intrinsic goodness? The same question may be raised about the laws of physical nature: we saw that it was impossible to think of those laws as having their existence merely in our transitory minds or as properties of a self-existing matter, that the objectivity even of our ordinary judgments about matters of fact implied for their justification the existence of a Universal Mind. But still the Materialists can plausibly explain the physical laws of nature as existing *in* matter. At all events, the objectivity of those laws, their independence of our chance thinkings or likings, forces itself upon us in the most palpable manner. The attempt to "cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bare imagination of a feast," refutes by its palpable failure the attempt to deny the reality of a physical world independent of us, whatever metaphysical interpretation we may put upon this "independent existence." But what account can we give of this moral "objectivity"? Can it be explained on any but a spiritualistic interpretation of the world? If the ultimate Reality, or source of Reality, be spiritual—if, in short, there be a God—then we can regard his thought and his will, his ultimate purpose, as the reality of which our moral judgments are the more or less inadequate representations. They are true or false in proportion to their conformity to this standard. On any other supposition the "objectivity" which our moral judgments claim remains inexplicable. We might, of course we should, undoubtedly in proportion to the strength of our natural desire for the ends which we pronounce good, continue to guide our own actions by these judgments. But on reflection we should be forced to admit that the only objectivity

¹ This does not imply that the same concrete actions are always right, since under different circumstances the true end, in so far as it can be promoted at all, must be promoted by different means.

which we could rationally claim for them would be their conformity to the judgments of other human beings ; and we should have to admit that at bottom moral judgments are only the actual ways of thinking about conduct which *de facto* prevail among a race of bipeds who happen to have been evolved during what Mr. Balfour has called a " brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets." It is one of the worst practical results of such an admission that the only objectivity which moral judgments admit of is their conformity to public opinion ; and from that there is but a step to the admission that " to wish to be better than the world is to be already on the threshold of immorality."¹ Those who have given up belief in a moral Deity can hardly avoid making a god of public opinion. A robust Agnostic conscience, like that of Huxley, which defies a " darkening universe," and opposes his own moral convictions to those of the world, proclaims its profound belief in an objectivity, which really demands Theism for its explanation. Our moral judgments claim to be, in so far as they are true, the law of the universe. They can only be the law of the universe if (with Plato) we find the source of reality and morality in one and the same " idea of the Good," and an idea can have its abode only in a Mind.

The idea of Personality which we ascribe to God is complete when we regard Him as not only a Reason and a Will, but as moral, as objectively good. By this it is not of course meant that his action is limited by our accepted rules of morality. We recognise that in detail our moral rules must be adapted to our nature as human beings ; many of them imply the possession of a bodily organism and relations to other such organisms. What is meant is

¹ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 180. Of course, if the meaning be merely that his motive should not be the surpassing of his neighbours, the principle would be harmless enough. [In the second edition of the *Ethical Studies* (Oxford, 1927), the passage is on p. 199.]

that the ideal life for man must be such as commends itself to the supreme mind—that God pursues ends which possess absolute value, and that our ends, so far as they are the right ends for us, must be in principle identical with the end or ends which have value for God. Philosophies which deny all real distinction between the divine and the human consciousness tend more or less explicitly *either* to deny goodness to God, sometimes constructing a picture of an “Absolute” who is certainly no fitting object of worship for men believing Benevolence to be a virtue, *or* to deny the validity, not merely of our moral judgments in detail, but of our whole moral ideal. They pronounce that acts which in human beings we should call bad are really good, inasmuch as (no less than the acts which we call good) they tend to bring about the end which, being the end of the universe, must be thought of as essentially good. A glance into the history of thought might reveal the fact that the immoral tendency of all pantheising philosophy has not always been merely speculative. In the political sphere, at all events, the doctrine that “whatever is, is right,” has borne the fruit that might have been expected of it.

But it may be objected, “How do you, on your part, reconcile a theory which ascribes the existence of the world to the volition of a perfectly good Deity—and a Deity whose goodness is, in principle, the goodness of our human ideals—with the existence of so much undeserved suffering and so much inevitable moral evil?” The discussion of this great problem would require a separate Essay; but no argument for Theism is likely to have the smallest weight with those who have ever doubted it, which does not, however inadequately, touch upon this, the fundamental difficulty of Theism. Lotze,¹ the one

¹The *Microcosmus* is easier reading than the *Logic* and *Metaphysic*, but is a very long work. A sufficient idea of Lotze's attitude towards religious questions may be obtained from his short *Philosophy of Religion*. All these works have been translated into English.

philosopher of our time who is at once a thinker of the very highest rank and wholly and unexceptionably Christian in his thoughts, has confessed that he not only knows no solution of the problem of evil, but that he does not in the least know in what direction to look for one.

To the first of these statements I should be prepared heartily to assent ; and if I were compelled to assent to the second, I should (with Lotze) contend that no such difficulties can destroy the validity of the line of arguments, which points to these two conclusions, "the ultimate source of Reality is a rational will," and "the ultimate source of Reality is good." But I do not think we need stop short at the point at which Lotze does stop. The line of thought which suggests that God is the cause of all things, and that He is good, will carry us further. If God is good, then the ultimate end of the universe must be good. Anything that appears evil must be really a means to the good. Following this line of thought, it is usual with optimistic thinkers to go on to contend that consequently those means that appear evil are not really evil at all, that evil is but the other side of good, etc.—and herewith the whole of the paralysing Pantheism to which I have already alluded. But to assert that that which my moral judgment condemns as evil is really very good, is to condemn myself to utter scepticism. I am just as certain that pain and sin are not good as I am of the first principles of reasoning. Compel me to doubt the first, and I must doubt the second ; and if I doubt that, I have no longer any reason for affirming or denying anything at all. The end must justify the means certainly, but that does not prevent the means from being bad. A surgical operation is certainly justified so long as the end cannot be attained without the means ; but the pain remains an evil. The same end without that pain would be still better than the end with that means. No matter

what the goodness of the end which is being realised by this universe of ours, the pain and the evil in it can never become good. A being who is compelled to attain his ends by the use of means which are bad must in a sense be regarded as limited. And this limitation has generally been admitted by reasonable theologians. Bishop Butler, for instance, admits that there may be things which are intrinsically as impossible as for God to change the past. The same limitation in principle is really implied by the explanation of evil as the work of a personal devil, however groundless such a belief may be, and however little it really gets rid of the difficulty. It is perhaps not so much from the theologians as from the philosophers that objections are likely to come. Directly we admit that God is limited by the essential nature of things (it will be urged), we are really giving up our theistic view of the universe. God ceases to be the ultimate source of reality; He becomes merely a part of reality, and we have abandoned the monistic idealism which we profess to have accepted.

Now it is not impossible to combine a sincere Theism with the admission that God is not all and did not make all. The old Greek philosophers admitted a *ὑλη*, which was not created by God, though it could be—partially and imperfectly—controlled by God, and made subservient to his ends. And Dr. Martineau seems inclined to adopt a somewhat similar view. To Origen and to the modern Pluralists souls are without beginning and coeternal with God. Now I do not myself feel disposed to take refuge in such a view, much as it has to say for itself. The pre-existence of souls seems to me a gratuitous hypothesis, opposed to all the probabilities and analogies which our experience suggests. On the other hand, the pre-existence of matter seems alike inconsistent with the modern science which declines to distinguish matter from its laws and with an

idealistic metaphysic which compels us to reject the idea of a matter with a nature of its own independent of the knowing subject. And it is not necessary, because we think of God as limited, to think of Him as limited by anything outside Himself. The limitation springs from his own nature. All the theories by which philosophers and theologians have sought to reconcile the facts of the world's history with the perfect goodness of God really involve a certain limitation of power. That is the conclusion to which the actual existence of moral evil, when taken in connexion with the condemnation of it by the moral consciousness, seems to point. There is a sense in which God is finite. He is finite, not in the sense of being limited by some external law or blind overruling fate, by some thing or some person outside Himself, but in the sense in which every thing that is real is limited. It is difficult to see what the negation of this last proposition would really mean. Space is infinite, because space is not a thing ; it is not real ; it is mere " form," a system of intellectual relations in which all real things must find a place, but not real in itself. The real is necessarily finite. We may nevertheless think of God as infinite, inasmuch as He is not limited by anything outside Himself, inasmuch as everything that is springs from his perfectly righteous will and thought. When theologians have interpreted infinitude as meaning more than this, they have usually fallen into that pantheistic optimism which ends by destroying those moral convictions upon which all theology rests. God is infinite because He is the ground of all that is ; He is Omnipotent because He is the cause of all that is ; He is infinitely good because He wills the best that He has it in Him to produce. Such a deity will be described by some as " anthropomorphic." I am content that it should be so. Some of us will prefer an anthropomorphic Deity to the God who is only matter disguised or a mere intellectual

abstraction or a magnified devil. An anthropomorphic Deity in this sense, I venture to contend, is the only Deity who satisfies the demands of our rational and our moral nature. It is only by the analogy of our own consciousness that we can form a conception of "Spirit" at all, and if there be any truth in idealism, God is Spirit.

VI. THE RELATION OF OUR CONCEPTION OF GOD TO CHRISTIANITY

Such is the conception of God to which we are, as it seems, led by the use of our Reason. It would take me too long to enter upon a formal argument to show that this conception of God is also that which is set before us by Christianity, or (to be more definite) by the religious teaching of Jesus Christ and by the religious consciousness which is revealed in that teaching. I simply put it to my readers that these two conceptions are the same. And this is what we might naturally expect if the teaching and the personality of Christ are to be regarded as constituting in any sense a divine revelation. For our Lord Himself always appealed to the intrinsic reasonableness of what He said as the proof and confirmation of the truth of his doctrine. Because Reason is capable of assenting to the truth of religious teaching when once it is set before it, it does not follow that Reason, or rather *my* Reason, could have attained to the knowledge by its own unassisted efforts. And yet this opposition between unassisted and assisted Reason is really opposed to the principle which finds in Christ the highest manifestation under human limitations of the Divine Thought. It was in Christ that the human Reason first attained with complete self-consciousness to that view of the divine nature which in a purely formal way we have attempted to establish on metaphysical and rational grounds. I say "in a purely formal

way," because all that we have hitherto said about God's nature is that it is to be conceived of as "mind" and as "good." The content which we give to that idea will depend upon the concrete standard which we adopt as our ideal of life ; and it was because in Jesus Christ the moral as well as the religious consciousness of man is felt to have attained its highest development that Christians are able, without any surrender of the claims of Reason or of Conscience, to regard the teaching, the life, and the character of Christ as constituting a "Revelation of God."

To discuss the nature of Christ's teaching or of his Personality or the meaning of "revelation" does not form a part of our present aim. Still less is it possible to ask in detail how far the dogmatic teaching of the Church about the nature of God and his revelation in Christ can be accepted consistently with the philosophical position to which we have been led. All that I can attempt is to point out very briefly how the Theism for which I have contended supplies a basis for a rational interpretation of Christian doctrine.

(I) The view of the divine nature to which we have been led is one which is essentially in harmony with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is essentially a philosophical doctrine—a doctrine based upon data supplied by Christ's own conception of God and his relation to Him—but still undeniably a metaphysical doctrine ; and not the actual, explicit teaching of Christ. It had a slow growth and a long development ; it cannot be contended that it has at all times meant the same thing. But I take the doctrine as it is presented to us in the fully developed scholastic teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. We are there told that the "tres Personæ" are "tres proprietates"—three essential and eternally distinct attributes, as we might paraphrase the term. God is essentially Power, Wisdom,

and Will ; or (since the divine Will is always a will for good) the Third Person of the Holy Trinity may be equally described as " Goodness " or " Love." Is not this precisely the view of God's nature to which we have been led on purely rational grounds—that He is the Union of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, the will for the good springing from the union of Power with Wisdom ? We shall also be prepared to accept that scholastic doctrine, here still more closely treading in the steps of the Platonising Fathers, which sees in the Logos or Sapiientia Dei the whole world as eternally present in idea in the Divine Mind, in Creation the gradual unfolding of that idea. Even inanimate nature is part of the thought of God ; He is still more fully revealed in the life of souls—with increasing fullness as animal life passes into the intellectual, moral, and religious life of humanity. He is revealed in a pre-eminent degree by the teachers and the prophets who have taught the highest ideals of life and the worthiest views of the divine nature. And for those to whom the history of the world is really the work of a divine Will, not the blind process of necessary development in which the later stages are simply the products of the earlier stages, there is no reason why that divine Wisdom, who is God Himself, should not be regarded as pre-eminentely manifesting Himself once for all, uniquely, in one historical personality. The personal view of God's nature prepares the way for the idea of a personal revelation.

(2) The rationality of the idea of an Incarnation depends upon the view which is formed of the divine nature and of the human. The view we have taken of the divine nature is that human nature is the same in principle with the divine. " God created man in his own image." Every human soul is an emanation from the divine, a reproduction of the divine. But not all souls represent the divine in equal measure. All who accept the idea of a God

who is good must admit that the better the soul and the more profound its spiritual insight, the more fully that soul can be regarded as representing or revealing God. If an actual historical person is actually pronounced by the moral and the religious consciousness to embody the highest ideal of human life and of the true relation between God and man, such a person may be regarded on this ground alone as in a unique sense a revelation of God.

By some it will probably be thought that this view of the Incarnation would be more in harmony with that view of the relation between God and man which actually includes the consciousness of man in God, which denies all real independence to the human consciousness, and makes every man simply a phase of the divine Being. Such a view is, as I have ventured to contend, fatal to a really ethical view of God. However little such a consequence may be acknowledged, such a view must necessarily tend either to transferring to God the badness of the bad soul or else in denying that the bad soul is really bad. The moral and the religious consciousness equally demand that the human soul shall be regarded as a distinct person, the human will as a distinct will from God's. The divine Wisdom may be regarded as present in the individual, illuminating his understanding, inspiring his will—more or less, in proportion to the actual conformity between his will and character and the divine Ideal. Similarly, when we turn to the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ, the idea of an Incarnation loses all its value when either (*a*) the divine Logos is thought of as supplanting and taking the place of the human will and understanding, as is virtually done by many popular views of the Incarnation which have a strong tendency to Apollinarianism, or (*b*) the divine Logos is thought of as equally present to all human souls, or therefore as not present in any exceptional sense in the Person of Christ. Without laying much

stress upon the technical refinements of the later Catholic Christology, we may recognise in it a general conformity with the demands of a philosophy based on the "primacy of the practical Reason," inasmuch as it recognises that (1) the divine Logos, present in all souls to some extent and in some degree, was pre-eminently present in the human soul of Christ, and (2) that, however great the coincidence between the moral and religious ideals, between the will, the character of the human Jesus and of the God who was revealing Himself in and through Him, there remain two natures, two wills, two natures, not one.

How far the historical facts enable us to attribute such a position to Christ is a separate problem. Here I will merely add that it is essential to such a view of the Incarnation as has been inadequately suggested in these few sentences that there shall be no claim for infallible or unlimited knowledge of matters of fact on the part of the man Jesus Christ. The doctrine of the limitation of Christ's human knowledge, now so widely known and accepted through the influence of Bishop Gore, is the necessary presupposition of any view of the Incarnation which can claim to be regarded as philosophical. It may be that our view of this limitation will have to be carried somewhat further than would commend itself to many of those who have been most prominently associated with the doctrine. But it is not my object here to develop a view of Incarnation, but to leave room for one.

(3) A word must be said as to the bearing of Theism of the kind here advocated upon the question of Miracles. Apart from experience there is, so far as I see, no reason why it should be assumed that the course of nature should be uniform. By those who think of God as a Will, the idea of a "miracle," in the sense of an exception to the uniformities commonly prevailing among phænomena, ought not to be pronounced an *a priori* inconceivability. There is,

indeed, no difficulty about reconciling the "uniformity of nature" with a miracle, even in the common acceptance of the term, if we are prepared to admit that the will of God or of some other "supernatural being" may be included in that "sum of conditions" which, from the scientific point of view, is regarded as the cause of the phænomenon. A rational Deity must be thought of as guiding his action upon some intelligible and universal principle, and this principle may be regarded as a "higher law," under which both the ordinary course of nature and the exceptional event may be brought. But this is to use the word "law" in a very different sense from that in which the term is employed in science. Such exceptional events would have to be thought of as violations of what is ordinarily meant by the uniformity of nature—of uniformity in that sense which is presupposed by all ordinary scientific reasoning. We might indeed hold that under similar "conditions" the phænomenon would occur again, i.e. when the purpose served by the exceptional event could again be served by its repetition; but this inclusion of "final causes" among the "conditions" of a phænomenon violates all the assumptions upon which ordinary scientific reasoning is based.¹ There would be an end to the possibility of scientific prediction were we to suppose that the question whether a saint's finger will be chopped off by a machine depends not upon the momentum of the instrument at the moment before the introduction of the finger, but upon the spiritual advantages to be secured by the saving of the finger. I hold, therefore, that a miracle, in the common acceptation of the term, would be really a violation of what is commonly meant by the uniformity of nature, though it would not be a violation of the law of causality. Every event must have a cause, but the cause need

¹ How far it is possible to explain biological phænomena without the conception of "final cause" is a question on which I will not venture to express an opinion.

not be one that works uniformly.¹ A violation of the uniformity of nature in the sense explained I do not regard as *a priori* inconceivable. The objection to such a view is that all our experience of the actual course of events goes to show that the ultimate cause does not work after this fashion, but in accordance with general or uniform laws; so that if all the observable conditions of a phænomenon are correctly observed, the recurrence of the conditions may be expected to bring with it the recurrence of the phænomenon.

Our knowledge of nature not being complete, we cannot pronounce it inconceivable that there should be exceptions to this procedure; but the probabilities against such exceptions are enormous. In this as in other cases, probable reasoning is based upon imperfect knowledge of causes. Moreover, though the objection to the acceptance of a miracle in the sense defined must be regarded as springing from experience, the experience is so uniform in character as to suggest, though not to prove, that there must be some reason in the nature of things why such an event should be impossible. At all events, to admit in practice the possibility of such an event is to destroy the canons upon which not only our ordinary reasoning about matters of science, but in particular our ordinary canons of historical criticism, are based. Postulates cannot be proved;

¹ "But why so confidently assume, we might reply, that a rigid and monotonous uniformity is the only, or the highest, indication of the spirit of order, the order of an everliving Spirit above all? How is it then that we depreciate machine-made articles, and prefer those in which the artistic impulse, or the fitness of the individual case, is free to shape and to control what is literally manufactured, hand-made? . . . Dangerous as teleological arguments in general may be, we may at least safely say the world was not designed to make science easy. . . . To call the verses of a poet, the politics of a statesman, or the awards of a judge mechanical, implies, as Lotze has pointed out, marked disparagement, although it implies, too, precisely those characteristics—exactness and invariability—in which Maxwell would have us see a token of the Divine."—Dr. James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, pp. 108-9. I should hardly have ventured to put forth so slight a suggestion of so unfashionable a view of Causality, but that I am now able to refer the reader who may find it unsatisfying to this brilliant work.

but when they are denied, we have no longer a basis for argument. Sincere Theists will, indeed, continue to hold that it is not inconceivable that God should have governed the world otherwise than in accordance with general laws (i.e. laws of uniform sequence), but, as He does not appear to do so, there must be some good reason why He does not. We must suppose that it is better that the world should be governed by general laws. It is not *a priori* inconceivable that in the whole course of history there should be one single exception to such a uniform mode of action, but it may well be thought morally inconceivable that any spiritually important consequences should be dependent on the belief in an historical event which would be so utterly incapable of establishment by testimony as a supposed solitary exception to an otherwise uniform course of nature.

But are what are commonly called miracles inconsistent with the laws of nature? Does this general principle—that natural laws are not “suspended”—necessarily involve the negation of any alleged historical event for which we cannot account consistently with the uniformity of nature? It may be contended, indeed, that our knowledge of nature is never so perfect as to enable us to exclude the supposition of the interference with the ordinary course of events (as it appears to ordinary observation) by a hitherto unsuspected law; but practically it may be said that there are many cases in which our knowledge is really sufficient to exclude the admissibility of such an event, if we do not wish to plunge ourselves into a scepticism which would make historical research and practical life alike impossible. The actual suspension of the earth’s motion or the occurrence of any phænomenon which would produce an apparent “stopping of the sun” may be said to belong to this class. And I think it can hardly be doubted that if this principle of criticism be adopted, its application cannot be regarded as stopping with

the Old Testament. The rising of the saints out of the tomb with their bodies, and some of what are called the "nature-miracles," may surely with tolerable confidence be placed in this class. But we must very narrowly limit the area in which it is reasonable to exclude the possibility that extraordinary, and to us unaccountable, events may have occurred. When we come to the operations of mind, it is questionable how far we can apply the idea of "law" in its ordinary sense at all ; since no mental phænomenon can be regarded as caused by antecedent phænomena *in the sense in which one physical event causes another physical event*, since the mind is not *merely* a succession of psychical phænomena.¹ And it can hardly be denied that our knowledge of the limits which are set by natural law to the control capable of being exercised by mind on the phænomena of organic nature, and still more by mind upon mind, is extremely imperfect. We do know something of those limits. To suppose that the most exceptionally endowed human soul could have stopped the motion of the sun would be, as I have contended, to reject the assumptions upon which all historical research and all scientific reasoning proceed. But to suppose that some diseases can be healed by mental means, that some persons possess more power than others of such healing—this is not opposed to, but in conformity with what we know of the action of mind upon the physical organism ; nor can our present knowledge be held to exclude the belief that one person may have had a power unparalleled in history of effecting such cures.

It may, indeed, be doubted whether the ordinary action of the human will (putting aside altogether the hypothesis of free will in the ordinary indeterminist sense) can be brought within the common conception of the uniformity of nature. At some

¹ I here use the word "caused" in the sense of Physical Science and common life. I have contended above that this uniformity of succession is not really a case of causation.

point or other, if the self is really a cause (however little we may be able to say where such interference begins), every voluntary act—every case where a physical event is determined by an idea—there must be an interference with the course of nature, *as it would be without the action of soul or mind*. Every such act does in a sense “violate the laws of nature.” But then experience teaches us the limits of such violation. We know by experience that some muscles are subject to voluntary control, and others are not. We know that, while voluntary action does alter the direction of physical forces, it never suspends the law of gravity or the conservation of energy.¹ These experiences of the normal limits to the power of voluntary, i.e. mental, action enable us to formulate general rules which are reasonably treated as themselves laws of nature. But as to what these limits are we are dependent entirely upon experience. And in some cases these limits cannot at present be said to be fixed beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt. I have myself a strong conviction that the result of “psychical research” has already to some extent brought, and may hereafter be to a still greater extent able to bring, recorded events which rationalistic criticism has commonly dismissed as impossible within the limits of what may be regarded as possible without any further violation of the laws of nature than is implied in the normal action of the human will. But there is no probability that it will ever reverse the verdict which historical criticism and the study of comparative religion have passed on some other events recorded in the Old and New Testaments.²

To apply this principle to the criticism of the Gospel narratives forms no part of my present purpose. I will conclude with suggesting these

¹ In so far as we are justified in assuming it at all. But cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, I, p. 214 sq., II, pp. 36 sq., 77 sq.

² There are some interesting remarks on this subject by the late Mr. Frederick Myers in his review of Renan in *Modern Essays*.

principles as philosophical canons on the subject—

(a) The idea of a suspension of natural law is not *a priori* inadmissible.

(b) At the same time, since such an admission would destroy all the criteria both of scientific and historical reasoning, the admission of such a suspension could not reasonably be accepted without an amount of evidence which is practically unattainable in reference to the events of the distant past.

(c) The rejection of miracles in the popular sense (i.e. suspension of natural law) is not incompatible with the recognition of exceptional degrees of control over the forces of physical nature by individual mind and will.

(d) Our faith in the Incarnation must rest primarily on other grounds than alleged miracles, and must be of a kind which does not *demand* the occurrence of physical miracles. At the same time faith in such an Incarnation may be reasonably strengthened by the records of such an exceptional manifestation of the forces of personality if the historical testimony is sufficient.

(e) The probability of an alleged event of this nature must depend partly upon the amount of historical testimony in its favour, partly upon the extent of the analogy between it and other events for which we believe ourselves to have sufficient evidence. While in the present state of opinion it is extremely unwise to base any article of religious belief upon the acceptance of disputed "psychical phænomena," it may fairly be said that the results of recent investigation have been very considerably to widen our view of the possibilities of such personal influences.

It forms no part of my task, as I have said, to apply these considerations to the criticism of the Gospel narratives, but I will allow myself one concluding remark to prevent misunderstanding on the one hand or on the other. I believe that it will be found that

a sober, historical criticism, based upon the principles here suggested, will leave us in a modified form the beliefs about Christ's Person which are most cherished among ordinary Christians—notably (1) the general fact that much of his time was spent in the healing of physical disease by means of extraordinary spiritual capacities; (2) that after his death there occurred to his disciples visions of Himself which were not mere subjective delusions, and which confirm—for them and for us—the fact of his continued life and love for his followers. Belief in miracles, in the sense which is here in question, may not be wholly without spiritual value even now. But we may be quite confident that for minds which have once appreciated the principles of historical criticism, or minds affected by the diffused scepticism which has sprung from historical criticism, neither religious faith in general, nor any doctrine of primary religious importance, will ever depend mainly upon the evidence of abnormal events recorded to have happened in the remote past. Criticism must be wholly free; though when it is seen that faith is independent of miracles, it may become less destructive on the one side and less desperately apologetic on the other. Belief in God will rest in the long run upon the instinctive rejection of materialism by the common sense of mankind, confirmed by the reflective analysis of the philosopher. Belief in His goodness will rest upon the testimony of the moral consciousness. For minds which dare not explain away or minimise the presence of evil in human life, belief in Immortality will be a corollary of that goodness. Belief in Christ as the supreme, unique Revealer of God will rest upon the testimony of the same moral consciousness, recognising and welcoming its own ideal in Him. “No man can say that Jesus is Lord but by the Holy Ghost.” “He that is of the light cometh to the light.”

CHRIST AS THE LOGOS AND THE SON OF GOD¹

THERE is, I think, a growing demand that modern Theologians should say in quite definite terms what they really mean when they use the traditional language about the "Divinity of Christ." It is not easy to do this in a brief paper, but I will try. I trust you will forgive the appearance of dogmatism which must be involved in such a summary statement of conclusions, without much argument or defence.

In the first place it will be well to enumerate some of the things which we do not and cannot mean by ascribing Divinity to Christ.

(1) Jesus did not claim Divinity for Himself. He may have called Himself, or more probably allowed Himself to be called, the Messiah or Son of God. But never in any critically well-attested sayings is there anything which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than that of a man towards God—the attitude which He wished that all men should adopt towards God. The speeches of the Fourth Gospel, where they go beyond the Synoptic conception, cannot be regarded as history, valuable as they may be for theology.² The doctrine of our Lord's Divinity must be taken to express the

¹ Reprinted from the *Modern Churchman*, Vol. XI, pp. 278-286 (September, 1921). A paper read to the Churchmen's Union Annual Conference, 1921, at Girton College, Cambridge. The general subject dealt with at that Conference was "Christ and the Creeds." This paper was also printed in the volume *Jesus Human and Divine*.—EDD.

² I do not know of any scholar, however orthodox and conservative, who affirms that the discourses of Christ in the Fourth Gospel are verbatim reports, or denies that they are more or less coloured by the ideas of the Evangelist. Their whole tone and style is obviously so different from that of the Synoptic Gospels, that, if we accept the Synoptic discourses as substantially authentic (though not of course in every detail, for there are considerable discrepancies between them), it is impossible to regard the Johannine discourses as equally accurate reports: and even in this Gospel few sentences (when taken apart from the Preface, which does not pretend to represent the words of Jesus, and other comments of the Evangelist) imply actual "Godhead" in the sense of post-Nicene theology. "Is it not written in your law, I said [to the Judges of Israel], Ye are gods? If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came . . . say ye of Him,

Church's conception of what Jesus is or should be to His followers, and to the world, not His own theory about Himself.

(2) It obviously follows from this admission that Jesus was in the fullest sense a man, as much so as any other human being, that He had not merely a human body, but a human soul, intellect, will.¹ This was not always recognised by the Church. Many of the earlier Greek fathers—Irenaeus, for instance, and Athanasius—obviously thought of Him simply as the Logos of God residing in a human body. Later councils condemned this position in the person of Apollinarius: from the point of view of later theology it cannot be too strongly asserted that Athanasius was an Apollinarian.² And I fear a great many people who now think themselves particularly orthodox are really Apollinarians too. I have known quite advanced "Catholics"—not by any means stupid or ignorant people—who simply

whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?" The claim to be the Son of God does not necessarily imply "Godhead." This requires to be still more remembered in the Synoptists. The Jews, however highly some of them may have exalted the Messiah, never thought of him as God or as equal with God. However close the union which the Christ of the Synoptists feels to exist between Himself and God, the distinction is always preserved. The claim that He would judge the world (if actually made) would not imply "Godhead." Cf. Acts xvii. 31: "A day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness by *the man* whom He hath ordained." It is clear that till the Confession at Cæsarea Philippi, Jesus had not claimed to be the Messiah or Son of God, and (if we accept all the words subsequently said to have been uttered by Him) He never claimed more than this. Even Luke x. 22, though it implies a very high conception of His own Divine Mission, does not imply "Godhead."

¹ "Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting" (*Athanasian Creed*). The last words are obviously explanatory of the term "man." The reasonable soul is the human soul.

² In his earlier days. In the period when he wrote the *De Incarnatione* (before the Nicene Council) and almost as distinctly in the *Orations against the Arians*, there is no trace of any distinct recognition of a human soul in Jesus; the Logos seems simply to take the place of the human soul. In his later days (when the question began to be discussed) he did formally recognise the existence of a human soul, but it may be doubted how far this admission really affected his general way of thinking. See my book *The Idea of the Atonement*, pp. 299, 300, and two letters of mine in answer to Canon Lacey in *The Guardian* of November 4 and 18, 1921. [Cf. also the paper entitled "The Christology of Saint Athanasius" in the present volume.—EDD.]

did not know that the Church teaches that Christ had a human soul. When a Sunday-school teacher asks his class, "Who was Jesus Christ?" and tries to elicit the answer, "God," without the addition of the all-important "and man," he too is teaching Apollinarianism. Much so-called orthodoxy is really Apollinarianism; and some defenders of the Catholic faith, who are too well informed to become downright Apollinarians, are really under the influence of that heresy in the later reduced form of it which denied that Christ had a human will. It is curious to note that that fiery *malleus hereticorum*, the Bishop of Zanzibar, quite definitely lapses into Monothelitism.

(3) It is equally unorthodox to suppose that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed. There is simply no basis for such a doctrine unless (with Origen) we say that all human souls exist before their birth into the world: but that is not the usually accepted Catholic position. St. Paul, indeed, believed in the pre-existence of the heavenly Messiah or Son of God—without distinguishing between the human and the Divine or semi-divine Christ—but from the time when the Logos Christology was accepted by the Church it has been held that what pre-existed was the Divine Logos, not the human Jesus.

(4) The Divinity of Christ does not *necessarily* imply the Virgin Birth or any other miracle. The Virgin Birth, if it could be historically proved, would be no demonstration of Christ's Divinity, nor would the disproof of it throw any doubt upon that doctrine. Two Synoptic Gospels, which do not assert the Divinity of Christ, do in their present form narrate the Virgin Birth. The Fourth Gospel, which does assert the Divinity of the Logos, knows nothing of the Virgin Birth.

(5) The Divinity of Christ does not imply omniscience. Since the appearance of Bishop Gore's Bampton Lectures, it has been unnecessary to labour

that point, though the doctrine of a limitation of Christ's knowledge has not yet sunk into the popular mind. We still hear the conclusions of the higher criticism refuted by appeals to our Lord's acquiescence in the common Jewish views about the authorship or date of Old Testament books. I must add that Bishop Gore himself does not push his admission to anything like the point which is imperatively demanded by an honest and critical study of the Gospel narratives. There is no more reason for supposing that Jesus of Nazareth knew more than His contemporaries about the true scientific explanation of the mental diseases which current belief attributed to diabolic possession, than that He knew more about the authorship of the Pentateuch or the Psalms.¹ And even if we reduce (as I personally am disposed to do) the genuine eschatological sayings to a minimum, it is difficult to deny that our Lord entertained some expectations about the future which history has not verified.²

So much for the negative side. In what sense do these admissions allow of our still attributing Divinity to Jesus, and finding a permanent meaning in the formulæ of the Creeds and the Councils? Everything turns upon our conception of the true relation between God and man in general—and that is a vast problem which it is impossible here to discuss. I can only say this much. If "Divine" and "human" are thought of as mutually exclusive terms, if God is thought of as simply the Maker of man, if man is thought of as merely a machine or an

¹ This does not imply (as is sometimes suggested) that in the spiritual region He "knew no more than an ordinary man." The idea of Christ as the supreme Revealer of God obviously implies the contrary.

² Personally I think it probable that all the more definite statements about a "coming again" and a supernatural Judgment in the immediate future are due to the ideas of the disciples rather than to Christ Himself, but it would be disastrous to make the Divinity of Christ depend upon a particular answer to this most difficult problem. We know that our Lord did not claim to know the date of the Judgment, but to contend that He never used any of the current Apocalyptic phrases suggestive of a date nearer than 1900 years would involve a somewhat drastic dealing with the documents.

animal having no community of nature with the Universal Spirit who is the cause or source or "ground" of the existence alike of Nature and of other spirits, then indeed it would be absurd to maintain that one human being, and one only, was both God and man at the same time. But such a view of the relation between God and man would not at the present day be accepted by any philosophy which finds any real place for God in its conception of the universe.

That man is not merely the creature and plaything of God, that there is a certain community of nature between God and man, that all human minds are reproductions "in limited modes" (to use the expression of my old master, T. H. Green) of the Divine Mind, that in all true human thinking there is a reproduction of the Divine thought, and above all that in the highest ideals which the human conscience recognises there is a revelation of the ideal eternally present in the Divine Mind—these are the presuppositions under which alone any real meaning can be given to the doctrine. All modern philosophers who recognise that the knowledge of God is possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge by thinking of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest. And philosophical teachers have not been slow to identify this view with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, however severely they may criticise the form which the doctrine has received in the traditional theology. Professor Pringle-Pattison, for instance, in his *Idea of God* (a work of which I would speak with profound admiration), has written :

"We are far too apt to mechanise the great doctrine of the Incarnation, which forms the centre of the Christian faith. Whatever else it may mean, it means at least this—that in the conditions of the highest human life we have

access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the Divine. 'God manifest in the flesh' is a more profound philosophical truth than the loftiest flight of speculation that outsoars all predicates and, for the greater glory of God, declares Him unknowable."¹

He goes on to complain, as philosophers usually do, that this "Incarnation of the Son has been limited to a single individual."²

I quite agree with him that it is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ and not incarnate at all in anyone else. On the other hand, the philosophical critics of theology do not, as it appears to me, recognise how spiritually valueless—nay, how ethically pernicious—such a doctrine becomes when God is thought of as incarnating Himself equally in all human beings, the worst as well as the best. If we say "human nature is Divine," and stop there, we enter upon a line of thought which ends in the Hindoo theology or the very similar Absolutist philosophy which recognises no cosmic significance in human morality, and places God "beyond good and evil." There is much in human nature which is not Divine at all. It is just because it so emphatically negatives such a non-moral doctrine of Divine immanence that the Christian doctrine of a supreme Incarnation in *one* historical Person becomes so valuable. Professor Pringle-Pattison himself (who is no Absolutist, though he is too fond of Absolutist phrases which, I venture to think, do not express his real belief) recognises that it is "in the conditions of *the highest* human life that we have access as nowhere else to the inmost nature of the Divine." If we once recognise that it is especially in the moral consciousness at its highest, and in the lives which are most completely dominated by such a moral consciousness,

¹ *The Idea of God*, p. 157.

² *Ibid.*, p. 409.

that God is revealed, then it becomes possible to accept the doctrine that in a single human life God is revealed more completely than in any other. If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent*; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men; if we believe that up to the coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the whole progressive revelation of God (especially, though by no means exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it becomes possible to believe that in One Man the self-revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God Himself and of His will for man—that is (so far as so momentous a truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity.

Such at bottom is the permanent meaning of that doctrine of the Logos and the Holy Trinity in which this conviction clothed itself under the influence of Greek philosophical conceptions and terminology. The doctrine of the Logos grew up at a time when the Neoplatonic idea of the transcendence of God, His aloofness from the world, His inaccessibility to human thought or effort, had been pushed to a point which made it seem impossible that He should express Himself in created things or created minds without some sort of intermediary. The Reason or Thought or Word of God—the thought concept, be it remembered, rather than the spoken word—was conceived of as such an intermediary. God gave birth to the Logos and the Logos gave birth to the world. In the books of Proverbs and Wisdom the Logos, or rather the Wisdom of God (which is

practically the same conception), is personified in a semi-poetic manner as the Assessor who stood at God's right hand in the creation of the universe. In the Alexandrian Jew Philo the idea becomes more metaphysical. Practically everything that is said of the Word or the Son in the Fourth Gospel is said of the Logos in Philo, except his incarnation in the historic Jesus. In Philo the conception of the Logos has no connexion at all with the Messianic idea. That is the original thought of the Fourth Gospel—the master-stroke of its author's genius. But St. Paul, by attributing to Jesus all that the Apocalypticists had said about the heavenly Son of God or Messiah, had reached along another path much the same conception of the Messiah as the Fourth Evangelist expressed by saying that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. And the Johannine doctrine had great advantages over the Pauline. It was much less associated with Apocalyptic mythology. It made it possible to admit that the human Jesus had a beginning in time like other men, and to confine pre-existence to the Divine element in the historic Personality. Moreover, instead of presenting Christ as a semi-Divine being hovering between the Divine and the human, it enabled the theologian to say frankly that that in Jesus which was human was absolutely human, while that in Him which was Divine was absolutely Divine.

There remained, indeed, the problem of the relation between this "Word" which was God and yet incarnate in the human Jesus, and the Father-God, whose only begotten Son He was. Was this Word personal or impersonal? If personal, how can we escape Polytheism? And if the Logos be identified with the One God, what becomes of the distinction between Father and Logos? I cannot here sketch the history of that long controversy out of which the orthodox Christology was eventually evolved, but I should like to note two or three points

which are valuable for the modern reinterpretation of the doctrine.

(1) In the more philosophical Fathers such as Justin, and above all Origen, it was quite distinctly admitted that the Logos was not united to Jesus alone. He had dwelt in the Prophets. He had inspired Socrates and Plato. It was asserted only that the incarnation in Jesus was something supreme and unique.¹

(2) Many of the earlier Fathers did not quite definitely tend to think of the Logos as a distinct personality—a separate mind, will, centre of consciousness from the Father: the Son before the Incarnation was thought of as related to the Father very much as, for an intelligent pagan, Apollo was related to Zeus; but the more distinct the personality the more definite also is the subordination. When Athanasius made the Divine Son equal to the Father, co-eternal, “of the substance of the Father,” he was distinctly an innovator, but an innovator who saved the Church from the Polytheism into which it was drifting. In making the distinction between the Father and the Logos a distinction within the nature of the one Divine Being, he prepared the way for a more philosophical and genuinely monotheistic interpretation of the Logos doctrine and of that doctrine of the Trinity which had grown out of it.

(3) In St. Augustine, and still more distinctly in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen generally, it becomes evident that nothing is left of that older

¹ Here are two illustrations of Origen's Christology:

“We say that the Logos was united and made one with the soul of Jesus in a far higher degree than any other soul, seeing that He alone was able completely to receive the highest participation in the true Word and the true Wisdom and the true Righteousness” (*Contra Celsum*, v. 39; Lommatzsch, xix. 241).

“They see that from Him the Divine and the human nature began to be united (lit. woven together), so that human nature might become Divine by participation in the more Divine, not in Jesus alone, but also in all those who not only believe but also take up the life which Jesus taught” (*Contra Celsum*, iii. 28; Lommatzsch, xviii. 287).

conception of Christ as a distinct, a "second" and inferior God which is found in Justin and the earlier Fathers. The Logos now becomes not a separate mind, but a distinguishable activity of the one and only Divine Mind. The Son is the Wisdom of God, as the Father is His Power and the Holy Ghost His Love, and the three constitute "One Mind." It is difficult to say what Tertullian originally meant when he first introduced the fatal term "Persons" as the name for these distinctions within the Divine Mind, but it is evident the term "Person" is now (in Augustine and St. Thomas) used in a very technical sense and a sense quite different from that in which it is used either in popular speech or in the language of modern philosophy. It cannot be too emphatically asserted that, when traditionalists like Canon Mason, and even philosophical and rational theologians like Canon Peter Green, speak of the three "Persons" of the Trinity as three minds or centres of consciousness and frankly deny that God is One Mind, it is they and not those whom they criticise who are heretics from the standpoint of Augustinian and scholastic orthodoxy. To St. Thomas, as to the ordinary modern philosopher, their position would have been Tritheism, pure and simple.

There is undoubtedly much in the fully developed scholastic doctrine, and still more in the earlier theology out of which it grew, which is of no intrinsic value at the present day. All of it requires translation into the language of modern thought, and some of it, it must be frankly confessed, almost defies such translation. The conception of the Logos taken by itself, apart from its Christian application, is one for which modern philosophy has no use. But that does not prevent our seeing in the fully developed doctrine of the Person of Christ the expression in the language of a bygone philosophy of that which still is—and, I believe, always will be—the central truth of

Christianity, viz. that in the life and character, the teaching and the Personality of Jesus Christ the world has received its highest revelation of God, a revelation, however, which is still being continued and further developed by the work of God's Spirit in other human minds, and particularly in the society of Christ's followers.

That is, at bottom, I believe, what we mean when we speak of the Divinity of Christ. To justify the central position which it ascribes to Jesus in the religious history of the world would require an elaborate examination of the teaching and life of Jesus, and the comparison of His religion with other religions and other systems of religious and moral teaching. And yet after all the truth of such a conception could not be in the ordinary sense "proved." The truth of a moral ideal is a matter of immediate judgment. The doctrine of a supreme revelation of God in Christ must ultimately rest upon the affirmation of the moral consciousness that in its essential principles that moral ideal which is most fully incarnated in Christ's teaching and His life is still the truest and the highest that we know.

III

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. ATHANASIUS¹

MODERNISTS are sometimes accused of not believing in the Divinity of Christ because some of us do not believe two things :

(1) That there existed before the birth of Christ a Son or Word of God who was " personally " distinct from God the Father, and (2) that there was between this Word and the historical Jesus a complete " personal identity."

Now I would observe, in the first place, that the Nicene Creed says nothing whatever about " personality," whether in its technical theological sense, or in its ordinary modern sense. Still less is anything said about " personal identity." The idea belongs to an interpretation of the Creed—not to the Creed itself; and people ought not to be accused of not believing either the doctrine of Christ's Divinity or the Nicene definition of it because they do not accept a particular interpretation of its language. And, secondly, I would point out that our opponents do not always define the sense in which they use the word " personality." They leave us to assume that they use it in the modern sense of the term—in exactly the same sense in which it is commonly said that I am one person and the reader another person. Thus Bishop Gore writes :

" The Personality of Him who appeared on earth, Jesus Christ, did not begin with his human birth, but was the Personality of an eternal Person, the Eternal Son of God."

If Personality is not to be understood in the modern sense, there is not even a plausible ground for saying, " I feel sure that for Dr. Rashdall the Person of Jesus began to exist when He was born of human parentage." It is true that, even when we accept

¹ Reprinted, with considerable modifications, from the *Modern Churchman*, Vol. XII, pp. 6-27 (April, 1922).

this identification of the theological with the modern sense of the term, vast questions might be raised as to the real meaning and interpretation of human personality. To some extent they should be discussed in any work which pretends to give anything like a philosophical account of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity. But I am not now writing such a treatise, and I am content to assume that we know what we mean when we apply the term "person" to an individual human being: and this is the sense in which, so far as appears, conservative writers insist upon our treating Jesus Christ as, before the Incarnation no less than after it, a Person distinct from the Person of the Father, and as the same Person with the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Now I propose to ask whether this is the true meaning, or the only possible meaning, of the Nicene Creed. And as a means to answering this question I think it will be useful to examine what was the belief of Athanasius on the subject, to compare what he believed with what these conservative writers apparently believe, and to ask whether the two beliefs can be identified.

Many champions of Traditionalism are fond of talking about the "mind" of the Nicene Council, and of assuming that the clergy of the Church of England at the present day are bound to accept the doctrines of that famous Assembly in the sense in which the Fathers of Nicaea held them. There is, as it seems to me, a certain absurdity in asking what was the "mind" of 318 persons. Anyone with a little experience of the ways of ecclesiastical or political assemblies knows very well that the formulæ which they agree upon frequently fail to represent the opinions of the majority who vote for them, or even of the majority of that majority, and that, in so far as they are really accepted, it is only because they are understood in a variety of senses. And in the particular case of the Nicene Council,

there is a peculiar absurdity in talking about its "mind." The Creed was from the first accepted by a large part of the Assembly as a compromise, and as soon as the Council broke up, its members immediately fell asunder into groups and parties which interpreted the decisions in different ways, and some of which wanted to go back upon those decisions just on the ground that they did not represent what they considered to be the true mind of the Assembly. Moreover, even if we could ascertain the mind of the Nicene Fathers, I should contend that clergymen of our Church, or of any Church which includes the Creed in its Confession of Faith, are not in any way bound to accept their formulæ in the sense which they put upon them. They are not bound by the decisions of that or any other General Council except in so far as they are embodied in the Creeds or other formulæ of the Church to which they give their assent: and whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the extent of the latitude which may be allowed to the clergy in interpreting them, there is not the least pretence for saying that they must necessarily be accepted in the sense which from external evidence we may suppose that the majority of the Council intended. Least of all are we bound to agree with the personal opinions of Athanasius. But, subject to these reserves, Athanasius may, I think, reasonably be accepted as representing, so far as any individual can do, the "mind" of the Nicene Council.

ATHANASIUS ON THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE WORD

In the first place, I will ask what sort of pre-existence the Logos possessed according to Athanasius. For my own part I can fully assent to the doctrine that the Logos was a distinct Person of the Holy Trinity in the technical and theological sense

of the term "Person"; and I also think that Athanasius held the same belief, so far as one can express what he believed in the terms of a theology which was not then fully formulated. The Latin term "Persona" is, of course, not used in the Nicene Creed at all, nor is either of the terms which have at different times been accepted as its proper Greek equivalent—"Prosopon," generally rejected as savouring too much of Sabellianism, or what afterwards became the orthodox term, "Hypostasis." This last term is indeed used in the Anathemas attached to the Creed, but in a quite different sense. It is treated in these Anathemas as the equivalent of Ousia, and an anathema is hurled against those who say that the Son is of a different "Ousia or Hypostasis" from the Father. The original meaning of these two terms was practically the same: and the theological meaning for the Council and for Athanasius in the time of the Council was still the same. Those who talked about three Hypostases talked also about three Ousiai; to talk about three Hypostases or three Ousiai was at present a note of Arianism. Those who maintained that there was in the Godhead one Ousia maintained that there was one Hypostasis, and were accused by their enemies of Sabellianism for doing so. To this category Athanasius belonged. By a large part of the Christian world Athanasius was for a long period habitually regarded as a Sabellian, along with Marcellus of Ancyra, with whom Athanasius eventually disagreed, but whom he would never treat as a heretic. This fact must always be borne in mind when we endeavour to interpret the language of Athanasius.

Now undoubtedly Athanasius was not really a Sabellian. He quite distinctly asserted that the Father was not the Son, and the distinction which he recognised between Father and Son was an eternal distinction, not (as with the Sabellians) one that could be put off and on. But it must not be assumed

that he would have recognised the distinction between them as equivalent to what we mean by a distinction of personalities. Even if we could assume that "hypostasis" really meant what "persona" meant for Latin theology, and that that meaning was equivalent to our modern term "person," we could not say that Athanasius treated the distinction between Father and Son as a distinction of "Persons": for Athanasius treats Father and Son as having the same "hypostasis." But it may be suggested that, though he did not use the term, he habitually treated the difference between Father and Son as being of the kind which we should call a difference of personality. Now I do not deny that there are passages which point in this direction. When he is speaking of the Incarnate Son, he does this habitually; and there are passages in which he applies to the distinction between Father and Son, even before and apart from the Incarnation, language which could most naturally be held to express a difference of personality—especially when actually quoting passages of Scripture which he believed to refer to the relation between Father and Son. I do not profess to make Athanasius wholly consistent or wholly intelligible. I do not believe it possible to express in intelligible modern language exactly how Athanasius understood the relation between God the Father and the Word. He was not much of a Philosopher: his whole position rested upon exegesis; and he was bound to believe equally passages in the Old Testament, irrelevant or wrongly interpreted passages in the New Testament, pieces of tradition or judgments of extra-canonical authorities which really represented a number of quite inconsistent views. To some extent he would no doubt have professed himself unable fully to reconcile these contradictions, or to present a clear and perfectly intelligible account of the relation between the Father and the pre-existent Son; but of this I am

quite sure—that, so far as he had any intelligible theory of the matter, it was not that view of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity which, by failing to distinguish the ancient and the modern sense of “Person,” and holding a doctrine of three persons has a definitely tritheistic character.

The Arians, be it remembered, regarded Christ as God, but as a different God from the Father—different and inferior. They believed in a Trinity, but they did not believe in an “undivided” Trinity. The meaning of the Homo-ousion and of a clause in the original Nicene Creed which Athanasius regarded as more important than the “Homo-ousion” (“from the Ousia of the Father”), was precisely this—that there were not two divine Minds or three, but one. Whatever for him was the nature of the distinction between Father and Son, it was not a distinction between the one eternal God and another inferior, created God or demi-god, but a distinction within the Being of the One and Only God—and an eternal distinction. The Logos did not owe His existence to any act of the Father’s will, any “begetting” in time: the Logos was an element in His eternal Being. Never does Athanasius, in trying to explain or illustrate this distinction, use language which suggests the notion of two distinct minds. He repudiates as forcibly as he can the Arian notion that the Three are One simply because of their complete harmony and agreement, which is very much the popular modern conception. He compares the relation between them to the relation between the fount and the stream, the luminous body and its rays—physical metaphors which may strike us as wholly inapplicable to mental existence, but which at all events suggest an identity much greater than any which can be supposed to exist between one mind and another mind. And it is not only negatively that Athanasius excludes personal difference. Whatever we may mean by “personality” in the modern

sense, we certainly mean the possession of knowledge. If the Father and the Son are two Persons in the modern sense, the Father must have knowledge, and the Son must have knowledge; there are two consciousnesses, each of which knows just as two human persons may know the same thing without forming one knowing mind. That which they know may be the same thing: but, psychologically speaking, there will be not one knowledge, but two knowledges, not one knowing mind, but two. The fact that one ceased to know would not affect the knowledge of the other. But this is not at all Athanasius's conception of the Father's relation to the Son. The Logos *is* the Wisdom of God: and there is no other Wisdom of God. The Father does not know except through the Logos. And this is no mere inference of mine. He expressly urges the point against the Arians. The Arians thought that the Son had a beginning in time, and was created by a deliberate act of the Father's will: the very idea of Sonship implied, they contended, a Being who existed before the Son existed, and was meaningless on any other assumption. But this, Athanasius argues, is impossible: if the Wisdom (i.e. Logos or Son) of God was created, then before that creation the Father could not have had even the thought of creating the Son or the World through Him, for the Father thinks only in or by means of the Son.¹ The Son, in fact, is His knowledge. The Son is God Himself as knowing and as creating, including in some sense the world which is created through Him, the Word. Athanasius takes quite seriously and literally the idea that the Son is the actual thinking of the Father: the Father without the Son could not think: and therefore, of course, the Father could not exist without the Son. It would be scarcely possible to repudiate more formally the view ascribed to him by some present

¹ *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 61—63; *De Synodis*, 18, 52; *De Sentent. Dionysii*, 23.

day writers that Father and Son are personally distinct in the modern sense. If they are personally distinct, then according to modern ideas (for those who do not merge human personality in "the Absolute") they are "outside" one another: and this is just what (according to Athanasius) they are not.

"The Word is not outside Him" (i.e. the Father).¹

"Father and Son are one and the same Mind."²

I contend that so far my own interpretation of Christ's Divinity is much nearer "the mind" of Athanasius and of the Council than that of many of my conservative critics. With Athanasius I interpret the Logos to mean the Wisdom or Thought of God. Sometimes Athanasius adopts a position which could only be justified by a more thorough-going Idealism than perhaps he would deliberately adopt. "The Word of the Father is all things."³ I suspect that, if this sentence had been found in a number of the *Modern Churchman*, it would have been quoted to show that all "Modernists" are Pantheists. At times Athanasius tells us also that the Son is the Will of the Father. God's Wisdom⁴ of course is distinguishable from His Power and His Love, but that Wisdom is not a separate Mind or Person in the modern sense. If God is one God, He must be one Mind. Anyone who is prepared to accept this, would find it hard, I think, to distinguish his view from mine. If he is not, he differs from Athanasius. All this is upon the assumption that "Person" is used in the modern sense.

THE APOLLINARIANISM OF ST. ATHANASIUS

How far can the belief that the historical Jesus is personally identical with the pre-existent Logos or

¹ *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 62.

² *Ibid.*, III, 67.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 63, *ad fin.*

Son of God be attributed to Athanasius? There is a difficulty in answering this question because, as we have seen, it is improbable that Athanasius regarded the Son as a different "Person" (in the modern sense) from the Father. But we can have no difficulty in saying that whatever sort of distinctness from the Father the pre-existent Son possessed, that sort of distinctness was possessed also by the Incarnate, so far as the Mind (and not the body) of the Incarnate is concerned. Or rather we might say that practically the Incarnate possessed (as it would appear to us, though Athanasius might have repudiated it) greater distinctness: for most of the passages in which the distinctness of the Son from the Father is emphasised relate to the Word after the Incarnation rather than before it. But if we waive this difficulty, there is no doubt whatever that for Athanasius Jesus Christ was in the most literal sense the Word of God—as much God, and in the same sense God, as the Father.

In all the earlier writings of Athanasius there is not the least trace of the belief that there was in Christ a human soul. Here are a few of the passages which seem to me to prove that Athanasius was practically an Apollinarian:

(I) "Accordingly, when inspired writers on this matter speak of Him as eating and being born; understand that the body, as body, was born, and sustained with food corresponding to its nature, while God, the Word Himself, who was united with the body, while ordering all things, also by the works He did in the body showed Himself to be not man, but God the Word. But these things are said of Him, because the actual body which ate, was born, and suffered, belonged to none other but to the Lord: and because, having become man, it was proper for these things to be predicated of

Him as man,¹ to show Him to have a body in truth, and not in seeming.”²

The body only is mentioned, and that repeatedly. The incarnate Jesus had a body in truth: not a word about a soul. Does not that imply that to Athanasius Jesus was not really man at all, but seemed to be man because the Word spoke and thought in a human body? This involved a nearer approach to Docetism than we find in Apollinarius himself, who admitted a sensitive but not a rational soul. It seems pretty clearly implied that the mind which inhabited that human body did not really feel pain at all. It is a little more possible to bring the idea of a sensitive soul within Athanasius's language, because a sensitive soul might, in a sense, be regarded as belonging to the body, but the distinction is nowhere made by Athanasius.

(2) “Did He not then hunger? Yes; He hungered agreeably to the properties of the Body. But He did not perish of hunger, because of the Word that wore it.”³

In the *Orations against the Arians* the same tendency is obvious, if it is less prominent. I cannot find in them any passage which shows that Athanasius thought there was in Christ any *consciousness* except the consciousness of the divine Word—still less any rational consciousness. One of my critics has appealed to what he says about Christ's ignorance as a proof to the contrary: but Athanasius does not attribute this ignorance to the soul, but to the flesh. In reply to those who insisted upon the fact of the Lord asking questions in proof of the limitation of His knowledge, he says:

“If He knew what He was doing, therefore not in

¹ I have used Bishop Robertson's translation. I should myself be disposed to translate “a man.”

² *De Incarnatione*, xviii, 1.

³ *Ibid.*, xxi, 7.

ignorance but with knowledge did He ask. . . . And thus with ease is their clever point exploded ; but if they still persist on account of His asking, then they must be told that in the Godhead indeed ignorance is not, but to the flesh ignorance is proper, as has been said.”¹

(3) It is the same with the ignorance about the day and the hour.

“ He knows Himself what through Him has been determined.”²

“ But for them, when they thus blaspheme the Spirit, they must expect no remission ever of such irreligion, as the Lord has said ; but let us, who love Christ and bear Christ within us, know that the Word, not as ignorant, considered as Word, has said, ‘ I know not,’ for He knows, but as showing His manhood, in that to be ignorant is proper to man, and that He had put on flesh that was ignorant, being in which, He said according to the flesh, ‘ I know not.’ ”³

“ For as, on becoming man, He hungers and thirsts and suffers⁴ with men, so with men, as man He knows not ; though divinely, being in the Father Word and Wisdom, He knows, and there is nothing which He knows not.”⁵

“ For us, therefore, He said, ‘ No, not the Son knoweth ’ ; and neither was He untrue in thus saying (for He said humanly, as man, ‘ I know not ’), nor did He suffer the disciples to force Him to speak, for by saying, ‘ I know not,’ He stopped their enquiries.”⁶

¹ *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 37.

² *Ibid.*, 44.

³ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴ By “ hunger,” “ thirst,” “ suffering,” he apparently means that His body submitted to physiological processes which in ordinary men are accompanied by sensations of pain.

⁵ *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 46.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

It is pretty clear¹ to me that what Athanasius really thought was that the Mind of Jesus, i.e. God the Word, knew, all the time He was speaking, when the Day of Judgment would be ; but since ignorance is a property of the flesh and He had assumed that flesh, it was right that He should pretend to be ignorant. He was acting a part ; He had taken upon Him the rôle of man : and therefore He said, "I know not," when really He knew. It is utterly impossible that Athanasius should have discussed this problem of the limitation of knowledge in the Incarnate without betraying his belief that there was a conscious human soul in Christ, if he had held any such notion.

It has been contended that the word "flesh" merely means human nature in general. It is true that Athanasius sometimes expressly explains that flesh means "the man" or "the race of man."² But sometimes he uses the term "body," which can hardly thus be explained away. Thus, in the same treatise, he explains St. Luke's statement that our Lord "increased in wisdom and stature" by saying that the advance (*Prokope*) belonged wholly to the body :

"Of the body then is the advance ; for it advancing, in it advanced the manifestation of the Godhead to those who saw it."³

It may be suggested that he is here speaking of the advance in stature, but the argument requires that it should apply to both stature and wisdom. In the sentence before he has said that "ages belong to body." Therefore there was never in Christ a mind that was young.

¹ Of course I do not deny that much ambiguous language is used (e.g. in Chapter xxxvi), some of which would *prima facie* be inconsistent with my interpretation, but it is reasonable to interpret ambiguous passages in the light of those which are clearer, unless we are prepared to admit hopeless inconsistencies within the limits of two or three chapters.

² *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 30.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 52.

Clearly there is here present to the mind of Athanasius only two alternatives: the advance must belong to the Logos or to the body: it cannot belong to the Logos: therefore it must belong, wholly and exclusively, to the body. So in the later *Letters to Serapion* :

“ For since He has become man as it is written, and to be ignorant belongs to men, as also to hunger and to thirst and the rest (for men do not know unless they hear and learn), therefore also as having become man He exhibits also the ignorance of men: He does so first, in order that He may show that He truly has a human body; and secondly, that also, having the ignorance of man in the body, having ransomed and cleansed it from all pollution, He may present the manhood complete and holy to the Father.”¹

Here, then, is the same assumption that in Jesus Christ there were two elements, and two only, viz. the Logos which was divine, and a body which was human; and even the body ceased eventually to be human, since by the indwelling of the Word, it was actually by degrees converted into the divine substance.

“ The manhood (*lit.* not that which was divine) advanced in Wisdom, transcending by degrees human nature, and being deified, and becoming and appearing to all as the organ of Wisdom for the operation and the shining forth of the Godhead.”²

It is true that at a later date—at the Council of Alexandria over which he presided in 362—when the question of Christ’s human soul for the first time became explicitly a subject of controversy, Athanasius made an attempt to reconcile the disputants,

¹ II, 9; Migne, *P.G.*, xxvi, 624. ² *Or. contra Arianos*, III, 53.

and concedes formally the fact of the human soul merely on the ground that, if there was no human soul in Christ, the whole man would not be redeemed.¹ But after all it is doubtful whether this concession seriously altered his way of looking at the whole matter. The letter is written in the name of the Council, other Bishops being mentioned by name as well as Athanasius. It may be that he recognised the soul as present in the body, and no doubt as deified with the body, in much the same metaphysical (i.e. illusory) sense as that in which he had earlier thought of ignorance as being present "in the flesh" at the very moment when the Word was merely pretending He knew not the day nor the hour. There is no trace, now any more than earlier, of any *consciousness* which was not purely and entirely divine. Had he really faced all that was implied in the admission, much of his earlier work must have needed re-writing. In any case, his language at this date cannot cancel the clearly contrary doctrine of the earlier writings, nor can they throw any light upon the "mind of the Nicene Council." So far as Athanasius represents the mind of the Council, it is the earlier Athanasius who does so, not the Athanasius who, as an old man, subscribed the decision of the Alexandrian Council in 362. And with the mind of the Nicene Council on the question of Christ's human soul I am at one with most modern theologians of all schools in being wholly out of sympathy; for this mind (if Athanasius represents it) was Apollinarian, and was corrected by later Councils.²

¹ "They confessed also that the Saviour had not a body without a soul nor without sense or intelligence (Nous)" (*Tomus ad Antiochenos*). Much later than that (*Ep. ad Epictetum*, circa 371) Athanasius still says: "Truly our salvation is not merely apparent, nor does it extend to the body only; but to the whole man; body and soul alike have truly obtained salvation in the Word Himself." In the context he has been establishing the real humanity of the body, but there is nothing about the soul.—Cf. also *Ep. ad Adelphum* (probably belonging to the 3rd Exile). I assume that the treatise against the Apollinarians is not genuine.

² Harnack recognises that Athanasius, "like Arius to the time of the Apollinarian controversy, usually thought of humanity as flesh" And he

THE PROBLEM OF THE "PERSONAL IDENTITY" OF THE LOGOS WITH JESUS

We may now ask, Has this position of Athanasius any bearing on the question of the "personal identity" of Jesus with the pre-existent Word? I think most certainly it has.

To Athanasius there would have been no great difficulty in thinking of the historical Jesus as personally identical with the Son of God, had he thought in terms of our modern "Personality" at all, just because Christ was to him for practical purposes simply God in a human body and nothing else. Now, if I were to have prefixed to this discussion an enquiry about the modern concept of Personality, I should have tried to show that personal identity has degrees. I am the same being as I was when I was one year old, but I am also different—changed, and changed very considerably. In those abnormal dislocations of the personality of which we have heard so much of late, the element of identity may be reduced to a vanishing point. And therefore I will not venture to assert that *a priori* the notion that the Word could be united to a human soul without any loss of personal identity is quite impossible. But if the conservative phrase, "still the same person," is to be made intelligible, it would have to be accompanied by an equally strong, or a stronger, assertion that the identity was accompanied

adds a note: "So correctly Baur. I have not found Dorner's statement that the presupposition of a human soul occupies the background of the whole view of Athanasius 'of the incarnation and redemption as affecting the totality of man' to be supported by evidence." He thinks, however, that Baur "goes too far when he expresses the opinion that Athanasius *designedly* left the human soul of Christ out of account" (*History of Dogma*, E.T. Vol. IV, p. 37). I should quite recognise that Athanasius had never seriously thought the question out or realised its importance. Loofs duly notes the fact that prior to the Alexandrian Council no recognition of a human soul in Christ is to be found in the earlier works of Athanasius. Prof. Ottley acknowledges that Athanasius "regards our Lord rather as the Logos veiled in human flesh than as the man passing through the different stages of human probation and development" (*Doctrine of the Incarnation*, II, p. 33).

by difference. And this assertion would involve a frank abandonment of the doctrine so incessantly insisted upon by Athanasius (though not asserted by the Nicene Creed), that after the Incarnation the Word was "unchanged." Even on Athanasius's premisses this conception implies a very arbitrary and wholly unphilosophical distinction between what something is "in itself" and in its relations to other things. Any view of the Incarnation must acknowledge that it involved a change in the relations of God to humanity, and that is really change in God. But on the orthodox view of the Incarnation, the assertion that the Incarnation involved no change is absolutely impossible. There is surely a difference between a Logos united with a human soul and a Logos not so united. If there is a difference, there must be change. The attempt to avoid this consequence—to make out that the personality of the Logos was just the same after as it was before the Incarnation, and therefore purely divine—leads up to the line of thought which was to culminate in the doctrine asserted at Chalcedon—but not contained in the actual Canons of the Council, or reproduced in our Articles—that the Logos took upon Him "human nature," but not a human personality, that He was man without being *a* man. I pass over the difficulty that "hypostasis," if it be interpreted to mean "person" in our sense, must also retain its original meaning of "substance" (most modern philosophers who make much of human personality would not object to calling the soul a substance), and that therefore if the "person" of the Son is to remain purely divine, the substantiality, i.e. the reality, of the human soul in Christ, is absolutely denied: or we have to admit two hypostases in Christ, which would be Nestorianism pure and simple. All these difficulties spring from identifying the term "hypostasis" with the modern term "person."

LIMITATIONS OF THE KNOWLEDGE IN CHRIST

Bishop Gore's greatest service to the cause of progressive religious thought in England is his express avowal of that doctrine as to the limitation of Christ's human knowledge which has happily never been expressly condemned, which was no doubt tacitly assumed by the more traditional theologians in the past, but which had seldom in modern times been expressly avowed by any theologian with a reputation for orthodoxy to lose. The Bishop differentiates himself from liberal theologians who hold the same doctrine by saying that he has never denied the "inerrancy" of Christ as a teacher. The distinction is a fine one. If Jesus thought that a certain psalm was written by David when it was not written by David, He did "teach" what was not true: or if knowing its true authorship, He yet spoke of it as David's, then we sacrifice His veracity to His "inerrancy." No doubt we may say that this matter had nothing really to do with religion, that such a limitation was not inconsistent with His mission as the Revealer of God, and so He was inerrant as a *religious* teacher: but I should say the same as regards His belief in diabolic "possession." I do not see, indeed, how any *a priori* theory could prove "inerrancy" as distinct from actual freedom from error. All Christian believers will assert that Christ was free from error within certain limits, in certain matters; the question is about the actual limits of His knowledge. And this can only be ascertained by experience. However, this is beside our present point. At all events Bishop Gore admits the limitation of knowledge very frankly.

And this limitation was very extensive. According to Bishop Gore the Word up to the moment of the Incarnation knew everything—all history, all modern science, all the undiscovered science that there is to know, the whole course of future history,

so far at least as it is known even to God the Father,¹—but from the moment of the Incarnation He knew all this no more for some thirty-three years. Now, it is surely a difficult doctrine to maintain that such a colossal loss of memory, such a profound change of intellectual outlook, such a complete breach of continuity in the consciousness of the Son, was consistent with what we commonly call personal identity. For a time at least, during His infancy, He knew very little indeed.

“He grew so truly as a human child that Joseph and His mother had not been led to expect from Him conduct incompatible with childhood, when they took Him up with them to the temple in His thirteenth year.”²

This would apparently reduce His knowledge as an infant to almost no knowledge at all, and even throughout life would deny to Him most of the knowledge possessed by the highly-educated Greeks of His own time, almost all historical knowledge, all knowledge of modern science—still more the enormous mass of at present undiscovered science. Such an admission is hardly consistent with the preservation of personal identity. Certainly it is ridiculous to say that it is consistent with the Word being “unchanged.”

Consider what this really means. There can be no doubt that in the view of Athanasius, if the incarnate Word had ceased to be Omniscient and Omnipotent, He would have ceased to be God. The admission of ignorance in the incarnate Word was the very worst of the Arian offences ; ignorance belongs to a created being : the Word was not created and could not be

¹ Bishop Gore pushes his doctrine of indeterminist Free-will to the point of denying even to the Father complete knowledge of the future, with the reservation that the two beliefs are incompatible “according to any standard of thinking possible to us in our present state” (*Belief in God*, p. 126).

² Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 77.

ignorant. An ignorant mind and an all-knowing mind would have been for Athanasius two minds, not one mind.

Bishop Gore does not, as some advocates of "Kenotic" theories do, fall back upon the expedient of limiting the ignorance to our Lord's human consciousness, while holding that the divine Word retained His Omniscience: this, he sees, would involve a double consciousness which must end in something like Nestorianism. He deliberately holds that, when and so far as the Incarnate betrayed ignorance during His human life,

"The Son Himself, as He reveals Himself to men in manhood, did not know." ¹

It would seem that either the Universe was for some thirty-three years carried on without the co-operation of God the Word (for to administer the Universe would surely have required a knowledge which Jesus of Nazareth did not possess): or that there was still a consciousness of the Word which somehow retained the Divine knowledge, while the same Word as incarnate in Jesus was ignorant of many things. There can be no doubt which alternative Bishop Gore means to adopt. The words imply, and Bishop Gore has elsewhere told us very distinctly, that the Word in His "Cosmic functions" did not lay aside the divine knowledge which the government of a world implies.

"If we are asked the question: Can the functions of the Son in the Godhead and in the universe have been suspended by the Incarnation? We cannot but answer with the theologians of the Church, from Irenaeus to Dr. Westcott, that it is to us inconceivable. Nor can we dissociate the fulfilment of these functions from the exercise of omniscience." ²

¹ Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 97.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

The Bishop, for himself, holds

“that the real Kenosis within the sphere of the Incarnation must be held compatible with the exercise of divine functions in another sphere.”¹

This distinction of “spheres” seems to cover an ambiguity. It seems to admit that, besides the limited and partially ignorant consciousness, there was an omniscient consciousness which was ruling and governing the world and that would practically involve the admission of four distinct consciousnesses, i.e. four Persons, in the Holy Trinity at one and the same time. To say that one and the same Person could be at one and the same time Omniscient in one sphere and of extremely limited knowledge in another seems to me to be to use words without meaning. At all events to say that a single personal consciousness could at a given moment in history split up into two such dissimilar consciousnesses “without change” is a difficult assertion.

But of one thing I am quite certain—that, on any interpretation of his views, Bishop Gore is poles asunder from the thought of Athanasius and of the Council of Nicene so far as Athanasius can be supposed to represent the “mind” of that Council. Whatever exactly Athanasius meant by attributing ignorance to the flesh of Jesus, he would assuredly never have admitted that “the Word was ignorant.” The suggestion that in one sphere the Word was ignorant while in another sphere He was still the Wisdom that rules the Universe, would have involved for him just such a separation between Father and Son, and such a catastrophic change in Deity, as he wished above all things to avoid. So far as he thought in modern terms of “personality” at all, he would have protested with all his soul against the notion that the omniscient Son, through whom the Father rules the world, could have become

¹ Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 105.

a child's mind of extremely limited knowledge and that without suffering any loss of personal identity or, indeed, any change at all. By "Godhead" Athanasius primarily meant the possession and the exercise of all the attributes which could be applied to God the Father, especially Omnipotence and Omniscience (goodness is with Athanasius in his metaphysical moments a secondary matter, for this could admittedly be possessed by a created being). The surrender or even the temporary non-exercise of those attributes would have certainly meant to him such a revolution in the very being of the Son as could not possibly be described as involving no loss of personal identity and no "change."

Perhaps I may be criticised on the ground that the problem is insoluble by the human intellect. But surely it is unreasonable first to compel us to accept all the consequences which human logic—I feel tempted to say very human logic—draws from the available data, data chiefly supplied by doubtful interpretations of irrelevant passages in the Old Testament, together with assumptions about the inspiration of Scripture and the authority of the Church for which no evidence is offered, and interpretations almost equally strained of doubtful sayings of our Lord; and then, when the reasoning leads to conclusions which to human logic are self-contradictory or absurd, to cry off and protest the limitations of our faculties. Surely it would be a more modest and a more reasonable course to suspect that something must be wrong with the premisses which lead us to such an *impasse*. And here, once more, let it be understood, it is not the Nicene Creed or any other document of the early Church which has landed us in these difficulties, but the assumption that the Persons of the Holy Trinity are "Persons" in the modern sense, and that the identity between the pre-existent Word and Jesus Christ is what the modern world would call "personal identity." The

Nicene Creed does not involve such a doctrine.

I believe that there is nothing in my view of Christ's Person which is not compatible with a full acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of the Divinity of Christ as defined by the Creed and the Councils. I will at present confine myself to the Nicene Creed and Council. And in this case the question will mainly turn upon what we understand by the famous Homo-ousion. If the Word of God is (as Athanasius maintained) the Wisdom of God, I see no difficulty in accepting the statement that the Wisdom of God is "of one substance" with the Father: the Wisdom of God is certainly as divine and as eternal as God Himself. Further, I believe that this Wisdom of God was revealed in or was united to Jesus Christ in an exceptional, supreme, and unique sense. Athanasius's habitual illustration of what is meant by "Homo-ousion" is that a son is of the same substance with his father. Most assuredly I believe that there is a certain community of nature between God and Jesus. And I do not think so the less because I also recognise that there is a real community of nature between God and humanity at large. The mind of man is not merely a created thing, but also reproduces in some measure the divine intellect and the divine power or will, and (in some cases at least) the divine goodness, the divine love. There is nothing about this in the Creed; but there is nothing in it which forbids me to hold this, and there is much in the teaching of some of the Greek Fathers—much in Athanasius, much more in Origen—which encourages me to do so. Origen certainly held that the Word of God was united with men in many souls in varying degrees, but that in Jesus this union was far more complete. Athanasius very distinctly recognises that the Word was "in the prophets."¹ The community of nature which receives its most complete development in Jesus consists partly in the

¹ *Ep. ad Serapion*, I, 31; Migne, P.G., XXVI, 601.

reproduction of the divine thought, but most completely in the perfection of His character. I believe (here without the support of Athanasius but with that of Bishop Gore) that this incarnation of God involved a laying aside of the divine Omnipotence and of much of the divine knowledge, but it carried with it a unique communication of the kind of knowledge which was necessary to enable Jesus to perform the task of completely revealing God to man, and above all the reproduction in Him of the divine character. Such a conception of the relation of Christ to God gives a perfectly real and important meaning to the clauses of the Creed which assert that Christ was "of one substance with the Father, God from God, very God from very God." And this interpretation involves no difficulty about the "cosmic functions" of the Word for those who do not look upon the Word as a consciousness or personality (in the modern sense) distinct from the consciousness or personality of God the Father. No doubt the phrases of the Creed are not those which a modern thinker would most naturally choose. We do not in modern philosophy talk much about a divine Ousia and a human Ousia. We should be more disposed to say, if we had to construct a creed *de novo*, "Jesus Christ is the supreme Revealer of God: Christ is God revealed in humanity." But, allowing for the obsolescence of the terminology, I do not find it at all an unnatural thing to say that the Wisdom of God received the fullest incarnation in Jesus, and that Jesus, so far as He shares and reproduces the divine nature (and that in a unique manner), is of one substance with God the Father, while, so far as He is man, He is of one substance with other men. There is nothing in the Creed which compels me to say that the Wisdom of God was a person (in the modern sense) separate from the person of the Father before the Incarnation, or that He continued to be the same person after the Incarnation.

There is one point more. In spite of my distinct acceptance of the Nicene definition, my opponents sometimes assert that I look upon Jesus Christ as a created Being. I do hold that the human body and soul of Christ were created. The Word or Wisdom of God who was united to that soul was not created. Most certainly I do not believe that God at a point of time created His own Wisdom. My answer is exactly the answer which Athanasius himself would have given, except that in his earlier years, at all events, he would have said nothing about the created soul. I do not contend that the meaning which I attach to the Nicene Creed is precisely the meaning which Athanasius or any other Father of Nicaea attached to it. I do not believe that any enlightened modern thinker so understands it. But I do contend that as regards the relation between the Eternal Word and the Father before the Incarnation, my understanding of it is nearer to that of Athanasius than that of some modern writers. Athanasius did not believe that the Son before the Incarnation was a distinct consciousness from the Father : whereas they apparently do. Athanasius was still further from Arianism than they are. And as regards the personal identity of Jesus with God the Word, I differ from Athanasius just because I take very seriously all that the Church has taught about the true human soul of Jesus.

TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE FROM ST. ATHANASIUS TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS¹

To most modern students of Church history nothing is more evident than that what is now considered the orthodox doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and the Divinity of Christ is the result of a long and slow evolution. However strongly it may be maintained that the developed doctrine is the logical result of what went before, however superior in philosophical truth and internal consistency the developed doctrine may be, most modern scholars have accepted the general fact of development—of a real development of thought—as distinct from a mere increased technicality and precision of language. But Bishop Gore, like the Roman Catholic theologians who attacked Newman's doctrine, believes that the Church has

“ throughout taught, explicitly or almost explicitly, exactly the same doctrine from the days of the Apostles to Nicaea, and from Nicaea to the last General Council or beyond it.”

The apostles, he seems to think, had in their minds all that is asserted in the decrees of Chalcedon or in the Athanasian Creed ; only they had not at present hit upon the language appropriate to the expression of their thoughts. He tells us :

“ The dogmatic product is something more than the survival of the fittest formulas. It represents simply and faithfully, in language supplied by the Greek philosophical schools, the original Apostolic Creed in Christ the Incarnate Son of God.”²

The variety of senses in which such an expression as “ incarnate Son of God ” may be taken, and has

¹ Reprinted, with considerable modifications, from the *Modern Churchman*, Vol. XII, pp. 196-213 (July, 1922).

² *Bampton Lectures*, Ed. I, p. 89.

been taken, whether we think of the early heresies or of the orthodox Fathers, Schoolmen or modern Theologians, seems altogether to escape some modern divines.

There is another truth which might have been supposed to be—since the days (let us say) of Blanco White and Bishop Hampden—pretty generally admitted ; and that is the fact that the established doctrine of the Church has been evolved very largely by a fusion of the original ideas of Christianity with the ideas and doctrines of Greek philosophy. Yet even this is denied.

“ What the Church then borrowed from Greek thought was her terminology, not the substance of her creed.” ¹

Now to suppose that we can thus sharply separate between thought and terminology—that the thought of an individual or of a school can remain entirely unaffected by the adoption of a wholly new terminology—is impossible. New words necessarily bring with them new meanings, suggestions, associations. Moreover, words—especially in the region of philosophical thought—are always changing their meaning, and the changes are either caused by or they cause a change in men’s thoughts. It would be absurd to say that it was merely a new term or a new use of an old term which came into the world when Socrates or Plato began to teach the doctrine of “ ideas.” It is equally absurd to suppose that, when men who had previously not used the word “ substance,” or any possible Aramaic equivalent of it, began to discuss whether the Son was of one substance with the Father, or of like substance or of unlike substance, those who accepted the orthodox view are really only thinking the thoughts of St. Mark or St. Paul, or even those of the Fourth

¹ Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, Ed. I, p. 101. He afterwards makes a certain exception as to the use of the term Hypostasis, but apparently without seeing how much is implied in the exception.

Evangelist. Obviously the men who discussed such questions were facing new problems. And consequently were thinking new thoughts, whatever was the answer they gave to them. One answer may have been more continuous, more harmonious, more consistent with the earlier tradition than another: but assuredly it was not the same thought.

And there is another assumption which conservative scholars sometimes make. They assume that the meaning of those terms, which are admittedly borrowed from Greek philosophy, is something perfectly simple and unmistakable, and (apparently) always the same.

“The ideas of substance or thing, of personality, of nature, are permanent ideas; we cannot get rid of them; no better words could be suggested to express the same facts.”¹

To suppose that even these terms (and he carefully selects the less technical in the elaborate vocabulary of dogma)—whether we think of the English words or their Greek equivalents—have been always used with the same meaning, is a strange contention for anyone even a little acquainted with the history of human thought.

It is interesting in this connexion to study the history of the words *Ousia* and *Hypostasis*. The two terms in ordinary usage meant practically the same thing. In the Nicene anathemas, as in the writings of Athanasius, the words are used as equivalents, and they are used to express the unity of the Godhead: Father and Son were of the same *ousia* or *hypostasis*. In Athanasius's earlier days the doctrine of two hypostases or three was a characteristically, if not exclusively, Arian mode of expression. Gradually a change in the use of these terms came

¹ *Bampton Lectures*, p. 105. In a recent utterance (the *Deity of Christ*, p. 70) he admits that “the theory, the theology of the Church,” we owe to the Greeks. Surely this is something more than “terminology.”

about. At the Synod of Alexandria (362 A.D.), presided over by Athanasius himself in his old age, it was settled that, while there was certainly only one *Ousia* in the Godhead, the use of the term *Hypostasis* to denote either Father or Son was allowable, while the older use of the term as the equivalent of *Ousia* was still permitted. Now such a change of terminology was scarcely possible without a corresponding change of thought—whether the change of terminology was the cause or the effect of such an intellectual change. It is pretty obvious that, when men who had been taught to think of the Son as of one *hypostasis* with the Father and to reject with indignation the notion of two or three hypostases, came to apply to Father and Son separately the very word which they had hitherto used to denote their unity, this must have implied a movement of thought towards an increased emphasis on the separateness and a diminished emphasis upon the unity. And this is exactly what critical students of dogmatic history tell us was the case.

One of the great puzzles of early Church history is to understand (1) the sudden abandonment of the Nicene formula by the greater part of the Christian world after the almost universal acceptance of it at the Council: (2) the eventual triumph of the Nicene formula. Professor Harnack and others have taught us to understand the meaning of the change. The Athanasian ideas went far beyond the commonly accepted ideas on the subject. Athanasius was at least as much an innovator as Arius, or more so. The usually accepted ideas in the pre-Nicene period (outside Sabellian circles) were, if not Arian, at least nearer to Arianism than they were to Athanasianism. Justin and others called the Son frankly a "second" or "another" God. A new development was urgently called for, if the Church was not to lapse into sheer Polytheism. The "higher" the Arianism might be, the greater the measure or the kind of

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divinity ascribed to the Son, if He was not to be regarded as sharing the very same Godhead as the Father, the greater was the danger of His being thought of as one of a triad of three distinct Deities. The true glory of Athanasius is that he saved the Monotheism of the Church—or at least began the process by which Monotheism might be saved. But to say that Athanasius was right, or at least much nearer the truth than Arius, is not to explain how an Arian world eventually became Athanasian or Nicæan. When we note the change in the meaning of the term *Hypostasis*, we begin to see the inner history of the process. We may either look upon the change registered at the Synod of Alexandria as a merely diplomatic or external compromise between two really distinct modes of thought, or as an intellectual compromise by which a *tertium quid* was discovered between the sharply antagonistic positions. It was probably both. There was a coming together of the moderate men of both parties—a practical desire for outward unity and also a disposition towards intellectual conciliation. The excesses of the extreme or Anomœan Arians which began by saying that Christ was of unlike substance to the Father and ended by making Him “a mere man” created a reaction against Arianism in general: and there was a corresponding disposition on the part of the Athanasians to put the best construction upon the language used by the Conservatives or moderate Arians. The compromise took this form. The term *Hypostasis* came to be understood as expressing the distinctions in the Godhead—at first side by side with the older phraseology but eventually to its practical exclusion; while the Arians gave up the three *Ousiai* and agreed that there was only one *Ousia* in the Godhead. On the other hand the Arians agreed to adopt the Nicæan formula, *Homo-ousion*, but they practically explained it in a sense approximating to the moderate Arian *Homoi-ousion*.

Athanasius himself consented to explain "of one *Hypostasis* with the Father," by the words "like in all things" to the Father. The group of theologians through whose influence this compromise was effected was what is now known as the Cappadocian School, of which the chief members are Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen.¹

My object in calling attention to these facts is to bring out the great variety of thought which may be covered by a common acceptance of such phrases as the *Homo-ousion* or the three *Hypostases*. Now I have insisted in the preceding paper² that Athanasius does not use the word Personality or any Greek term which can fairly be regarded as its equivalent. If you maintain that *Hypostasis*, which was eventually accepted as the theological equivalent of the Latin *Persona*, really means the same thing as the modern English "Person," then we must say that Athanasius explicitly denied that Father and Son were distinct Persons: for he held that there was only one *hypostasis* of Father and Son. Without saying that his language is either perfectly consistent or perfectly intelligible, his conception of the Unity of the Godhead is much stronger than what some modern writers regard as essential to orthodoxy; he makes the Father and the pre-incarnate Son far less distinct than they do. It is quite clear that he was no Tritheist.

When, however, we turn to the Cappadocians,

¹ This view, which is supported by Zahn and Gwatkin as well as Harnack, has been vigorously combated by Prof. Bethune-Baker in a learned article (*Texts and Studies*, ed. Robinson, Vol. VII, No. 1). But the passages quoted by him from the three Cappadocian Fathers seem to me to prove the opposite of what he intends. They seem to me to show clearly that these writers did, as Athanasius did not, habitually think of the Three on the analogy of three human individuals, though they undoubtedly try to balance the obvious Tritheism of the comparison by distinctions and strong assertions of the Unity. It will be observed that I have avoided the assertion that their position is actually identical with that of the Homoiousian Arians, but it seems to me quite clear that they follow them in asserting a much stronger separation between Father and Son than Athanasius had done.

² "The Christology of St. Athanasius."

with their three *Hypostases*, there indeed we do encounter a mode of thinking and speaking about the Trinity very similar to the mode of speaking and thinking which is now commonly accepted as orthodox, but which Athanasius, at least in his earlier days, would have been disposed to treat as savouring of Homoi-ousian Arianism or of positive Tritheism. At the very least, these men emphasised the three-ness rather than the oneness.

“Starting as they did, from the three-ness in the Divine, with the unity as a mysterious problem, it was particularly difficult for the Cappadocians to avoid the semblance of Tritheism, and this was an accusation long current in the West.”¹

It is chiefly upon this compromise between Athanasianism and Arianism, if I am not mistaken, that the theology of some conservative present-day theologians is built up. In many ways these Fathers are worthy of the highest respect. Would that the popular orthodoxy of the day were as philosophical and as liberal as the teaching of the two Gregories! But their weakest point is their approximation to Tritheism, in spite of their formal repudiation of it.²

Whatever may be thought of the Cappadocian compromise in the West, just because its faith was simpler and less subtle, the attachment to Monotheism was much stronger. I have attempted to

¹ H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, ed. iii, p. 194.

² Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxix, 12 (cf. Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, II, pp. 45-7). So Dorner says of Basil: “It we ask . . . whether when he speaks of *hypostasis*, he means a person in the sense in which we use the term of men, we must answer, ‘No.’” (*Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, E.T., Div. I, Vol. II, 1862, Third Epoch, ch. iii, p. 310.) It is true that Bishop Gore writes: “The three Persons are not separable individuals, so that it could be argued that what one of the sacred three does another does not do, as we commonly argue about persons among ourselves, recognising each person as separate and exclusive of others” (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 133). This statement no doubt satisfies the requirements of conventional orthodoxy, but it does not alter the impression that he habitually thinks of the three Persons as three quite distinct consciousnesses always co-operating with each other.

show that even for Athanasius the Second Person in the Godhead was not thought of as a distinct Person from the Father in anything like the ordinary modern sense in which Bishop Gore and his friends appear to take it. Still more decidedly is this the case when we turn to St. Augustine and the Schoolmen whose theology was built up upon his. In examining the teaching of St. Augustine on this subject, it must be remembered that his treatise on the Holy Trinity is the source of what has always been accounted in the West the orthodox doctrine on the subject. The so-called Athanasian Creed is simply a bald and bad epitome of that work—bad because everything which tends to explain the doctrine and make it intelligible is left out.

Now, in spite of assertions to the contrary, I maintain that it is quite clear that for St. Augustine the Son was not thought of as a distinct person from the Father in anything approaching the modern sense. He repeats and enlarges the physical analogies which help us so little when we have to do with the phenomena of Mind—the fountain and the stream, the light and the brightness or the whiteness, and so on. But the analogy upon which he most strongly insists is the relation between different aspects or activities of the human mind. Never does he compare the relations between the Persons of the Trinity to the relations between two human beings or two members of any other species of conscious beings. The Trinity is always likened to the relation between different activities of one and the same divine Mind. That God is one Mind (*unamens*) is with him a fundamental truth. The human activities within the one consciousness in the light in which he understands the Trinity are not always the same. The Father is sometimes *Principium* (the “source of Godhead,” *πηγή θεότητος*, though this term is also applicable to the Son in virtue of the double procession); sometimes He is Memory;

sometimes Mind (*Mens*) in general. The Son is the Wisdom of the Father or His knowledge (*sapientia*) or His intelligence (*intelligentia*), the knowledge by which He knows Himself; and sometimes (be it added) created beings are in some sense included in the being of the Word.¹ The Holy Spirit is the Love by which the Father is loved by the Son and the Son by the Father. In other passages He is the Will (*voluntas*) of God. Since the Will of God is always a loving Will, there is no essential discrepancy between the two formulæ. How little he thinks of the three Persons as three distinct minds is most conspicuously shown by his doctrine that the love of the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit.² The love of one entity for another cannot possibly be thought of as a person in the modern sense, and then (be it remembered) that the Son whom the Father loves and knows is for St. Augustine simply God Himself. The Son is not only God's subjective thinking, but also the object of His thought, just as when a human subject knows himself, the object of his knowledge is in a sense distinguished from the knowing self, and is yet at the same time that very self.

That there are passages inconsistent with this interpretation to be found in St. Augustine I do not deny. Much more even than St. Athanasius, he was bound by authorities which he could not disregard, authorities in which the Son was, or seemed to be treated as, a distinct Mind. He was full of the idea that the Trinity was, strictly speaking, incomprehensible to mortal minds. He is full of inconsistencies and full of unintelligibilities.³ He did not

¹ "Hoc loco (i.e. *In principio erat Verbum*, Jn. I, 1) melius verbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus sed ad illa etiam quae per Verbum facta sunt operativa potentia."—*De Diversis Quaest.* LXXXIII, q. 63; Migne, P.L., xl, 54.

² "Spiritus quoque sanctus . . . sit summa charitas utrumque conjungens nosque subjungens."—*De Trin.* VII, c. iii, 6.

³ See especially *De Trin.* XV, c. vii, 12, where he says: *Quis audeat dicere, Patrem nec se ipsum, nec Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum intelligere nisi per Filium, vel diligere nisi per Spiritum sanctum*, thus admitting two knowledges within the Trinity, which is inconsistent with his whole position. Athanasius had said the very thing of which Augustine exclaims, *Quis audeat dicere?*

profess to make the doctrine completely intelligible. But he does *try* to make it reasonable ; and, so far as he does so, he always thinks of God as a Being whose distinct activities as much constitute One Mind or Consciousness as Memory, Wisdom, and Love in a human being—not as three beings who are united by the closeness of their intercourse and their agreement to adopt the same policy in their government of the world after the fashion of the Arian Milton or our modern orthodox Tritheists. Man is the *imago Trinitatis*—one Mind, not three minds.¹ The “*Una Mens*” in God, the union of the three activities, is even closer than in the human mind : for in the human mind these distinguishable activities, though not three conscious beings, are, indeed, according to him, three *things* : in the Divine Mind they are only one thing which is called by all three names.²

In the Schoolmen the inconsistencies, the uncertainties, the mysticism of St. Augustine largely disappear. St. Augustine is reduced to a clear-cut doctrine, and here the fact that *Persona* is used in the most technical of senses positively leaps to the eyes. The first thinker who attempted to put what was, after all, only St. Augustine’s doctrine into a quite definite and rational form was Abelard, the true founder of the scholastic theology : for him God is Power, Wisdom, and Love or Will. The clearness and lucidity with which the doctrine was expressed by Abelard exposed the unfortunate man to a furious persecution at the hands of ignorant ecclesiastics hounded on by the arch-persecutor, St. Bernard. By one Council he was condemned for Sabellianism :

¹ Bishop Gore always seems to avoid the admission of “ One Mind.” He says, indeed, that “ In God then, we imaginé, is a perfect and eternal life, of will and reason and love ” : but from the context it would appear that the “ life ” is thought of in the singular merely as we speak of many human beings sharing the same “ social life.”

² “ Nec distent in eis ista, sicut in nobis aliud est memoria, aliud est intelligentia, aliud dilectio sive charitas : sed unum aliquid sit quod omnia valeat, sicut ipsa sapientia ” (XV, c. xvii, 28). Of course there are distinctions which save him from actual Sabellianism.

by another for Arianism. But for all that the Trinitarian doctrine which he formulated was substantially the same as that which, in the hands of his successors, became the orthodox doctrine of the Western Churches. The *Sentences* of Abelard's disciple, Peter the Lombard, became the official textbook of theology taught in all the mediæval Universities. For the Master of the *Sentences*, as for Abelard, the Father is Power, the Son Wisdom, the Holy Ghost Love or Will. In St. Thomas Aquinas the Triad is the same, except that he substitutes Augustine's term *Principium* for *Potentia*, but explains that word as "the power of generating the Son." For Aquinas, as for St. Augustine, the Son is the knowledge by which God knows Himself, and the Holy Spirit is the love by which God loves Himself.

The best way in which I can convince my readers that there is no trace in St. Thomas of the three-mind view of the Godhead, will be to translate literally a few passages from the famous *Summa*.

First of all as to the meaning of the term Person and the relations between the Persons. St. Thomas thus explains the "processions" of the Divine Persons, i.e. the *generatio* of the Son (which is also a *processio*), and the *processio* of the Holy Spirit.

(1) "We must not understand 'procession' in the sense in which the term is used in corporal things or in connexion with motion in space, or with the action of any cause to produce an exterior effect, as warmth proceeds from the thing that heats into the thing heated: but in the sense of an intelligible emanation, as, for instance, the intelligible word (or concept) proceeds from a speaker while remaining at the same time in him."¹

The relation of Father to Son is the relation of a

¹ *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. xxvii, Art. 1. Compare the words in the same article: "Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within him which is the conception of the thing understood coming forth from intellectual force and proceeding from his knowledge."

thinker or a speaker to his thought. This has not the least resemblance to the relation between two human beings ; the speaker or thinker is not one consciousness, and the spoken word or concept another consciousness.

(2) " By which name (i.e. Holy Spirit) is designated a certain vital motion and impulsion ; as a man is said to be moved or impelled by love to do something." ¹

How can the love which impels a man to do anything be thought of as a separate consciousness from the man ?

(3) " The processions in the divine region (*in divinis*) follow immanent actions which in an intelligible and divine nature are only two, to understand and to will, which are precisely the processions, in the divine region, of the Word and of Love " ²

What can be plainer ? The Word is a name for God's thinking, including the object of His thought, which is also Himself, and includes in a sense potentially or actually all that He creates.

(4) Again : " The term Word is applied in a special sense (*proprie*) to God, in a sense according to which the Word signifies the conception of the Intellect." ³

(5) " It must be said that in the Word there is implied a respect to the creature. For God, in knowing himself, knows every created being. The word therefore conceived in the mind is representative of anything that is actually understood. Whence in us there are divers words, according as the things understood are divers. But because

¹ *Summa Theol.*, Q. xxvii, Art. 4.

² *Ibid.*, Q. xxvii, Art. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, Q. xxxiv, Art. 1.

God understands both Himself and all things in one act, His one and only (*unicum*) Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of the creatures." ¹

Here the Word means the world, as it is thought of by God, and is therefore not a person in the modern sense. ²

(6) "The Son proceeds by way of intellect, as the Word : but the Holy Spirit by way of Will, as Love. But it is necessary that Love should proceed from the Word ; for we do not love anything except what we conceive in our minds." ³

Whatever may be thought of this as a defence of the Western doctrine of double procession, it shows clearly enough that the Son (apart from the Incarnation) is to St. Thomas just the divine thought, including the object which it thinks, while the Holy Spirit is the love which God has for the object of His thought (which is potentially all creation), and which love is inseparable from the thinking of that object.

(7) "When therefore it is said that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son (*in Filium*) there is not signified anything that passes over (*transiens*) into another, but only a habitude towards the thing loved ; as also in the Word there is implied a habitude of the Word towards the thing expressed by the Word." ⁴

This is rather a difficult passage. It seems to mean that the Word represents in a sense, or contains, without being actually identified with, all the things which God was from all eternity going to

¹ *Summa Theol.*, Q. xxxiv, Art. 3.

² It will be observed that this object of the divine thought is only "representative of" the creatures. A more thorough-going Idealism would have said that the created things themselves were the objects of the divine thought.

³ *Summa Theol.*, Q. xxxvi, Art. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Q. xxxvii, Art. 1.

create and does at a definite moment create and continuously conserve in time. In the same way God is the Holy Spirit because He eternally loves this thought of Himself and His creation. Its object is to guard against the suggestion that the Love, which is the Holy Spirit, begins to exist when the Holy Spirit puts forth the actual energy of love at a particular moment of time. Observe the phrase, "the *thing* expressed by the Word." The love with which the Spirit is identified is not of a kind which necessarily implies a conscious being as its object, or a capacity for returning the love. And yet the Holy Spirit is represented as being the love not merely of the Father for the Son but of the Son for the Father.¹ This is a difficult thought to grasp, and I do not know that Thomas ever clearly explains it, or reconciles it with the doctrine that the Son is just the Father's activity of thinking. It might perhaps be explained to mean that the Word (in a sense) includes all rational beings who have the capacity of returning the love of God, and in that sense the Word loves God the Father who is One Being with Himself. Or perhaps we should be nearer St. Thomas's thought if we suppose him to mean that since in thinking the divine Thought the Word necessarily loves that which He thinks, the Word may be said to be loving the Father from whom these thoughts proceed. At all events, be it observed, the Holy Spirit is not a lover but love: so the term Person does not by itself imply a distinct consciousness that thinks and loves another distinct consciousness.

Finally, St. Thomas' position is summed up in the words :

" In rational creatures, therefore, in which there is intellect and will, there is found a representation

¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, Q. xxxvi, Art. 2 (quoted above). The whole of this *Quaestio* is extremely subtle. Thomas has great difficulty in distinguishing his position from the position illogically and inconsistently condemned by St. Augustine in the passage quoted above, p. 111, n. 3.

of the Trinity by way of image in so far as there is found in them a word conceived (*verbum conceptum*, i.e. a concept) and a love that proceeds." ¹

Any candid and honest reader of these passages, even if he cannot share the added confidence which comes from the impression produced by reading them continuously and in their context, will, I think, require weighty evidence to convince him that, when writers like St. Augustine, and still more clearly St. Thomas, speak of a Person of the Holy Trinity, they do not mean what we mean or anything like it.² They do not consider the Father and the Son as personally distinct (in our sense) from each other or from the Holy Spirit: nor do they think of the pre-existing Son (after the fashion of the Arian Milton), as beings so distinct as to be capable of holding deliberations and conversations with one another. When they declare that God is One Mind (*Una Mens*), they really mean what they say.

When we turn from the writings of the modern conservatives to St. Thomas Aquinas, we find, as I have tried to show, a doctrine of the Trinity which is perfectly rational, intelligible, and at bottom quite simple. That God is Power, Wisdom and Love is surely a doctrine which most genuine Theists will accept. It is a doctrine which might well be taught in every Sunday School. To some it will seem an insuperable objection that most Unitarians would

¹ *Summa Theol.*, Ibid., Q. xlv, Art. 7.

² [Father Vincent McNabb, O.P., took part in the discussion which this paper occasioned on its publication. His contribution will be found reprinted in *From a Friar's Cell* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1923), under the title "Bishop Gore, Dean Rashdall, and St. Thomas Aquinas." While believing that Rashdall had, in the main, correctly interpreted St. Thomas' doctrine of the Trinity, he criticised the exclusive character of the phrase in the text here, *or anything like it*. Writing in the *Church Times* for February 14, 1929, p. 180, he asserted: "I had such trust in the scholarly instincts of Dean Rashdall as to send him a copy of the article with its correction of his mistake (i.e., the overstatement of the phrase in question). I here put on record for the first time my sense of relief and gratitude when I received a letter from the Dean, thanking me for pointing out the mistake in his statement, and adding simply that he would never make the statement again!"]—EDD;

accept it. That ought to be no objection to a reasonable Trinitarian. If the doctrine of the Holy Trinity has been so misrepresented as to become a source of offence to so many, it ought not surely to be an objection to a modern restatement of it that it would enable many Unitarians to accept it, and so to be Unitarians no longer. The doctrine is no worse because it happens to be perfectly orthodox. You cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas Aquinas, even if in agreeing with him you have the misfortune to disagree with some modern writers who have a reputation for orthodoxy.

While I contend that the actual doctrine of the Trinity as taught by Thomas Aquinas is both simple and rational, I think candour requires that I should admit that there are many doctrinal statements in St. Thomas which it is much more difficult for a modern philosophical thinker to translate into terms of intelligible modern thought. But these are positions which the most conservative modern Anglican, unless he is among the very few who have thought themselves into a thoroughly scholastic frame of mind, will find it as difficult as the Modernist to accept or to interpret. I will take an instance. When St. Thomas calls the three Persons *Hypostases* he does not imply that they are separate conscious beings: the word *Hypostasis* has no suggestion in it of any of the ideas commonly implied by our modern term "person"—consciousness, thought, will. But it does suggest the idea of Substance. And he is very anxious to establish the fact that the divine Power, Wisdom, and Love are distinct *hypostases* or substances. This was forced upon him by the weight of the authorities which had asserted the doctrine, and by the necessity of escaping the appearance of Sabellianism. And yet it is the essence of his doctrine that the three Persons are three relations—three internal relations within the divine Mind. A *hypostasis* seems to mean for him precisely a thing of

which something can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of anything else. If then the Son means the relation of "Sonship" (*filiatio*) it would seem that it must be a predicate of some other thing: you cannot have a relation without terms. To escape this difficulty, he has to fall back upon the doctrine that in the divine nature relations are not mere relations but are real things: in the divine nature there is no difference between the abstract and the concrete. I will not attempt the translation of this doctrine into terms of modern philosophy. I am far from saying that it cannot be done. Indeed, it bears a strong resemblance to that doctrine that all relation is at bottom unreal which, in Mr. Bradley's hands, leads up to a conception of the Absolute fundamentally opposed to that which St. Thomas or any other genuinely Theistic thinker wishes to defend. From a more philosophical point of view there can be no difficulty in calling the divine Wisdom a *hypostasis*. It is something real and something distinguishable from the divine Power. It is no less a reality because it is incapable of existing apart from that Power.

I am afraid that some of my readers may already be wearied even with the amount of metaphysical subtlety which is involved in the scholastic doctrine of the Trinity, even so far as I have expounded it. They may ask whether it is really worth while to construct an apology for formulæ which seem so remote from modern modes of thinking and speaking, and which have so little to do with life and godliness. Had we not better get rid of them altogether? I am far from attaching high intrinsic value to the formulæ about the Trinity and the Incarnation which are contained in the decrees of the General Councils and in the Patristic and Scholastic Theologies which have grown out of them. I believe that for practical purposes, in our teaching and our preaching, it is a very simple doctrine about the Person of Christ that

we want—a doctrine which shall recognise the reality and the supremacy of the revelation which God has made of Himself in Christ, which shall understand the Divinity of Christ in such a way as not to make his humanity unreal or unintelligible, but which shall not attempt to define the nature and mode of the union of the divine and human in Christ in any but the simplest way. But the fact remains that we have got these formulæ. Some of them are contained in the Creeds and Confessions of Faith, in hymns and in prayers. They are often understood in a way which makes them unintelligible, irrational, and a serious obstacle to vital faith in Christ and to hearty membership in the Churches which are more or less committed to the traditional phrases. And those who understand the Christian doctrine in a manner more intelligible and more natural to modern minds, are accused of unorthodoxy ; and (if they are clergymen) are told that, as honest men, they have no place in the Churches which profess to be orthodox or Catholic. These accusations have a most deterrent effect on possible candidates for Holy Orders. Hence, where it is possible to show that the original meaning of these formulæ, or the meaning which they have received at the hands of authorities in the past whose orthodoxy cannot be disputed, is really much more reasonable and intelligible than is commonly supposed, and to show that their essential meaning is capable of being expressed in simpler and more modern language, one is doing a useful thing. I have tried to show that this is so to some extent with the Trinitarian dogma as expounded by Athanasius, still more as expounded by St. Augustine, and most of all with the interpretation which that doctrine receives in the most authoritative of the Schoolmen. In particular I have tried to show that the greatest cause of offence in the Trinitarian doctrine is no part of the orthodox dogma. What makes the doctrine seem unreasonable and unintelligible

to most thoughtful modern minds is the notion that to speak of three persons in the Godhead involves the belief that God is three distinct consciousnesses, whose unity consists merely in the closeness of their co-operation and mutual agreement. This is the feature in the Trinitarian doctrine which causes most difficulty, and yet which is most insisted on by the recognised champions of orthodoxy. I believe that this interpretation is not required even by the most rigid orthodoxy, and that, on the contrary, the zealots who insist upon it are themselves unorthodox, and go very near to the confines of Tritheism if they do not deliberately and ostentatiously plunge into it.¹

I do not believe that the patristic and scholastic formulations of the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the Divinity of Christ are of very much spiritual value. Unless they are explained and translated into more modern terms, they may even be causes of much spiritual loss—alike to those who make much of them and to those whom their existence prevents from reaching the very truth which they were originally designed to assert. It is, as it seems to me, of the utmost importance that these elaborate technicalities should be looked upon merely as means of expressing in terms of an obsolete terminology and an obsolete philosophy the infinitely important truth that God has made a full, supreme, and, in a sense, final revelation of Himself in the historical personality of the man Christ Jesus; and yet that He still goes on revealing Himself in the hearts and consciences of men, and particularly in that Society of Christ's followers which we call the Church. I do not think these technicalities are very important, even when explained; but unexplained, they are positively pernicious.

¹ Tritheism in these days seems not to be unpopular: nobody objects to believing too much.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

I AM going to speak of the moral argument for Immortality. And I have chosen that line of argument because I very much doubt whether there is any other which does not at bottom presuppose or involve very much the same line of thought. Direct metaphysical proofs of immortality—arguments based upon the “simplicity” of the soul, upon a supposed present independence of the body or the like—may be regarded as wholly out of date: they all imply a view as to the relations of soul to body which cannot now be maintained. But to admit that there can be no direct metaphysical proof of immortality does not mean that Metaphysic has nothing to say to the matter—far from it. On the contrary, I believe that a reasonable man’s attitude towards the question will, in the main, be determined by his general view of the Universe and particularly by that vital element in his *Weltanschauung* which is concerned with the status of the individual mind in its relation to the Universe as a whole. By a direct metaphysical argument I mean any line of thought which tries to establish immortality without taking into account the facts of the moral life and the world of values. What I mean by the moral argument for immortality is the contention that it is impossible to construct a view of Reality which shall do justice alike to that aspect of the Universe which is revealed by the judgments of Science and that aspect of it which is revealed in our moral judgments or judgments of value without the hypothesis of immortality for the individual soul. This implies that any argument for immortality must start with establishing a certain view of the ultimate nature of things. It is obvious that in a single lecture it will be impossible even to outline that general view of the

Universe which such an argument must presuppose. In such a lecture I can but enumerate the assumptions which I must make. I call them assumptions without implying that they cannot be justified by lines of thought as valid and as cogent as we can ever expect to obtain for any theory as to the ultimate constitution of Reality as a whole. Only here I have hardly time even to hint at the lines of argument by which they can be justified.

(1) I shall assume that the ultimate principle or ground of the Universe is spiritual—that is to say, that it must be thought of after the analogy, admittedly imperfect as such an analogy must be, of the only spiritual being of which we have immediate experience—that is to say, the human mind, conceived of not merely as intelligence but also as activity or will.

(2) I shall assume that the relation of the individual human mind to the ultimate or universal Mind is conceived of in such a way that its reality and its activity are not wholly merged or absorbed in that larger Mind from which its being is derived—that it is allowed to have a certain measure, not of absolute but of relative, independence.¹ I do not mean here to assume what is popularly known as the freedom of the will; but I do assume that the individual mind is something more than a phase or appearance of the universal Mind, and that the individual will is really the cause of what are commonly called the actions of the man.

(3) I assume the objective validity of our moral judgments. This does not, of course, mean that I or any other human being is infallible in his judgments of value, any more than he is in his scientific or his historical judgments. It means rather that the concept of Oughtness, or Goodness, or Value is part of the real nature of things—that it is not a mere

¹ I may refer to Prof. Laird's recent work *Problems of the Self* as containing a remarkably sane and judicial statement of this relative independence.

expression of my personal wishes or desires or idiosyncrasies, or even of the mental and emotional constitution of a particular species of two-legged animals which happens to have flourished during what Mr. Balfour has called a short and transitory episode—he might have said a discreditable episode—in the life of the meanest of the planets: and I shall assume that even in their concrete detail we may regard such judgments as valid, though here as in other regions of thought not all such judgments are equally trustworthy. Judgments of value, I shall assume boldly, are valid for Reality. We have just as much right to trust them, and to use them in our construction of the ultimate nature of things, as we have to trust any other of our judgments.

In more popular language my three assumptions are (1) the existence of God; (2) the reality of the human soul as against either Materialism or any form of thought approximating to Pantheism; (3) the existence and authority of Conscience.

The denials of immortality generally spring from the denial of one or more of these positions, or at least from insufficient appreciation of, or emphasis upon, one or more of them when they are not actually denied. It is clear that the idea of immortality is impossible to anyone who takes a materialistic view of the relation between mind and body. If the soul is in any sense the mere accident or attribute or by-product of material processes, it is clear that its survival is out of the question. Almost equally fatal to a real belief in immortality are all the numerous shades of thought which tend to make of the individual soul merely an appearance of God or (as some thinkers would prefer to say) the Absolute, however spiritual the being of that Absolute may be declared to be. The most emphatic repudiation of personal immortality on the part of philosophers of a spiritualistic type has usually come from this side. Spinoza in the classical period of philosophical

thought and Mr. Bradley in modern times are the typical exponents of this attitude, though even Mr. Bradley's contempt for the individual hardly equals that of the eminent thinker who is too modestly in the habit of describing himself as a mere disciple of Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley's denial of full reality to the individual has in it a tinge of regret : Professor Bosanquet's attitude reminds me of the workhouse master who told a dying pauper that he ought to be very grateful that there was a Hell for the likes of him to go to. Many philosophers who in other ways are Christian enough in thought and feeling are more or less influenced by the same line of philosophical speculation, though in some of them this merging of the individual in the universal mind is represented in mystical fashion rather as a goal of future aspiration than as something which is already a fact in the case of the meanest, as of the most exalted, finite mind. This line of thought is responsible for the assertion of personal immortality by certain divines in a sense which it requires considerable subtlety to distinguish from a denial, and for the absence of such a hope in some of those lay philosophers in whom one would most expect to find it.

The beginning of any valid argument for immortality must be a vindication of the reality and the value of the individual soul. For such a vindication I of course have no time. I can only say that I assume the general line of thought which has recently been brilliantly developed by Professor Pringle-Pattison in his *Idea of God* ; and still more convincingly, and (I must add) more consistently, by Professor Sorley in his *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. But the fullest recognition of the reality and limited activity of the individual soul will not help even to suggest the idea of immortality unless there is also a strong confidence in the validity of our moral judgments. Speaking broadly, the moral argument for immortality is based upon the affirmation of the

moral consciousness that, given such a being as man is in such a world as this is, man ought to be immortal. But the fact that we affirm man ought to be immortal supplies no reason for thinking that he actually is immortal unless we are able to treat these moral judgments as valid judgments about reality, judgments which we have as much right to use in building up our conception of the Universe as any other part of the knowledge about its nature revealed by, or implied in, our experience of that little bit of the Universe with which we are in immediate contact. And this is just what is generally denied, with more or less emphasis and consistency, by those who tend to regard the individual mind as mere appearance. From mere appearance to false and delusive appearance is but a short step. In proportion as the individual is regarded as a mere appearance, an inconsistent, misleading, and rather contemptible appearance of the Absolute, possessing value merely in proportion as he contributes to the life of some larger Whole, his judgments as to what is really valuable, and any claims which he may make on the strength of them to recognition and satisfaction and greater fullness of life, are discredited in advance. Any arguments which may be based upon the evil or imperfection of a Universe in which such a being as man is doomed to a very imperfect development, a maimed and often painful existence and an early extinction, are set aside as arising from the too limited and one-sided, the merely subjective character, of human judgments about right and wrong. Looked at from the point of view of the whole, we are assured, the atrocities and the sufferings of the late war are as beautiful a thing, as essential a contribution to the perfection of the alone valuable Whole, as German Philosophy or English Philanthropy. Such is the avowed attitude of men like Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet ; and even in their more Christian-minded imitators there are

traces of the same contempt for mere morality, and for the estimates of human sin and suffering which mere moral judgments entail; though in them it may take the form of exalting the mystical intuition in the light of which, even without any hope of individual survival, it is seen that all things are and always have been very good—that is to say, good for the few mystics who enjoy these experiences, and the Absolute of whose existence theirs is a part. For any serious examination of this position I have no time. All I can do is to admit that without a thoroughgoing respect for the moral consciousness and its affirmations, no argument for immortality—a personal or even, if such language has any meaning, an impersonal immortality—can possibly be constructed. All I can say by way of argument on this head is to challenge the objectors to give any reason why human judgments about right and wrong should be distrusted more than those human judgments the validity of which is assumed in the argument directed towards the discrediting of them.¹

Assuming then the existence of God and self and the validity of our highest ideals of good, why cannot we construct a reasonable and self-consistent idea of the Universe without immortality? In one of the most penetrating attacks upon the hope of immortality, or at least upon this particular argument for immortality, which I have ever read—an article, “The Ethics of Immortal Reward,”² by Professor Laird in a recent number of the *Hibbert Journal*—it is suggested that the moral argument for immortality really implies the retributive theory of

¹ This does not imply the “ethical obsession” against which Dean Inge of St. Paul’s protests if by that is meant the view that only the good will has value to the exclusion of knowledge and æsthetic experience and other forms of spiritual life; it does mean (a) that the good-will (which of course cannot exist apart from knowledge and feeling) is assigned the highest value, and (b) that the moral consciousness is recognised as the judge of the value to be assigned to other elements in life.

² Vol. XVI, p. 580 (1918). In his *Problems of the Self* Prof. Laird leaves the question wholly open, maintaining that Psychology has nothing to say for or against the belief.

Punishment and the corresponding theory of Reward, and has no basis apart from it. The argument, as he understands it, is supposed to run thus. Our moral consciousness assures us that goodness ought to be rewarded, and vice punished. But the ordinary course of Nature shows hardly any tendency to secure an adequate reward for virtue or punishment for vice. Assuming that there exists a spiritual Being capable of rewarding virtue and punishing vice, and assuming that these moral judgments of ours represent the nature and will of that Being, it must be supposed that He will provide a future life wherein these rewards and these punishments shall be brought into existence. Such is undoubtedly—in substance—the way in which the argument was stated by thinkers like Kant and Bishop Butler, and in which it is still sometimes propounded—more often perhaps by theologians than by philosophers. But this seems to me a wholly inadequate statement of what is meant by the moral argument in the form in which it would find most philosophical support at the present day. It seems to be the last infirmity of acute philosophic minds that they can seldom state the case of their opponents in its strongest form, and prefer to win easy triumphs over some antiquated version or some gross caricature of the case they have really got to meet. I agree with Professor Laird in rejecting the notion that punishment is an end in itself, and that reward can be claimed as a matter of right or abstract justice. But the Professor proceeds to argue that, if there is no reason why vice should be punished or virtue rewarded, then the inequalities of human life, the sufferings of the righteous, the spectacle of the wicked flourishing as a green bay-tree, the great tragedies of history, the low degree of happiness attainable in the three-score years and ten of average human existence—all these constitute no argument why the Universe should not be regarded as a just and reasonable Universe even without the

hope of any future life for the individual. Whatever be Professor Laird's exact attitude towards Theism, he very emphatically states his belief that the Universe has moral ends and that these ends are fulfilled. That being so, he would, I presume, account for the presence of evil in such a universe as being a necessary means to the good. If we refuse to regard pleasure as the only or the chief good and pain as the supreme evil, then we must suppose that the existence of real evil in the world is the necessary condition for the production of the highest good in the world—for the development of character and intellect, and especially character—for the evolution of souls freely willing the good for its own sake. If this is Professor Laird's position, I am in hearty agreement with it. Now some measure of such moral goodness and of other high values is undoubtedly produced by this Universe, and therefore—so it seems to be suggested—the Universe has got all the justification that Reason can demand. Or, to put it theistically, the world is such a world as can be supposed to be willed by a God whose nature is revealed by our highest judgments of value. Now I believe profoundly that, so far as it goes, Professor Laird's theodicy—if such it is intended to be—is right. I should insist, indeed, that the willing of a world with so much evil in it implies a certain limitation of the divine Power; and I should point out that, though we can see the necessity for the evil up to a certain point, we cannot see in detail the necessity for all the evil that actually exist. But still substantially it is right, as it seems to me, to find the explanation of the evil—so far as our limited intelligence can find it at all—in the values which are realised in and by the struggle against it, and in the other values to the production of which we must suppose the evil to be a necessary means. The value of moral goodness is not dependent upon the fact of its being rewarded here or hereafter any more than

the value of intellectual activity or of æsthetic enjoyment : it is good in itself. Moral evil is none the less evil because in some cases it may lead to a life in which pleasure predominates. Professor Laird even maintains that the "impartiality of the universe, miscalled indifference, is precisely what ought to occur in a moral universe," by which I suppose is meant that it is conducive to the moral ends of the Universe that virtue should often not be rewarded, and wickedness often prosper. And up to a certain point, this is a proposition which can hardly be denied. Kant long ago maintained that if we had the same certainty as to the existence of future rewards and punishments as we have of the existence of the Sun and Moon, it might "corrupt the purity of our wills." Many theologians have said the same thing in other words. But is this theodicy sufficient? I do not think Professor Laird sufficiently recognises that to justify the Universe as an expression of Reason and Goodness it is not enough to show that in it certain values are realised : we must find grounds for believing that the good is sufficient to outweigh the evil, the pain and misery, the ignorance and stupidity and the sin which also exist in the world. And is this actually the case?

I for one cannot take a contemptuous view of the value either of pleasure or of happiness : and Professor Laird is quite emphatic in asserting that "happiness is good and pain is bad." Pleasure is of many different kinds : some kinds of it are doubtless of very little value—some perhaps have a negative value, but other kinds of pleasure are of high value, and pleasure is an element in all the highest and most desirable kinds of conscious life. I cannot, therefore, dismiss the pleasure-side of life in the light and airy way which is fashionable with some idealistic philosophers. Nor can I regard it as a note of moral elevation to be indifferent to the negative value of other people's pain. And when I

ask myself whether the good that is realised in this transitory existence (if this were all) is really worth all the pain that it costs, I begin to have doubts. The doubts are strengthened when we turn to the higher goods, when we think of the small number of those who have participated to any high degree in the best intellectual life, in the highest æsthetic enjoyment, in the most satisfying forms of practical activity. And when we turn to the strictly ethical side of life, how few are those who have attained; how mixed has been the character even of the reputed saints and heroes; how low has been the general level, how appalling the mass of sin and selfishness, excuseless cruelty and irrational hate! Is the good that is produced really worth the misery, the ugliness, the sin which it has cost?

After all, would any one of us like to be responsible for the creation of the world as it is? No doubt it may be suggested that the question implies a creation in time such as modern philosophers and men of Science are pretty well unanimous in rejecting. But the question is a quite legitimate one for anyone who thinks of the world, including the being of the lesser spirits to whose life it is organic, as a world created by a universal Mind in the sense that it expresses the ultimate nature of that Mind—for anyone, that is, who attaches any sort of meaning to the idea of creation, though it may be conceived of as an eternal creation. I repeat, then, would any of us care to be responsible for the evil of the world? Or (if from an indeterminist point of view you plead that part of this evil is due to the undetermined choice of partially free spirits) would any of us care to be responsible for allowing this evil to go on, and for directly causing the evil that is not due to human freedom, for the sake of such hedonistic, intellectual, and moral values as are actually realised in the world's history up to the present date? And without any pessimistic disparagement of possible future progress we

may add the further question, "Is there any sober ground for anticipating such a quality and quantity of life in the future as will be worth the thousands of years during which the highest attainments have been rare and very imperfect, the general level low, the abysses of misery and of sin profound and terrible?" If it rested with one of us to determine whether the life of this planet should go on, if by pressing a button he could put a stop to all the conscious life upon it, would he feel justified in refusing to press that button? For myself, I think I should say "Great as is the good that I know I am extinguishing, I cannot make myself responsible for a continuance of our present horrors." I think I should have to press the button. Still more certain am I that I should have pressed the button, had I been given that opportunity in the days (say) of palæolithic man. And I am sure most people will agree with me, or would do so but for the operation of certain powerful prejudices. Why should we suppose God to be so much less loving and compassionate than man? If that is the way in which we, in the exercise of that moral judgment which supplies our only means of judging about these questions, feel bound to think, why should we suppose that God thinks otherwise? If we deny that our moral judgments have any application to God or the Absolute, we have no ground left for saying that God is good. There is only one way in which the good realised in these years of earthly life can be supposed adequately to outweigh the evil; and that is to look upon earthly life as but a part, a preliminary part, a relatively short stage in the development of souls which have a long period of development and vast possibilities of increasingly valuable experience open to them after they have been delivered from the bodily organisms which determine, and which limit, their present capacities for action and for enjoyment. With the hypothesis of immortality we

can regard the world as a reasonable word expressive of a purpose for the realisation of the highest possible good, and a purpose which on the whole and in the end will be accomplished : without immortality I do not see that we can. To put it more simply, with immortality we can believe that God is Love, and the world an expression of that Love : without it we cannot.

So far I have been speaking of the total mass of good and evil in the world. In a reasonable Universe there must be no evil that is not necessary as a means to, or a condition of, the realisation of good ; and the good realised must be worth the evil involved in the means—greater than the evil, I should be disposed to say *much* greater, because the absence of good is such a much less evil than the presence of evil. But I am not prepared, as Professor Laird seems to be, to ignore altogether the question of distribution. Such good as is realised in human life seems hardly worth the evil that it costs ; but not only so ; that good is most unequally distributed. Goods of all kinds—the highest as well as the lowest—are distributed in a way which suggests the wildest caprice. If it be insisted that the highest goods can only be realised by personal exertion, there is certainly no equality of opportunity in respect of the highest any more than of the lowest goods. Unless (like Origen) we believe in a pre-natal fall, unless we believe that man's spiritual privileges in the present life are the consequences of pre-natal effort or pre-natal sin, it is not the fault of one man that he was born an African devil-worshipper or due to the virtue of another that he was born a Christian. I cannot follow Professor Laird in regarding this utter lack of correspondence between virtue and happiness as no evil or even as a positive good. I am not prepared to say that a righteous will is not justified in causing a very unequal distribution of good if that is necessary to increase the quantity of good on the whole.

The best men, in the exercise of their voluntary activity, constantly cause pain to one man in order to secure a greater good to a greater number. And certainly, if God is in any sense the cause or the ground of this world, that is the only principle upon which it is possible to explain the actual distribution of goods upon this planet. I do not say that justice requires that the wicked should be punished, except so far as they can be made better thereby: nor do I say that the good ought to be rewarded in exact proportion to merit. But I do regard this very unequal distribution of goods as an evil. If we are justified in believing a future life as the only hypothesis on which the quantity and quality of good here attainable can be regarded as worth the evil, we are justified equally in hoping for a state in which there will be some nearer approach to justice in distribution: and without that future state there cannot even be that predominance of good over evil which might justify some inequality of distribution. I am not now reverting to the retributive theory. Because one gives up the idea of retributive justice, that is no reason why one should give up the ideal of distributive justice—that ideal which was so strongly emphasised, for instance, by the late Professor Sidgwick, who was no believer in retributive punishment or reward. I do not say that justice demands that virtue should be rewarded with other goods. But I do say that it does require that, so far as possible, every soul that is created should enjoy some good proportionate to its capacity. The possibilities even of virtue are most unequally distributed. And virtue by itself is not the whole good of life. The life of the virtuous man on the rack has a value, no doubt; but there is one thing better than the life of a virtuous man on the rack, and that is the life of a virtuous man off the rack. Happiness is part, though it is not the whole, of “our being’s end and goal,” and happiness does include pleasure and

the absence of pain. If this life were all, then that true end of life, that supreme beatitude—which includes both virtue and happiness, the enjoyment of knowledge and beauty and much besides—would be missed, or enjoyed but in a most imperfect measure and for some transitory moment, by a very large proportion of the best men. And that is an evil. The ideal which our judgments of value hold up to us would have to be pronounced to be unattainable, and the attainable approximation to it a very distant approximation for the vast majority. Is a Universe so constituted a reasonable Universe? We need not, it seems to me, postulate even in the future life any exact compensation in proportion to merit or to sufferings previously borne; but it is reasonable to hope for a life in which the other elements of the ideal life will become attainable for those who have reached the higher levels of goodness. The morally good ought to be made happy, not because they have earned a reward, but because, if they are not, the true good will be attainable by no one, nowhen, and nowhere. That is the element of truth which lies at the bottom of the popular demand that the good shall be rewarded. As for the more imperfect characters—the less good, the average men, the wicked—positive punishment is, indeed, justifiable only as a means: but for them, even more than for the righteous, the attainment of the true end of their being is possible only on the hypothesis of a future life, in which, whether by painful or by other means, they may be rendered capable of the higher goods and of the sort of happiness which cannot exist without the higher goods, but which the higher goods cannot by themselves secure.

Professor Laird seems to think that the Universe is sufficiently rationalised or moralised if there is in it some amount of goodness and some amount of happiness, but that there is no reason at all why the two should go together or be enjoyed by the same

persons. I venture to hold that the supreme good does not lie either in goodness or in happiness enjoyed separately or by different persons, but in a life which is both good and happy (not to mention the other elements of good which it will include) ; and if this supreme good is to be enjoyed by anyone, it must be enjoyed by some definite person or persons. If it is not so enjoyed, it does not exist at all, and to that extent the end of a moral Universe remains unrealised. To my mind it is an evil that any human being should miss such a life ; and it is evil or irrational that the elements of it should only be enjoyed separately. It is an evil that those who possess the highest thing in life should never enjoy that lower good without which the highest good is not *the* good. It is an evil that the wicked should permanently get pleasure or happiness, because the pleasure or happiness which is compatible with wickedness is a good of a very low order ; and its enjoyment, so far as bad men do enjoy it, tends to make them incapable of a much higher good. A Universe which would not ultimately bring about a greater co-existence of the higher and the lower elements of good than now exists is not a Universe to which I should think it reasonable to attribute a moral purpose. To put the matter in more definitely theistic and Christian terms, it would be a Universe which could not be reasonably regarded in as any sense the expression of a righteous and loving Will.

To put the whole argument in another way, the true ground of the ethical demand for immortality lies in the unrealised capacities of human nature. Humanity is capable of, and (if any teleological assumption is justified) seems made for, a good so much higher than any that is actually attainable in this life. The good actually realised seems hardly worth the cost. Unless this realisation can be carried further, it would seem better that so little good, mixed with so much evil, should not have been

at all. That is what we naturally think—those of us whose eyes are adequately open to both sides of the matter, the poverty of the actual realisation, the supreme value of the life of which in brief and fitful glimpses humanity shows itself capable. And so we must suppose God to think, if God is anything like humanity at its best. A God of love could not create such a world. The contrast between the immensity of human capacity and the poorness of the attainment—that is the inmost kernel of all the great classical arguments for immortality. That is the thought which underlies the famous Platonic arguments, so indefensible as mere pieces of dialectic. That is the thought which Kant somewhat degraded or caricatured. That is the real meaning of the one argument which Jesus Christ ever used on the subject. A Being who was ever thought worthy of such communion with God as the heroes of the Hebrew race were thought to have enjoyed could not be destined for so poor and transitory a life as this world would be, if this were all. “God is not the God of the dead but of the living.” So poor and so transitory : the transitoriness is part of the poverty. For I cannot sympathise with those who loftily pretend that true values have nothing to do with duration. A tenth of a second of the direst torture ever endured by man would be a negligible evil ; and who would care for an intellectual insight, an æsthetic rapture, a supremest blessedness which lasted only for such a period ? Our life here is in time. Once again, a God of love could not have doomed humanity to such a life, unless indeed His power is limited to an extent which would seem hardly compatible with the ascription to Him of any power at all. The attempt to combine the Christian view of God with the denial of immortality is peculiarly difficult for thinkers who are full of lofty scorn for the idea of even such a limitation of God’s power as has been recognised by most orthodox theologians.

I have given you a bare outline of what I believe to be the true argument for immortality. I am deeply conscious of the difficulties of the conception: but to me it is the only way of escape from the greater difficulties which stand in the way of every other possible theory of the Universe—of all non-theistic theories and of a Theism without immortality. But difficulties are not necessarily objections. It may be possible for a theory of the Universe to escape contradiction or fatal objections: no theory can escape difficulties. Many lectures would be wanted if I were to try to meet possible objections: but there is one about which I must say just a word. I shall be told in many quarters that I have been assuming the reality of time, and that that is an assumption which no philosopher can make. I am afraid that my reply must be brief and dogmatic. All our experience is in time, and we can form no intelligible conception of an experience which is out of time. That is admitted by most of those who talk so glibly about Reality or the Absolute, or perhaps even their own individual selves, being “out of time.” They feel driven to it by certain lines of argument, but they admit that they do not really know what it means. When, as is sometimes the case, they are scornful about personal survival and yet speak of personal immortality, they are compelled at every turn to use language which implies time.¹ I for one do not think that an appeal to the unintelligible is any real solution of difficulties. For us nothing is out of time except truth and true judgments; and judgments are not real existences.

¹ “Space and time do not belong to the eternal world. . . . Eternal life is no diffusion or dilution of personality, but its consummation. It seems certain then that in such a state of existence individuality must be *maintained*.” (*Outspoken Essays*, by W. R. Inge, D.D., Dean of St. Paul’s, p. 276.) The word “maintained” of course implies persistence in time. “If my particular life-meaning passes out of activity, it will be because the larger life, to which I belong, *no longer* needs that form of expression. My death, like my birth, *will have* a teleological justification, to which my supratemporal self *will* consent.” (*Ibid.*, p. 273: *Italics mine.*)

To say that we are eternal because it will always be true that we have lived, and that our life possessed a value,¹ is merely to trifle with a serious problem : and yet that is what seems to be meant by a future life for the individual which will not be in time. I quite recognise the force of the old Kantian antinomy—the impossibility of thinking either of a first event, a beginning of time, or of an endless series of events both ways. But it is no solution of that difficulty to talk about time as merely an appearance, as purely subjective or phenomenal and the like. If and so far as it is an appearance, all our lives—our joys, our sorrows, our knowledge, our morality, our sins, God Himself as thought of by us—are mere appearances too. That is admitted by the philosopher who has most logically followed out this line of thought ; and he ends by admitting also that the Absolute is after all an entity which exists only in these appearances. Therefore, after all, the appearances are the only reality there is. It is perhaps not impossible to justify belief in a future life, and even an endless future, upon the assumption that the Absolute is timeless. If the Absolute (or the Universe as a whole) somehow includes within itself the experiences which we call lives in time, even on that view there is no reason why it should not contain within itself immortal lives in time. The unending life will be an appearance, no doubt, but it need not be less real than the life that now is. Doubtless we cannot think how endless lives should be comprised within a timeless reality : but neither can we understand how a life of six weeks should be an element in a timeless reality. And the same line

¹ " If every life in this world represents an unique purpose in the Divine mind, and if the end or meaning of soul-life, though striven for in time, has both its source and its achievement in eternity, this, the value and reality of the individual life, must remain as a distinct fact in the spiritual world." (Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, p. 276.) Elsewhere the Dean tells us that it is a legitimate hope that in another life the Soul may be able to act more freely (*The Philosophy of Plotinus*, i, 264). I find it quite impossible to reconcile his various utterances on the subject.

of reply, I may say in passing, might be adopted against those who object to personal immortality on the ground of the unreality of the individual person, and talk about an impersonal immortality in which the person will somehow be swallowed up. Granted that the individual is unreal, a mere appearance, and generally contemptible: there is no reason why an immortal self should not be at least as real as a mortal one. And that perhaps would satisfy most of us. These are not mere *argumenta ad hominem*; they tend to show the impossibility of reconciling the mode of thought on which the objections are based with the actual laws of human thinking, and still more with an even approximately Christian presentation of the Universe. Those who deny personal immortality on the ground that the temporal is unreal are equally bound to reduce to the level of mere appearance the present self, our present notions of morality and sin, God Himself, so far as He is knowable at all: The more logical of them avowedly do so.

My own way of dealing with the antinomy about time is far too simple to please philosophers. It is simply to recognise that here we come to the limits of human thought. Doubtless there must be a way of "transcending" the antinomy. Doubtless God knows what it is, but we do not. Doubtless God must be supposed Himself in some way to transcend time: we may if we like call Him "*supra tempus*" (that is much better than "out of time"), but we do not know how this transcendence is effected. And I have never read any philosopher's attempt to effect that transcendence which does not fall into manifold more antinomies and contradictions than it escapes. We cannot transcend the antinomy: but, just as the existence of that antinomy is no reason for not believing in the Sciences which assume a real difference between past, present, and future, and for not treating as real and very important the selves which

are in time, so that unsolved difficulty supplies us with no reason for not accepting the conclusion to which we are led no less inevitably by the use of our intellectual faculties—that the only way in which the world can be supposed adequately to fulfil a rational purpose is by supposing that after death there will be a continuance of this personal life for the individual. That conception is doubtless inadequate ; but it is less inadequate than the meaningless assertion that time exists within a timeless reality, or the still more self-contradictory assertion that at a certain date in the future *I* shall pass out of time into the timeless.

One word on a further objection. It is very common among philosophers to assume that, if you believe in personal immortality, you are bound to believe in personal pre-existence. That assumption seems to me part of that deep-rooted philosophical prejudice that the temporal is a synonym for the unreal or the contemptible, that there is no such thing as real change, that nothing ever really happens, that the whole drama of events in the natural world and in the innermost life of souls is all a phantasmagoric representation of a static Reality. What the purpose or the value of such a representation—or misrepresentation—may be, is a question which does not seem to trouble such thinkers,¹ and indeed it would seem from such a point of view that there can be no real purpose in the Universe as a whole : for at the end of the procession, or at every point of it, you are only just where you were at the beginning. The eternal “as you were” is always the end of all human and of all divine actions, in so far as we can still talk about action in a static world. From such a point of view it may well seem, as it has seemed to some, a grotesque supposition that the fluctuations of the birth-rate can affect the quantity

¹ Unless, as some have suggested, we say that it supplies timeless diversion to the Absolute.

of real being in the Universe.¹ Against such a point of view the system of M. Bergson is a much-needed, though exaggerated, protest—exaggerated, because I for one fail to understand the idea of change without the complementary idea of something which persists through change. I must once again express my admiring agreement with the searching criticism to which this whole line of thought has recently been subjected by Professor Pringle-Pattison and Professor Sorley² When once this prejudice against the idea of change is abandoned, there is nothing unreasonable in the ordinary doctrine of immortality without pre-existence, though I should be far from wishing to describe as unchristian or irrational a doctrine which was held by Origen. The short answer to the objection about pre-existence is that, if the belief in immortality is based upon moral considerations—upon the impossibility of rationalising the Universe without it, then we may disbelieve in life before birth because it is not required for the rationalisation of the Universe, and believe in life after death because it is so required. What is the ultimate goal of that continued progress towards the good in which both the present life and the life beyond must be supposed to consist is a question which our inability to understand the true nature of Time prevents us from answering: but, if there be any truth in the moral argument, we may be content with feeling sure that the solution must be one which will give a real meaning to the idea of salvation—a meaning which cannot be given to it by any

¹ "A kingdom of heaven inhabited by a population of spiritual monads, the number of which is determined by the fluctuations in the birth-rate and the duration of human life on this planet . . . is hardly credible except as a symbolical picture." (Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, p. 182.) I need hardly say that the doctrine of "impervious monads" is not maintained in this Essay or by most of the writers against whom the Dean seems to be tilting.

² I am most completely in agreement with Prof. Sorley who, much more definitely than Prof. Pringle-Pattison, regards the belief in personal immortality as vital to any theory which represents the Universe as rational.

philosophy which reduces change, human effort, personal existence to unreal seemings within the being of a changeless, unpurposeful, super-moral, and impersonal Absolute. All attempts to christianise such a Universe seem to me to represent an illogical, vacillating, and at bottom unintelligible halting between two fundamentally opposed and incompatible points of view.

May I conclude with one word of protest against the cheap sneers indulged in by many philosophers who either disbelieve, or, while professing in some sense to believe, seek to disparage, the doctrine of personal immortality. They persistently represent it as springing from a mercenary hankering after personal reward, or a personal dislike of extinction, from which, often with considerable self-complacency they profess themselves immune. Such sneers are as unjustified and as unworthy as the old suggestion, long since abandoned by reputable theologians, that the real motive of "infidelity" is to be found in a personal desire for vicious self-indulgence and a fear of the penalties which, if religion were true, would await it in another world. St. Paul was willing to be accursed for his brethren's sake, if they could be saved: but he would not have looked upon the extinction of those brethren at the moment of death with the wonderful complacency with which the philosophers in question seem to contemplate the extinction of the millions who have, so far, had little reason to be grateful for their existence. Which is the more refined, the more exalted, and (as some of the philosophers in question profess the Christian religion) I will add the more Christian frame of mind—which attitude may most reasonably be attributed to the supreme Mind—I will leave you to judge. Doubtless our wishes—even our disinterested wishes—are no proof that their object is attainable: but, if the Universe is so constituted as habitually to thwart the desire naturally felt by the best men in

their best moments, I do not myself see how it is possible to think of that Universe as expressing the nature of a Mind which is supposed to have made the fullest revelation of Himself in the human mind, and in particular in its judgments of value.¹ I do not understand a philosophy which proposes to find in our judgments of value the clue to the inmost nature of Reality, and yet treats the hope of Immortality as irrational, immoral, or contemptible. In view of its many difficulties, I can understand—only too well—many degrees of hopeful confidence or of regretful doubt in minds which share this fundamental conviction. I can understand in short any attitude but one—that of contemptuous indifference.

¹ I need not say that the whole of my argument is immensely strengthened for those who regard this revelation of God in humanity as culminating in a unique revelation in Christ.

VI

WHAT IS JUSTICE ?¹

I.—THE THEORY OF EQUALITY

A VERY slight acquaintance with the social and economic discussions of the present day is enough to excite surprise at the ease with which people persuade themselves that they know well enough what justice is, however great the difficulty of bringing it about. As of old, in Plato's day, men are engaged in hot debate about "just things"—the justice of this or that particular social arrangement, while they complacently ignore the fundamental question, "What is Justice itself?" No doubt we all have some rough and ready working idea of justice, which might serve well enough for many, if not most, practical purposes. And if the discussions to which I have alluded were limited to immediately practicable measures, we might perhaps be able to get on without any defined theoretical idea of justice in general. But at the present day the immediate reform proposed is often advocated or opposed, not on its own merits, but because it is regarded as a step towards some ideal reconstruction of society which presents itself to one party as the ultimate aim of all political effort, and to the other as fundamentally opposed to that very abstract justice in whose name the reform is demanded. People may agree, for instance, as to the practical justice of an eight-hours day; but the legislative enactment of an eight-hours day commends itself to some who would admit that this particular advantage could be gained by other means, precisely because it is considered a step towards a State-regulated equality of conditions; while to others who would have no objection to the particular measure, the means of obtaining it seems objectionable because it asserts a

¹ Reprinted from the *Economic Review*, Vol. I, pp. 466-485 (October, 1891).

principle the logical application of which involves the very essence of Injustice, or (as Aristotle would have put it) equality for the unequal. When the most everyday questions of practical politics are thus debated on the most speculative grounds, it becomes a matter of pressing importance to examine the theoretical basis of the ultimate social ideals to which appeal is made, and particularly of the fundamental conception which, though not the whole, is an essential part of all of them—Justice.

Among the current popular conceptions of Justice the most prominent are perhaps—

1. The ideal of Equality—Every one to count for one, and nobody for more than one.

2. The ideal of just Recompense—To every one according to his work.

I propose in the following pages to examine the meaning of the above propositions, and to ask how much guidance they are capable of affording as ultimate canons of political justice. When we have ascertained the limits within which each of these doctrines can reasonably be propounded (1) as ideally true, (2) as capable of practical application, it may be easier to ask how far there is any fundamental opposition between what present themselves at first sight as antagonistic and inconsistent ideals.

In examining the doctrine of Equality, it is essential to bear in mind the context in which it stands. It was put forward by Bentham (not, of course, for the first time) as a canon for the distribution of happiness; and it is obvious that the Greatest Happiness principle, or the principle of Greatest Good (however Good be interpreted), stands in need of that or some other supplementary canon before it can be available for practical application. It is obvious that in a community of a hundred persons we might produce the greatest possible happiness or good in a variety of ways. It would be quite legitimate, so far as the Greatest Happiness principle

is concerned, to give the whole of our disposable good to twenty-five out of the hundred, and ignore the other seventy-five, provided that by so doing we could make each of these twenty-five four times as happy as we should make each of the hundred by an equal distribution ; and if by an unequal distribution we could make twenty-five people five times as happy, or give them five times as much good (whatever the true good be) as we could procure for each of the hundred by an equal distribution, we should be absolutely bound by our Greatest Good principle (taken by itself) to ignore the seventy-five, and distribute our good exclusively among the twenty-five.

So long as the amount of good would be neither increased nor diminished by an equal distribution, it will hardly be denied as an abstract principle that justice requires an equal distribution. It is true that the principle is an exceedingly abstract one. It merely asserts that if you have a certain quantity of good to dispose of between A and B, you ought to give half to A and half to B, *so long as all you know about them is that one is A and the other B, or other things being equal, or so long as there is no reason for preferring A to B.* How far the axiom ought to be modified in its practical application by the fact that A never does differ from B solely in being a different individual, and what kind of inequality between A and B supplies reasonable ground for an inequality in the shares assigned to A and B respectively, are questions which must be postponed. But, for the present, I assume that it will be generally admitted as a self-evident truth, that equality is the right rule for distributive justice in the absence of any special reason for inequality. Our first difficulty arises in the case where an equal distribution of good necessarily diminishes the amount of good to be distributed. It will hardly be denied that this is often the case. It is easy to imagine cases where the difficulty arises in connection with an actual distribu-

tion of a definite and assignable good to a definite and assignable number of persons. In a beleaguered garrison nobody would question the justice of an equal distribution of rations ; but supposing it were known that relief could not arrive for a month, and the provisions available could keep half of them alive, while an equal distribution would insure the slow starvation of the whole, it would surely be better to cast lots as to which half should be fed and which should starve. I do not maintain that the exact conditions indicated could ever be exactly forthcoming, or even that the course suggested would be actually the right one to take if they were. But if that course would not be right in the case supposed, it must be for some other reason than its injustice. No one would be bold enough to propose that the whole garrison should starve simply to insure an ideal equality between all the individuals concerned. In a less extreme form the difficulty I have indicated is of constant occurrence. The schoolmaster, for instance, has to face the problem how far a whole class is to be kept back that the ultra-stupid minority may learn something. And when we turn from detailed questions of individual conduct to large problems of social and political action, the case supposed is not the exception but the rule. Nobody will deny that the present distribution of good things is excessively and arbitrarily unequal. The most satisfied champion of the existing social order will not deny that many people are badly clothed, badly fed, over-worked, and otherwise miserable through no fault of their own. And the most extreme advocate of social reconstruction, who is at once sane and well-informed, will hardly deny that any attempt to produce an *immediate* equality of possessions, or of happiness, or of opportunities (whichever it be), would only cure these inequalities by producing, in no long period, a general dead-level of misery and want, or (to put it at the lowest) by seriously dimin-

ishing the ultimate well-being of the country or the race. Here, then, an unequal distribution has to be adopted in order that there may be something to distribute. Either we may say (from a rough and practical point of view) that equality is *a* good, but it is not *the* good, and that we must in practice balance the principle of Greatest Good against the principle of Equality, or (with more scientific precision) we may assert that in such cases there is no real sacrifice of equality. The law is fulfilled even in the case wherein its practical operation seems to involve the height of inequality, just as the laws of motion are fulfilled when two opposite forces neutralise each other and produce rest. For what the individual is entitled to is simply *equality of consideration*. The individual has had his rights even when the equal rights of others demand that in practice he should receive no good at all, but even a considerable allowance of evil. It would be the height of injustice, indeed, that the good of ninety among a hundred people should be considered, and the well-being of the remaining ten wholly ignored. The ninety and the ten are entitled to consideration precisely in the ratio of ninety to ten. The rights of the ten would be grossly violated if the ninety were to do what would be best for themselves were the remaining ten out of the way ; as, for instance, by dividing among themselves all the available provisions, and giving none to the excluded ten. On the other hand there are cases where it would not only be expedient, but just, that ten men should die that the remaining ninety might live, e.g. in case of a forlorn hope in war. In such cases the minority gets its rights as fully as the majority, provided its proportionate claim to consideration has been duly satisfied before it was determined that the measure proposed was on the whole for the general good.

The distinction that has just been laid down seems to me of considerable practical importance.

1. In the first place, it is of importance in connection with the Philosophy of Rights. I am at a loss to discover any tangible concrete thing, or any "liberty of action in acquisition," to which it can be contended that every individual human being has a right under all circumstances. There are circumstances under which the satisfaction of any and every such right is a physical impossibility. And if every assertion of right is to be conditioned by the clause "if it be possible," we might as well boldly say that every man, woman, and child on the earth's surface has a right to £1000 a year. There is every bit as much reason for such an assertion as for maintaining that every one has right to the means of subsistence, or to three acres and a cow, or to life, or to liberty, or to the Parliamentary franchise, or to propagate his species, or the like. There are conditions under which none of these rights can be given to one man without prejudice to the equal rights of others. There seems, then, to be no "right of Man" which is unconditional, except the right to consideration—that is to say, a right to have his true well-being (whatever that be¹) regarded as of equal importance in all social arrangements with the well-being of everybody else. Elaborate expositions of the rights of man seem to me, at best, attempts to formulate the leading rights which an application of the principle of Equality would require to be conceded to the generality of men at a particular stage of social development. They are all ultimately resolvable into the one supreme and unconditional right—the right to equal consideration.

2. It is more to our present purpose to notice that most of the crude or dangerous misapplications of the doctrine of Equality spring from the neglect of this principle—from the attempt to translate an abstract equality of consideration into an immediate equality

¹ For fear of misunderstanding, I may say at once that I entirely deny the hedonistic identification of Good with Pleasant. By Good or Well-being I mean something like the Aristotelian *εὐδαιμονία*.

of concrete possessions, or liberties, or political power, or what not. Most of the objections to the doctrine may (I think) be met by bearing in mind the distinction on which I have been dwelling.

Thus it might be objected to the principle of Equality, that an attempt to realise the immediate equality of property, or of some particular kind of property, might be good for the present generation, though it would lead to ultimate anarchy. The objection is met if it is remembered that future generations have rights as well as the present. Generations yet unborn may have the right to consideration ; though that is obviously the only right that they are at present capable of enjoying.

Then, again, almost every *direct* application of the Equality principle involves the tacit assumption that the legislator has at his command a definite quantity of happiness or good which he can distribute at his pleasure. A moment's reflection shows that it is *never* " Good " itself, but simply the conditions of Good, that are capable of being " distributed," either by the State or by a private individual. Nothing that can possibly be distributed is a good under all circumstances or to all persons. There is no Paradise that some people would not contrive to turn into a Hell even for themselves. It is obvious that equal conditions of well-being will not produce equal amounts of actual well-being to persons of differing mental and bodily constitution. The devotee of Equality as a practical watch-word will probably say, " Let the conditions be equally distributed ; for the rest, the individual must take care of himself." Such a rule of conduct would violate the principle of Equality of Consideration. The difficulty may be seen most clearly if we take one of the lowest kinds of good—a good the external conditions of which really are capable of " distribution " to an extent which is rarely the case with higher kinds of good. It will hardly be denied that different people require

different amounts of food. Put aside subjective differences due to habit, education, and so on, and it will remain true that the same amount and quality of food will produce very different amounts both of immediate sensual gratification and of ultimate bodily well-being to men of different races, or even to different individuals of the same race. It is obvious to my mind that if meals were served out by the State, the *ideal* would be to give equal attention to the health and pleasure of each, not to serve out to all a ration which would be repletion to A and leave B unsatisfied. On the other hand, it would be equally inconsistent with our principle to say that everybody must have his hunger or appetite equally satisfied, regardless of the fact that the community has to do twice as much work to satisfy A as to satisfy B, although (it may be) A's contribution to the general good is no greater than B's. That might, of course, be quite right and fair, provided that the labour thus imposed upon the community was only such as was conducive to the well-being of each. But the moment this labour becomes an evil or an abatement of the well-being of B, C, D, etc., this inconvenience has just as much right to be considered as the inconvenience occasioned to A by a somewhat inadequate realisation of his capacity for food. Suppose that one man in every four requires an amount of extra food which would involve an hour's extra work to each of the four. If an hour's extra work to three men be an inconvenience of exactly the same negative value as an inadequate meal to one,¹ the two inconveniences ought to be of exactly equal account to the legislator. The ideal legislator would order that all should bear their fair share of the inconvenience, i.e. that each should work *half* an hour extra, and that the man with the abnormal appetite should receive exactly *half* of that extra

¹ i.e. the inconvenience of the inadequate meal *minus* the gain to him of being spared the extra hour's work which he would share with the others.

amount of food which would fully content him. The bare statement of such problems is sufficient to show the hopeless impossibility of giving full expression to any ideal of absolute justice in actual social arrangements ; but our *theory*, as a theory, is found not incapable of meeting the difficulty, and ideals may be none the less useful because it is recognised that only distant approximations to them are feasible.

When we come to the higher sources of human pleasure—or, if we admit goods which are not capable of being expressed in terms of pleasure, the higher kinds of human good—it is still more glaringly obvious that men's capacity for such goods vary enormously, and that it is only the conditions of them, not the goods themselves, that are capable of "distribution." We assuredly should not effect an equal distribution of æsthetic enjoyment by subjecting every citizen to a uniform course of artistic training. And were the fullest opportunity afforded of following the bent indicated by the varying capacities of each, it would still be as far as ever from realising our ideal of equal enjoyment for all. Whether we look to the actual intensity of enjoyment or to the intellectual or moral worth of the good which we seek to distribute, it will still remain true that men's capacities for such goods vary enormously. They vary partly, of course, on account of the use which men voluntarily make of the opportunities placed within their reach, partly on account of the physical and mental endowments for which nobody supposes them to be "responsible." The first source of inequality will become important when we come to examine the feasibility of the ideal of Just Recompense. For our present purpose, however, it may be ignored ; it is enough that equal distribution has to meet the difficulty that men's capacities of receiving the thing to be distributed are not equal. This is, however, a point which it is unnecessary to labour, since the fact will be readily

admitted. It will possibly, however, be contended that here the ideal is equality of Opportunity. I should be far from denying the great practical value, within certain limits, of this ideal : though, after the admirable article of Mr. Leslie Stephen¹ it will be unnecessary to show the impracticability of a literal realisation of that ideal. But from a theoretical point of view, the ideal itself is open to exactly the same objections as the ideal of equal distribution when applied to so gross and concrete a matter as food. The English navvy would not be given an equal opportunity of making the most of his life by an allowance of food which would seem wanton superfluity to a Russian *moujik* or an Indian *ryot*.² Equally far removed from the ideal of just distribution would it be to furnish equal educational opportunities to the dullard and the genius. Here it would, indeed, be difficult to say on which side the inequality would lie. The dullard might want three times the attention that the genius would require in learning to read : while the genius will require for the realisation of his capacities an education which the dullard is quite incapable of utilising. In either case an individual would be getting much more than his equal share of the distributable goods of the community. For though the man who is not capable of profiting by it may be said to "enjoy" the opportunity as much as the man who is, this is of course a mere *façon de parler*. The opportunity is no more a good to the man to whom nature has denied the capacity for using it than a pair of spectacles is a good to a blind man. And if the ideal of equal distribution as applied to actual goods be boldly given up and the ideal of equal opportunity substituted for it, we must ask whither the amendment will carry us. The change of front, if it is to be executed in a thorough-going manner, will involve

¹ Leslie Stephen's essay on "Social Equality" in *Social Rights and Duties*, vol. i, is here intended. Cp. *The Theory of Good and Evil*, i. 230 n.

² Their varying capacity for work is not *here* to the point.

the elimination from the inequalities which we are to aim at equalising all those which are due to the inequality of nature's bounty. In that case we shall have satisfied our duty to the idiot by giving him every advantage that we offer to the sane man, while we shall refuse to violate our ideal of equal opportunity by providing him with asylums and keepers, which the sane man does not want. The distinction between men of different race, between the sexes, between the sick and the whole, will have to be equally ignored.¹ The consequence seems preposterous: but there is no way out of it. One of two things: either we must try to neutralize natural differences of capacity, in which case more than an even share of opportunity must be given to those to whom nature has been ungenerous; or we must ignore differences of natural capacity, in which case we abandon the ideal of equal opportunity.

It will now be asked, How is the difficulty to be met on the view hitherto maintained? Theoretically our formula is still equal to the emergency. As in the case of the abnormal eater, we must regard the disadvantage inflicted by the extra demands of the abnormal intellect or abnormal physique as of exactly equal value to the evil which the attempt to compensate for the abnormality will inflict on each member of the community. It might seem that even on that principle, the idiot and the incurable would have a bad time. If labour were to be regarded as a mere curse, if sympathetic suffering were to be regarded as mere dead loss to those who suffer it, if real self-sacrifice—sacrifice of pleasure or comfort or ease—by individuals or communities in

¹ Another more formidable difficulty arises if we extend our view to inequalities not of physical constitution but of physical circumstance. If every member of society or of every local community is to have the full benefit of superior soil, climate, etc., we have Capitalism at once. On the other hand, we might ask the Socialist who aims at Equality whether he is really prepared to give to the Laplander as much extra advantage as would compensate him for not living in the Riviera, or to penalise the inhabitant of the Riviera to an extent which would put him on a level even with the Londoner?

the tending of the sick or the mentally afflicted¹ were to be regarded as simply so much deduction from the community's total Good, then no doubt a rigorous application of the principle of Equal Consideration might involve a much more drastic sacrifice of the individual to the community than common humanity would approve. It is because humanity is itself a good, that (upon my view of the nature of Ultimate Good) the principle of Equal Consideration would lead to no such consequences.

How far the principle of Equal Consideration requires an unequal distribution of actual Goods is a practical question which I do not desire here to discuss. The existing distribution of good things is, of course, just as far removed from an equal distribution of actual Good as it is from an equal distribution of the conditions or opportunities of well-being. Whether, on the principle of Equal Consideration, a particular step towards greater Equality ought to be promoted or resisted, will depend upon the question whether, under existing conditions—things being what they are, human nature being what it is, and so on—the change will be in the interest of all, the interest of each being regarded as of exactly equal importance. In practice it may no doubt be exceedingly difficult to balance the advantage of a greater production of Well-being on the one hand, and of a more equal distribution of it on the other. It is probable that sometimes a smaller production of Good must be accepted as a condition of greater Equality, or, rather, we should have to face that consequence if we assumed that an unlimited accumulation of external goods added to the well-being of their possessors. But, on the other hand, it is almost obvious that some inequality is a necessary condition of Well-being. That Equality of Consideration would be violated by immediate attempts

¹ I exclude the young and the old, because this amount of attention is normally required by all.

at forcible and sudden social reconstruction will be generally admitted. But that is not all. A certain liberty of action is, and always will be, a condition of Well-being ; and liberty of action implies inequality. It implies *some* power of appropriating to one's-self the results of one's own activity, or of disposing of them to others. Granted that necessary *work* might be parcelled out by the State, it is difficult to see how rational beings could occupy their leisure in an agreeable manner without a power of voluntarily disposing of their activities in such a way as to constitute an inequality of enjoyment, either for themselves or for persons immediately dependent upon them or favoured by them. And it is impossible that those inequalities should not be the parent of other inequalities. The man who has been benefited by association with a man of exceptional talent or learning or skill, will pass on his exceptional advantages to others. A town which has been blessed with inhabitants of exceptional energy and character will enjoy advantages which the State could not possibly transfer to others, though it might make it its business artificially to destroy them. Indeed, a logical application of the principle of Equality would involve the enforcement of the seminary maxim " Pas d'amitiés particulières." At what point the attempt to realise equality ceases to be on the whole productive of a greater probability of Good for each, is a practical question which experience only will enable us to decide. I merely want to point out (1) That some Inequality is a condition of Well-being ; (2) That it is an assumption that Socialism would realise a greater practicable Equality than now exists in the only sense in which Equality admits of philosophical defence—Equality of Consideration : that is an Equality that is always practicable, since we can always (ideally) give each individual equal consideration in making up our minds whether this or that will be on the whole for

the general good. The principle of Equal Consideration certainly requires us to aim at greater Equality of actual Well-being, but only on condition that the greater Equality will not violate the equal right of each to enjoy as much good as it is possible for him to enjoy.

So far I have been able to contend that obvious objections to the principle of Equality do not really form an objection to the principle of Equal Consideration—to the doctrine that each man is entitled to an equal consideration at the hands of the community, though the result of such equal consideration, under given conditions, may be an exceedingly unequal distribution of actual goods. But now I have to meet a difficulty which is less easy of even a theoretical solution.

It has already been indicated incidentally that it is not only the less than normal capacity, but also the more than normal capacity of exceptional persons, that may impose upon the community unequal sacrifices to enable them to attain an equal level of well-being. Let us look at the difficulty in its least serious form. The number of persons capable of the highest intellectual cultivation and of enjoying the good incidental to some high cultivation, is unquestionably a small minority. If such goods are to be enjoyed at all, they can only be enjoyed by the few; and yet to give these few the opportunity of such cultivation imposes upon the community sacrifices of inferior good (such good as can be enjoyed by all) quite out of proportion to the number of those for whom the sacrifice is made. It may be contended, of course, that the extra value of the services of such persons to the community is well worth the social cost involved in their long years of unproductive education or preparation, the number of persons and (it may be) materials employed in giving that education, the waste which (on any conceivable system of selection) will be incurred by

the education of persons who eventually turn out to be unfitted for the highest work, and so on. So long as that is the case we no doubt escape the difficulty by our formula of equal consideration. These favoured persons may be allowed advantages which the many do not enjoy; but it is good for each member of the community that they should enjoy them. Once again, equality of consideration itself demands a departure from equal distribution. In this way our difficulty is fairly met, so long as we confine our attention to such higher kinds of culture and resulting well-being as are of obvious social utility. But when we come to what (though I dislike the word) must, I suppose, be called "the higher culture," the case is different. It is greatly to be feared that the cost of "higher culture" to the community must always be considerable. It may be doubted whether there is not a kind of culture which demands for its vitality the existence of a class invested with something more than an equal share of all that makes life pleasant and attractive, and that relieves from sordid cares and gives room for the free expansion of individuality—a class with a good deal of leisure (at least in youth), a good deal of freedom, with an education of the kind that can only be kept alive as an hereditary tradition.¹ But of course such a class can only be maintained by enormous waste. The leisure will be wasted in a large proportion of cases; the liberty will be abused; the freedom to do with one's life what one pleases without justifying it to the rest of the community, will, in a majority of cases, be used to do with one's life what cannot be justified. Only a small proportion of these favoured individuals will do enough

¹ This view is unaffected by the fact that, where this class exists, individual members (often the highest intellects) may come from the classes outside it. They enter into and appropriate the tradition which is kept alive by the favoured class. And it is, of course, superfluous to remark that by this favoured class I do not merely or primarily mean the Aristocracy or the Plutocracy, but a class enjoying as an hereditary possession a more than average measure of wealth or opportunity.

fully to justify their superior advantages. It may be said, indeed, that a socialistic and communistic community might devise means for keeping alive such a class if its social value be adequate to the cost it involves. But, granted for the present this social value, what is the probability of a whole community, organised on principles of pure equality and accustomed to exert in all departments implicit obedience to its collective will, recognising the value of such "culture"? That, of course, is a practical question which does not necessarily touch our theory. If such a community would not recognise the value of a class which is essential to the highest social well-being, then to that extent Socialism is wrong, and all attempts at greater equality of social conditions must be stopped at the point at which the existence of this class begins to be endangered, on the principle of Equal Consideration itself. So far, so good. But all this is assuming the social value of the class. And yet may there not be a point at which the benefits of "culture" cease to be capable of very wide diffusion? Is it possible to prove, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, that there may not be a final irreconcilability between the higher well-being of the few and the lower well-being of the many? ¹ Many will be disposed to brush aside the objection somewhat contemptuously. They will be disposed to say, "Yes, there is a certain exquisite polish of life which probably is not capable of wide diffusion, which demands the existence of a few favoured families with estates, and dividends, and many roomed houses. It is probable that any socialistic or semi-socialistic community that the

¹ I mean merely that something must be taken off from the lower well-being of the many, not that the condition of the many must be made an absolutely undesirable one. It might be, of course, contended that it was actually good that men of lower capacities should enjoy less than the possible amount of the lower goods (eating, drinking, etc.). On this view the difficulty will disappear, but this position postulates that all who are capable of it have the opportunity of entering the favoured class. And this is just what no artificial arrangement seems capable of securing.

most sanguine of sane imaginations could look forward to, would seriously diminish the present expenditure upon professors and libraries in the German Empire. There would be less 'research' on matters but remotely connected with life. Fewer monographs would be published. Emendations would not flourish. Latin verse-making would lose the high market value which it still commands in this country. There would be even a general lowering of the standard of Greek and Latin scholarship. Those who would still study Greek and Latin would have to be content with knowing those languages, say, rather better than even learned men are now content to know French and German. And there would be fewer people to take an interest in Aldine editions or old china. But all this is of very little weight—of very little weight even for the serious *intellectual* interests of humanity at large. To urge such matters as a grave objection to any policy which would bring us a step nearer the social millennium, is like justifying Egyptian bondage because without it, in all probability, the modern globe-trotter would have had to eliminate the pyramids from his programme."

Personally, I should have a good deal of sympathy with such a reply, though I may feel less confident than our candid Socialist that the vulgarising rust, which might be the price of a real advance towards social equality, would stop at the mere polished surface of our intellectual life. But so far we are contemplating comparatively trifling differences of intellectual level—say, the difference between the intellectual level of Berlin and that of a third-rate American University in the far West. But now suppose it were possible, by some scheme of social reconstruction, to win for the great mass of European society the social and economic conditions which may be attained by some socialistic American brotherhood, but at the cost of extinguishing all

Science, all Literature, all Art, all intellectual activity which rises above the highest level known in such communities. That might possibly represent, even on the intellectual side taken alone, a higher kind of life than is now lived by the vast majority even of European humanity. The extinction of the "higher culture" could not, therefore, be resisted on the ground of the diffused influence upon the community of the small cultivated class. If the question be asked whether I should as a fact resist such a social revolution as I have contemplated in the interests of the higher culture, I answer, "If the programme included the bringing of human society up to the moral level of a Moravian mission settlement, I certainly should not lift a finger to prevent it. If we confine our attention merely to the general diffusion of a low material comfort, a dull contentment, and an education ranging between that of the Sunday School and that of the Mechanics' Institute, I should be in great doubt and perplexity. I should certainly doubt whether I could doom the world to a continuance of our present social horrors, although the change might lead to the evanescence of research and speculation, sweetness and light, full and varied exercise of the faculties, and all the rest of it." Of course I do not assert for one moment that such an alternative is now, or ever will be, in its naked simplicity, presented to the social reformer. In the long run (putting aside the influence of exceptional outbursts of religious excitement) I think it probable that moral and intellectual progress are intimately connected. All I wish to point out is, that it is easy enough to conceive circumstances in which we might have to choose between the wide diffusion of a lower kind of well-being and a much narrower diffusion of a higher kind of life. At least in the intellectual sphere, there is a higher life which, if it exists at all, can only exist for the comparatively few, and which, under certain circumstances, *may* be purchaseable

only by sacrifices on the part of the many which are not compensated by any appreciable advantage to that many. If under such conditions, we pronounce that the higher life ought not to be extinguished, then we do at last depart from the principle of Equal Consideration.

In the cases already contemplated, some will perhaps doubt whether the principle should be sacrificed or not. I will now mention a case in which probably no one will hesitate. It is becoming tolerably obvious at the present day that all improvement in the social condition of the higher races of mankind postulates the exclusion of competition with the lower races. That means that, sooner or later, the lower well-being—it may be the very existence—of countless Chinamen or negroes must be sacrificed that a higher life may be possible for a much smaller number of white men. It is impossible to defend the morality of such a policy upon the principle of Equal Consideration. If we defend it, we distinctly adopt the principle that higher life is intrinsically, in and for itself, more valuable than lower life, though it may only be attainable by fewer persons, and may not contribute to the greater good of those who do not share it.

I will only add a case which calls still more indisputably for the application of the same principle. When we say, "Every one to count for one," we are no doubt thinking merely of human beings; but why are the animals to be excluded from consideration? I, for one, should be prepared to say that in the abstract they ought to be included. Their pain seems to me an evil—possibly as great an evil as *equal* pain in human beings: their comfort or pleasure has a value to which every humane person will make *some* sacrifices. But few people would be disposed to spend money in bringing the lives of fairly-kept London cab-horses up to the standard of comfort represented by a brewer's dray-horse, in

preference to spending it on the improvement of the higher life of human beings. The lives of animals cannot be thus lightly treated except upon a principle which involves the admission that the life of one man may be more valuable than the life of another, on account of its greater potentialities—apart altogether from the social utilities which may be involved in their realisation.

No demonstrative proof can, as it appears to me, be given that the higher good of few and the lower good of many may not come into collision. And when they do come into collision, there are some cases in which we should, I think, prefer the higher good of the few; but I know of no theoretical principle by which it is possible to govern our choice. We have two self-evident maxims: (1) Seek the highest good; (2) Seek the most equal possible distribution of good: and there is no formula for reconciling the two, that I know of, which will be completely applicable to all cases. We may, indeed, save the universal applicability of our rule of Equal Consideration, but it is only by reducing it to its most abstract form. We may still say that every one is to count for one so long as all we know about him is that he is one. We may still say, "*Cæteris paribus*, every one is to count for one." But, then, this will amount to the assertion, "Every one is to count equally, so long as he is equal; but the capacity for a higher life may be a ground for treating men unequally." To what extent this principle should be carried, it is impossible to define. It will obviously go but a very little way towards the permanent justification of existing social inequalities, unless it is contended that such inequalities can only be removed by remedies which are worse than the disease; but, on the other hand, it does, I think, forbid us to make absolute equality in the participation of good part even of our ultimate social ideal.

While I know of no means of effecting a completely

satisfactory reconciliation between the principles of Maximum Good and of Equal Distribution, there are some considerations which will, I think, very largely prevent the necessity of choosing between them in practical life. While we cannot theoretically demonstrate that the best sort of life (in the intellectual region) will always extend its benefits over the whole social organism, we may find an ample justification for promoting the higher culture of the few in the *ultimate* results of such higher culture to the community generally. The principle of Election has a place in Ethics and Politics as well as in Theology. It is often right for governments and for individuals to bestow much more than their fair share of attention upon the few on account of the ultimate value to society of there being such a higher class. We are, in fact, applying once more the principle that, in the equal distribution of good, future generations have their share as well as the present. It is probable that, in the then condition of the world, Athenian culture and Athenian democracy were impossible without slavery. It would perhaps be hard to show that the actual slaves of the time were much better off for the intellectual and the political life in which they had no share ; but it would not be too much to say that in the forces which have ultimately banished slavery from Europe and America, in the forces to which the modern democratic movement owes its existence, that Hellenic city-life of which slavery was the foundation is no unimportant factor. On the same principle, we might justify our indifference to the welfare of the Chinese, when it collides with the higher well-being of a much smaller European population, by the consideration that if the higher life is ever to become possible for China, it can only be through the maintenance and progress of a higher race. Such considerations will, I believe, practically prevent the necessity of our actually claiming for a smaller class any social expenditure (so to speak) but

what can ultimately be repaid to the society (though not to the actual persons) which make that well-being possible. Since, however, the repayment is made to future generations, it supplies no ground for assuming that a communistic community would be at all likely to recognise the importance of such an expenditure.

It may be well, perhaps, to summarise the conclusions which I have endeavoured to establish.

(1) It is a self-evident truth that in the distribution of ultimate good every one should count for one, and nobody for more than one. This is the ideal of Justice.

(2) The equal distribution of concrete good things would produce unequal amounts of actual well-being, and would therefore not be just. Hence neither the equal distribution of property rights nor perfect equality of opportunity would satisfy the requirements of ideal Justice.

(3) The equal distribution even of the conditions of well-being would often produce a low actual amount of good to be distributed, and would consequently violate the equal right of others. Hence the equality can only be equality of consideration in the distribution of Good. Practically this consideration must involve inequality in actual distribution.

(4) Many of the objections to making Equality of Consideration our ideal may be met by recognising the rights of future generations as well as of the present.

(5) While the enjoyment by some of such good as, from the nature of the case, cannot be enjoyed by all is usually for the good of all, and hence justified by the principle of equal consideration, it is impossible to show that this will always be the case. Individuals, or races, with higher capacities (i.e. capacities for a higher sort of well-being) have a right to more than merely equal consideration with

those of lower capacities. Hence the formula, "Every one to count for one," etc., requires the addition of "*cæteris paribus*," or "so long as he is of equal capacity for the highest kind of life."

(6) In practice, it may, however, usually be assumed that the realisation of such superior capacities by those who possess them, is for the ultimate good of the human race.

I have, so far, left out of account altogether all strictly moral differences between man and man. I have left out of account the question whether the share of good to be allotted to each man, or rather (as we have seen) his share of consideration in the distribution of good, ought ever to be more than another's, on account either (from one point of view) of his greater contribution to the common good, or (from another) his greater virtue or merit. An answer to this question will practically amount to a discussion of the second of the formulæ which purport to be an adequate expression of social justice—the formula, "To every one according to his work." This discussion I must reserve for another article. Meanwhile, I must ask the reader who has followed me through this somewhat abstract and technical discussion, to bear in mind that I am compelled to leave at present a very incomplete representation of my views.

VII

WHAT IS JUSTICE ?¹

II.—THE THEORY OF REWARD

IN the previous article I attempted an examination of one of the current views of Ideal Justice, the view embodied in the Benthamite dictum, "Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one." Admitting the *a priori* validity of the axiom, I attempted to show that the only sense in which this equality could rationally be understood, is as an equality of consideration, which would necessarily result—except under conditions which there is no reason for anticipating—in an actual inequality of all concrete advantages which are capable of being "distributed," whether by the State or by private individuals. Seeking to meet the further question, whether capacity for a higher kind of life, or *Eὐδαιμονία*, did not constitute a ground for greater consideration, I contended that this was certainly the case, though—save in exceptional cases, where the disparity was very great—I did not admit the practical probability of our ever being obliged to treat the higher well-being of the few as of more importance than the lower well-being of the many, since the development of higher potentialities in the few may usually be assumed to be for the ultimate good of the many. Still to make our formula scientifically accurate, I contended that it required to be put into the amended form, "*Cæteris paribus*, everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one." Throughout the article, however, I neglected all such differences between man and man as are due to diversities of moral worth. Whether such diversities ought to be looked upon as ground for exceptional consideration in the ultimate distribution of the conditions of well-being, is the question

¹ Reprinted from the *Economic Review*, Vol. II, pp. 161-178 (April, 1892).

which I propose to discuss in the present paper. That such superiority is a ground for exceptional consideration, is what is asserted by the rival definition of Justice, which assumes the form, "To every man according to his work," or "To every man according to his merit."

Although, on a superficial view, these two formulæ might be accepted as practically identical, there is really a fundamental difference between them. We may either say that society ought to reward the individual according to the intrinsic or objective value to itself of the work produced by his labour or activity, or we may say that every one should be considered in proportion to the merit which he shows in doing that work. Reward—if that is the term employed—is in the first case understood in an economic, in the second in a moral, sense. A moment's consideration will show that the two interpretations would lead to essentially different results. A picture painted with the toes by a handless man may show much more zeal, industry, perseverance, and the like, as well as more skill and ability, than one painted in the usual way. If the two pictures were of equal artistic worth, the painters ought, according to the first formula, to be rewarded equally; while, according to the second, the toe-painter should receive, it may be, ten or twenty times the reward of the hand-painter. And this is by no means an extreme illustration of the divergent consequences of the two methods: it is hardly possible to exaggerate the difference between the maximum and the minimum of human talent, skill, strength, or other capacity, which determines the quantity and value of the results produced by a given amount of labour. Let us, then, examine the economic interpretation of our thesis first.

The theory that ideal Justice means paying each man in proportion to the value of his work to the community looks plausible only so long as we forget

that economic value is essentially relative, and not absolute. What we mean by the value of a given thing is the amount of other things which will actually be given for it under certain social conditions. But when we are assuming that the very constitution of society has been, so to speak, put into the melting-pot—when we are given *carte-blanche* to reconstruct human society in accordance with ideal justice, all the usual means of ascertaining value disappear. Our ordinary ideas of value postulate that wealth is divided among a number of individuals who, under whatever restrictions, are free to barter one form of it for another. The value—let us say—of medical attendance depends upon the amount of other good things which people are prepared to give up in exchange for medical attendance, under such conditions as the following: (1) that the numbers of the medical profession depend upon the number of persons who are induced to enter it by the advantages which it holds out, as compared with other professions open to the same class of persons; (2) that the profession requires a certain expenditure upon education; and (3) that this expenditure is only within the reach of a limited number of persons who have—themselves or their parents—accumulated a certain amount of wealth, and become, to a limited extent, capitalists; and so on. I need not take further pains to show that values, no less than prices, are fixed by competition. The very instance which I have chosen is, indeed, one of those in which prices are not *wholly* fixed by competition; and, just at the point at which they cease to be fixed by competition (between different classes of workers, if not between individual workmen), we cease to be able to express the value of the article supplied. It is customary with general practitioners to regulate their fees by the wealth of the patient, of which the probable rental of his house is taken as a rough indication. Now, if patient A.

pays 10s., patient B pays 7s. 6d., and patient C 5s., for a precisely similar visit, which fee represents the true value of the commodity supplied? This is a question which it is obviously impossible to answer. Now, in a community organised throughout upon a non-competitive basis, it would be as impossible to express in general terms the value of medical attendance as compared with other things that have value, as it is to express the true value of those particular visits which are remunerated according to the wealth of the patient. Value is ascertained by competition. It implies that there is a limited supply of the commodities in question, or at least a limited supply of commodities in general, and that if you have one, you can't have another. Now, medical attendance is precisely a commodity for which there is a by no means unlimited demand. A Socialistic State which should determine the vocation of all its members, and provide their whole education, might very conceivably secure medical attendance free for all its citizens. Now, if everybody could have as much medical attendance as he required without giving up his share in any other commodity, it would be clearly impossible to ascertain the economic value of medical attendance to the community.

It may be said that these considerations would cease to be applicable when the commodity is one for which the demand is practically unlimited. The case would not, indeed, be altered supposing the State undertook to determine how much of each commodity the worker should receive, and exchange were made as criminal as accumulation. But what if the worker were paid by tickets in the stores, and each worker were allowed to take his day's allowance in whatever form he pleased? Two cases are then supposable. The State would have to fix the amount of one commodity which should be exchangeable for another. If it undertook to estimate the value of the article by reference to the amount of

skill, knowledge, training, etc., which it took to produce it, we must suppose the problem which we are discussing already solved, since what we are in search of is precisely some common denominator by means of which to compare the value of watch-making and the value of turnip-cultivation. If, on the other hand (to avoid involving ourselves in a logical circle), we assume that the *quality* of the labour is to be neglected, the only criteria by which it is possible to ascertain how much of one commodity ought to be served out as the equivalent of so much of another will be (1) the amount of labour expended on its production, (2) the amount of capital required for its production. Now, capital is resolvable into (1) the results of past labour, (2) land and other natural constituents or products of the soil. On the principle now contemplated, the worker who was allowed to take his pay in beef or in bread would, of course, have to choose between several pounds of bread and one of beef, because it takes more land to grow a pound of ox-flesh than to grow a pound of flour. But this element in the relative value of different commodities has, of course, nothing to do with the value of the workman's work *qua* work. Hence, the only way in which we can compare the value of two pieces of work (on any hypothesis) is by their respective amounts.

Even then our difficulties are not at an end. What is *amount* of work? Clearly not the time spent on it; for some kinds of work are harder than others. But hardness is not by itself a reason for additional remuneration, except in so far as harder work is more disagreeable than lighter work. Some very light kinds of work may become disagreeable by reason of their extreme monotony; while severe bodily exercise is to some people a positive delight. Hard work may, of course, become disagreeable when pursued for such a length of time as would not be disagreeable in the case of lighter work. But all

that the hard-worker can claim is that, in so far as his work is more disagreeable than other work, he shall be compensated for its disagreeableness, either by liberty to work for fewer hours, or by other advantages—such as more food, tickets on stores, etc. It is possible that some system might be devised for comparing the relative disagreeableness of work by ascertaining the amounts of each which the average man would be willing to do for the same remuneration, including under that term all the advantages—whether in leisure or food or other conveniences—by which a community might endeavour to equalise the conditions of workers in different occupations. In that way it might be possible to ascertain the quantity of work which different commodities or services to the community cost. And quantity of labour, in the sense explained, is the only criterion by which we could measure the relative value of different kinds of work.

Although this reasoning seems to me to be unanswerable, it is probable that to some minds it will be found too abstract to be satisfying. “What !” they will exclaim ; “do you mean to say that the physician does not perform a greater service to society than the ploughman ? Is he not therefore to receive a proportionate reward ? Granted that the destruction of competition would prevent your measuring this relative value in terms of £ s. d., the general sense of the community will surely be equal to the task of appreciating the relative value of different services, and will act according to its innate sense of what is just or appropriate.” I answer : Is it so clear that the service of the physician is so much more important than that of the ploughman ? At present we measure their relative importance by the comparative difficulty of getting them. But with *carte-blanche* to postulate any form of society that he chooses, the legislator would have no difficulty in making it quite as easy to get medical

attendance as to get bread. A sufficient number of people will be educated as physicians to secure that medical attendance will be forthcoming for every man who wants it, and sufficient ploughmen will be provided to supply everybody with as much bread as he can eat. And, when these two conditions are secured, no further production either of bread or of medical attendance will be of the slightest value to the community.¹ If you can have enough of both, it is impossible to say which is the most valuable. If you ask which is the most valuable when you cannot have enough of both, it must be admitted that the ploughman performs the more indispensable service. Some of us would die or suffer without the physician : but we should all die without the ploughman or some equivalent food-producer. If, then, this is the sense which you put upon the principle "To every man according to his work," I must insist that the ploughman shall be paid more than the physician. But, for my own part, I cannot see the justice of the principle thus interpreted. The physician would naturally say to the State, "If I had known that I was to be served like that, I should have wanted to be a ploughman too. And if you, for your greater convenience, insisted that I should be a physician, why should I suffer on that account ? You say, 'Bread is more necessary than medical attendance ;' but if you did not want to have both, you should not have insisted on my being a physician."

It is evident that the real consequences of following out this maxim, "Every man according to his work," would be very different from those usually intended by its advocates. When they do not mean that equal work should be paid by equal advantages, they usually assume that what is commonly considered the higher work, that which employs the highest

¹ Foreign trade being for greater simplicity ignored. If corn is exported, it is, of course, not serviceable to the community *as bread*.

faculties, intellectual work, artistic work, spiritual work, etc., should be remunerated more highly than the lower, more mechanical, more animal work. Now, this contention may be based on one of two grounds: either (1) on the ground that by such work a higher service is performed to the community, or (2) that the higher faculty should receive higher remuneration simply because it is higher. In the first case, I am unable to see the justice of the demand. The man who prints Bibles no doubt renders a higher service to the community than the man who prints "penny dreadfuls." But, assuming that both minister to legitimate social needs, nobody proposes that the former should receive higher remuneration than the latter. So long as the different values spring from some difference in the mere objective results of work, nobody will contend that the more important or "higher" consequences should form a ground for unequal reward of exactly the same work. If you say, "The work itself is different, not merely its external consequences," I cannot see how there can be a difference in kind between one work and another when abstracted both (1) from the results to the community and (2) from the faculties employed on the work. If you mean to insist upon the last, then you adopt the second of our two original alternatives which we have yet to examine.

Is the superior dignity—the moral or æsthetic or intellectual superiority—of the activities employed any ground for additional remuneration? Of course, if intellectual work is considered more disagreeable than unintellectual, then the work ought to receive compensating advantages. But it is not the common opinion that *to intellectual persons* intellectual work is less agreeable than manual labour or mechanical drudgery. Most people would probably say, "*Cæteris paribus*, the intellectual work is infinitely the more pleasant." Even if we suppose the

conditions of intellectual and manual labour equalised, there would probably be more persons anxious to undertake intellectual instead of manual work than the community could find adequate employment for. For our present purpose, however, it is enough to negative any claim for additional remuneration on the ground of additional disagreeableness. If, however, the intellectual work is supposed to imply a sort of *merit* on the part of the worker, and to claim remuneration on that score, one must ask, "To what does the intellectual worker owe the opportunity of doing this higher work?" The answer will be, (1) partly to superior education and opportunities, (2) partly, in the case of the higher kinds of intellectual work, to the possession of natural capacities which are confined to a more or less small proportion of the human race. Now, in so far as the position of the brain-worker is due to education, it is clearly not his merit but the organisation of society which has put him in this position. Under present conditions, it is in the long run the possession of capital that secures education; and, the capital expended upon education being nearly always accumulated by others than the person whom it benefits, it will hardly be pretended that an accident of this kind can claim remuneration on grounds of abstract justice, however expedient it may be as a means to the general good under certain conditions that such remuneration should be given. And under altered social arrangements the community could, of course, easily secure that the requisite educational advantages should be given to as many persons as its social need might demand. In either case, there is no question of superior merit in the intellectual worker.

But how does the matter stand with regard to those capacities for higher work which are due to Nature? Nature has given to most Englishmen intellectual powers possessed by very few negroes. Among Englishmen she has made, perhaps, some

two or three per cent. capable, with the requisite education and opportunity and application, of obtaining a first-class in *litterae humaniores* at Oxford—to take the distribution of one particular kind of intellectual capacity as a sample of the comparative rarity of high intellectual powers. And when we come to the highest kind of intellectual capacity, she gives originality to one man in a thousand, genius to half a dozen in a generation, and so on. But should the possession of capacities for doing the precise kind of work which only a certain number of his fellow-countrymen can do—should even the power to do (as, of course, is the case with even the most modest kind of *originality*) the particular thing which no one else living can do, constitute ground for superior remuneration? The question is, I confess, not an easy one. So long as the question is considered merely as one of “reward”—of some additional gratification, having no relation or connection with the exercise of the superior faculty of the superior person—I must say that I cannot see the justice of this extra remuneration. Everybody would admit that the mere rarity of a capacity would be no ground for exceptional treatment; though, of course, the most mechanical and accidental kind of superiority (e.g. delicacy of touch enabling a man to test grain better than anybody else) may, under a competitive *régime*, enable a man to appropriate an enormous share of the world’s wealth. For instance, let us suppose that a community, for the purpose of some pageant, wishes to employ a man who shall exactly fit a particular medieval suit of armour. The suit is so narrow in proportion to its other dimensions that not one in a thousand modern men, strong enough to bear its weight on horseback, can get into it. Is there any reason, on principles of ideal justice, why the one man who happens to fit the armour to perfection should be paid more than whatever would be

considered fair remuneration to an average man for a day's appearance in a new suit of armour specially constructed for himself? Is the case any different because the qualification is not merely rare but intellectually or artistically or even—putting aside the questions of *will*—morally admirable? Should strength of brain entitle a man to a superior share of the good things of this life, any more than strength of arm? If a man has a body of extraordinary size or strength, it is right that I should look upon him—not, indeed, with the feeling of awe or respect which in our present rudimentary stage of civilisation is inspired in most of us by the feeling that under certain circumstances such a man might assault us with impunity, but with the feelings of wonder and interest which are inspired by an elephant or a fossil mammoth. If he has extraordinary skill, and agility of body, it is right that I should look upon him with the half-æsthetic, half-sympathetic feeling that is inspired by the sight of a gazelle or a greyhound. So far it is nature, not man, that I am contemplating. If he has exceptional brain-power, the imagination of a poet or the penetration of a philosopher, it is right that I should treat him with respect, i.e. the intellectual respect that his qualities merit. If he has moral qualities above those of common men, then it is right that I should treat him with moral and spiritual respect—that I should listen to and weigh his moral and spiritual counsels with a view to the improvement of my own character and conduct, just as I pay attention to the poet and the philosopher with a view to the culture of my imagination or my intellect. But I see no reason why, on account of either the intellectual or the spiritual superiority, I should offer him a bottle of champagne while for my less gifted guest I only provide small beer. Neither intellectual nor spiritual superiority seems to me ground for assigning to a man a larger share of carnal delights than his neighbour. The

opportunity of freely exercising his superior faculty and the power or authority which his particular gift fits him to wield, these strike us as the fitting rewards, and the only fitting rewards, for superiority of this kind. To the man who is capable of a higher kind of happiness than others because of his higher gifts, that higher happiness itself surely is the due reward—not a larger meed than others of those lower kinds of pleasure of which alone his inferiors are capable. If any difference were to be made between the two, it might be plausibly argued that the superior man should receive less of those lower pleasures which he ought better to be able to do without, than the man who is capable of nothing else. To translate this somewhat abstract language into terms of actual social arrangements, justice does not seem to me to require that because Nature has given a man capacities which fit him for superior usefulness to the community, his work per hour should be paid at a higher rate than the equally exhausting or disagreeable work of common men.¹ When I say “paid at a higher rate,” I mean that there is no reason why he should be better fed, clothed, or housed; that he should be indulged in more or more expensive amusements, or allowed longer holidays.

No doubt it is quite true that the man of higher faculty requires for the exercise of those faculties certain external conditions of an exceptional character. And some of these conditions may consist in a larger supply of those conveniences and indulgences which ordinary men are quite capable of appreciating. Nay, the higher faculty may sometimes be a source, not of greater happiness, but of greater misery, unless these conditions are forthcoming.

¹ The fatigue of work demands remuneration only in so far as (1) it makes it disagreeable, which it does not always do, or (2) makes the worker capable of doing less of it. If, on account of the value of his work, it is socially desirable that he should do a longer day's work than others, then no doubt the absence of recreation should be made up to him in other ways.

The musical genius, for instance, might be driven distracted by being compelled to live amid the noise and bustle, the barrel-organs and the hurdy-gurdies, which would be Paradise to an East End factory-girl. And of intellectual workers in general it may be said that they do require for the favourable exercise of their faculties a larger share of certain comforts and conveniences than would be likely to fall to the lot of the average workmen under a *régime* of absolute equality. I cannot see, indeed, that the luxurious table of a successful barrister is any more conducive to his activity than the humbler fare of the solicitor's managing clerk, who does quite as large an allowance of brain-work ; but it is probably true that the brain-worker wants more and better food than is absolutely necessary for the less exhausting kinds of mechanical work. Still, if everybody had his fill of plain and wholesome diet, I don't know that the brain-worker could claim anything more. Nor is there any reason in the nature of things—existing social conventionalities apart—why the brain-worker should be clad in broad-cloth, and the hard-worker in corduroy. But it is otherwise when we come to less material conveniences. It is probably desirable that the higher-class brain-worker should be set free from petty worries and anxieties. Under existing conditions, we should say that he ought to be allowed servants to do for him things which other people have to do for themselves ; under any arrangements he would want a larger amount of *service*. It is desirable that he should have more house-room than the most ideal Socialism would probably assign to ordinary hand-workers. The doctor's carriage is none the less a personal luxury because it is also necessary to his business. The author will want a study, the artist a studio, the student books and room to stow them. If his wife is to be capable of sharing his life, and not to be a mere housekeeper, she must also be secured more

than the normal exemption from household drudgery by nurses and other servants. And if family life is to be maintained, it is practically inevitable that some of these advantages should be extended to his children, who may nevertheless be very far from inheriting his mental superiority. Then, too, it is probable that if the lives of highly cultivated people are to be made as agreeable to them as *their* lives are to people of less cultivation, they will want amusements or interests that will impose upon the community a heavier tax than the amusements of the less cultivated. We can hardly conceive of the most absolutely socialistic State allowing very extensive opportunities of foreign travel to every one ; and yet it is clearly desirable that they should be within the reach of some. Moreover, for the exercise of certain mental gifts, considerable leisure and some liberty of action may be essential—including the liberty at times to be unproductive. Literary production has, indeed, at times, been stimulated by the most abject bodily want ; but it is certain that the higher kinds of intellectual labour could never be made into a daily task, to be exacted under penalty of imprisonment or short commons by a socialistic taskmaster. In ways like these it is desirable that the more gifted man—or even the more educated man when once the community has allowed him a higher education than the common—should have exceptional treatment. But it is rather because these things are necessary or desirable for the full development and enjoyment of his faculty, than as “reward” for being differently constituted to ordinary men, that he may rightfully claim from the community the use—in certain directions—of more wealth than would fall to his lot under a perfectly equal distribution.

The result of this examination of the dictum, “To every man according to his work,” has, so far, been this—that we can accept it only in the sense, “Higher

capacity ought to be provided with all the conditions necessary to its exercise." And this was, it will be remembered, the one exception which our examination—in a previous article—of the maxim, "Everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one," compelled us to adopt before we could admit its universal applicability in any sense other than the purely abstract one, "*Cæteris paribus*, everybody to count for one."

So far, however, we have confined our attention to those differences in capacity for work which are due solely to differences of natural endowment. But now, what of the differences which are due to Will? What of the strictly moral differences? Ought the good to be rewarded? What, in ultimate analysis, are we to make of the popular notion of *Merit*? Here it is necessary to put aside two philosophical problems with which a discussion of this question is usually involved.

1. I put aside the question of Free-will. The facts of heredity, the phenomena of mental pathology, and the constancy of statistics make it plain that free-will is on any view not the *only* cause of some men's goodness and other men's badness. And it is obviously impossible to discriminate between the parts which undetermined choice may play in the formation of actual good volitions, and the factors in their causation which are due to other influences. Hence it is clear that, if we are in any sense to reward men for their goodness, we must look only to the actual quality of their volitions. We must reward them for being good without raising the question how they came to be so.

2. The question suggests the theory of Punishment. If punishment is retrospective and retributive, then it will naturally follow that reward must also rest upon an *a priori* basis, and not be a means to anything beyond itself. I have elsewhere discussed this question, and rejected the retributive

view of punishment, though admitting that much important ethical truth is held in solution by it.¹ It does not, however, follow that, because we refuse to say that the bad man ought to suffer pain as an end-in-itself, independently of the moral effect to be produced upon him and others, we must, on that account, decline to say that happiness ought to be distributed in proportion to goodness. It is one thing to cause a man pain, another to refuse to make him happier than somebody else. When it is a question of inflicting pain, the *onus probandi*, so to speak, would seem to rest with the inflicter; when it is a question of distributing happiness, it may be considered to lie with the claimants. If I hang, or assault, or imprison a man, he naturally demands my authority for doing so; but it might easily be maintained that I do no wrong to A by giving a certain lot of happiness to B. The question is, therefore, not settled by the view we take of the theory of punishment. We must still ask, "Is it reasonable that an individual or a community, having the conditions of happiness at his or its disposal, should distribute them to all equally, or should distribute them in proportion to the moral worth of the individuals concerned?" The obvious answer is, that we shall of course distribute in accordance with merit because we want to make as many people good as possible, and that experience shows that the best way of effecting that object is to contrive that, so far as possible, goodness shall lead to happiness, and badness to misery.² The question, whether, apart from such tendency, justice would require an unequal distribution of external goods, is so abstract

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1891. [Cp. also H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*. Vol. I, cap. 9.]—EDD.

² If we hold that Virtue necessarily or intrinsically leads to Happiness (given the favourable external conditions, or an unimpeded exercise, of virtuous activities), the question ceases to have any meaning except in relation to God, who may no doubt be conceived of as creating human nature in such a way as to make goodness the true happiness of the creature; but, in stating such a position, it would be necessary to guard against the inference that virtue is made good only by the will of God.

a speculation that I may be excused from answering it. It is a question which can never affect the solution of any practical problem—even the speculative solution of any imaginable practical problem.

It should be observed, indeed, that the grounds on which we find the good entitled to reward will by themselves set a limit to the amount of this reward, in so far as it consists in the means of gratifying the lower or more animal desires. It will be generally admitted that the possession, or at least the consumption, of much wealth in such ways is not favourable to—may even be inconsistent with—the highest moral well-being. And when the existing inequalities are justified as a means to the encouragement of “merit,” it is often forgotten that the influence of excessive wealth upon the moral well-being of its possessors is quite as injurious as its influence in decreasing the moral and physical well-being of the poor. If the question be raised, whether the system of *rewarding* virtue is not itself injurious to virtue, I should be quite prepared to admit that the reward of virtue might conceivably be carried to this point. And this is one of the difficulties that I should feel in admitting, even as an abstract and theoretical proposition, that the good man ought, as a matter of *a priori* justice, to be rewarded *in proportion* to his merit; since that would mean, if we use words in their ordinary sense, that every increase of virtue should, on principles of ideal justice, bring with it a larger house, more servants, better dinners, more expensive pleasures, more splendid equipages, and more costly horseflesh.

But how far is this principle, that the good ought to be rewarded, available as a canon of distributive justice in actual life? For practical purposes not at all. The only kind of goodness which society at large has it in its power to reward is clearly such contribution to social good as admits of being expressed in terms of £ s. d. The only kind of

reward, in short, of which it is possible to take practical account is the economic reward for work done. For how is it possible to discriminate between the portion of the work produced which is due to superior good-will, to industry, perseverance, integrity, and that which is due to superior capacity? It is obvious that one workman can do in an hour twice as much work as another working equally hard. But how can we test the intensity of a man's application? It is practically impossible to reward industry without rewarding cleverness also. And yet we have seen that ideal justice is not satisfied by rewarding a man according to the actual quantity of work done. The conclusion is, that, if there is to be any diversity of reward at all, it cannot be based upon the principle of ideal justice, but must be regulated by social expediency. If anybody thinks that men in general could be induced to put forth their maximum activity in the service of the community without the prospect of reward, for themselves and those nearly connected with them, he is a person with whom it is useless to argue. Rewards there must be; and yet rewards cannot be governed by considerations of ideal justice.

The general result of our discussion I apprehend to be to substitute in practice the inquiry, what is the most generally expedient method of distribution that is at present possible, for the attempt to realise some ideally just method of distribution. By *expedient*, I mean conducive to the highest well-being of all. By *generally* expedient, I mean that which will realise the greatest amount of good for each. There is, therefore, no surrender of the position that everybody is to count for one; but it is the right of every one to consideration in the estimate of what is for the general advantage, not the right to an actually equal share of any actual thing, which will be implied in "counting for one." To put the matter in a less abstract and technical way, we shall aim at

the most equal distribution of good that is consistent with there being as much good as possible to distribute. Even so, the principle of equality must, if necessary, be qualified by the principle of the superior importance of the higher sorts of well-being which are only possible for the few.

To apply these abstract considerations to practice—to ask to what practical conclusions they point in the region of individual conduct, or of social effort, or of political action—forms no part of my present undertaking. From the impossibility of actually realising ideal justice I have endeavoured to suggest the conclusion that social justice must be always looked upon as an ideal—a far-off ideal, to which only more or less distant approaches are possible even in the region of self-consistent Utopias. This would, perhaps, be admitted by many zealous advocates of equality. But I hope I have further indicated the necessity of not making justice, even as an ideal, our primary object, but rather general well-being; and I trust I have shown that such a course is imperatively required by ideal justice itself, since the only equality that is capable of immediate realisation is equality of consideration, and to produce equality of distribution at the cost of there being very little good to distribute would be a violation of that one essential equality. If in the course of my argument I have incidentally suggested that some of the arguments by which Socialism is sometimes advocated will not stand examination, I trust it has become no less evident that any attempt to justify the *status quo* as an even approximate realisation of justice is a still more desperate undertaking. This may be for the moment—with the exception of this or that immediately possible reform—a less violation of justice than any other *possible* system, and so long the maintenance of the existing order of society *minus* the possible reforms will be demanded by justice itself; justice

can never require us to make matters worse. But none the less, the discrepancy between the present distribution of wealth and any that could *a priori* be justified in the interests of general well-being, calls upon us to begin in earnest the struggle for a more socially beneficial system, though we shall be prepared to find that even in the remote future no system of distribution that is at once possible and socially expedient, will realise the dream of any other equality than equality of consideration.

The ideal justice which I have attempted to adumbrate is not capable of immediate political realisation. It would open up a large question were I to ask how far it is capable of immediate application in the domain of private ethics—I mean, how far it is possible for each individual to act upon principles of ideal justice, in so far as it rests with himself to determine how much of that portion of the world's wealth over which he has legal control he shall allocate to himself, and how much to the service of other individuals or of the community. I cannot attempt now to discuss that question adequately; but I believe that the principal use of raising such speculative questions as to the nature of ideal justice is to suggest the necessity for bringing principle to bear upon the question of personal expenditure. It is obvious that it is not possible for most people in an un-ideal state to act in accordance with what would be the ideal in an ideal state of things. For each man to allot to himself no more of the good things of this life than would be his under a *régime* of ideal justice, would demand a heroism which it would not demand under such a *régime*, and at times would be injurious to others, and even to society at large. In some directions it would be inexpedient for *any one*; in many directions it would be inexpedient for *every one*. Some measure of conformity to the customs of one's class or position, in such matters as eating and drinking, dress,

entertainment, amusement, and the like, is demanded under penalty of hardship and isolation such as would not be endured by any one, were such matters arranged for us on principles of ideal justice in a socialistic State. Still, it is a clear duty on the part of every one who is convinced that the share of good things enjoyed by the few is disproportionate and intrinsically unjust, to seek to limit his own personal expenditure in such matters wherever he can do so without a less efficient discharge of his own social function. It would be a step to the creation of a new morality upon such subjects, if we were to cultivate the habit of compelling ourselves to give some kind of reason for our indulgence in any kind of expenditure over and above what would be allotted to us upon the principle "Every one to count for one, nobody for more than one," whether the justification be found in our particular social function, in the conditions necessary for the exercise of our own particular capacities, natural or acquired, or only in the necessities and conventionalities of the existing social code, which sometimes render unequal private appropriation the smaller of two evils.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS¹

POPULAR impressions of the Middle Ages generally fail to distinguish between two very dissimilar periods. Sometimes, indeed, the term Dark Ages is indiscriminately applied to the whole period from the fall of the Western Empire to the Renaissance or the Reformation. As a matter of fact the Dark Ages—that is to say the period of gross ignorance and uncivilisation—passed away at about the end of the Tenth Century. The Eleventh Century was a period of progress, while the Twelfth witnessed one of the most brilliant and extraordinary outbursts of intellectual vitality which history records. Art, Religion, Education, Literature, Philosophy renewed their life. We are concerned to-day only with one side of this great revival—the growth of what is commonly called the Scholastic Philosophy and the Scholastic Theology. The chief intellectual nourishment of the Dark Ages had consisted (so far as secular knowledge was concerned) in the remains, the scattered *débris*, of old-world Philosophy—one or two writings of Plato, and second-hand accounts of his opinions embedded in later writers, one or two fragments, chiefly the Logic of Aristotle, and later commentators or compilers like Boëthius. These works had suggested the problems on which the scholars of the Dark Ages had spent their strength—especially the great medieval problem as to the reality of Universals—the question as to what it is that we mean when we talk about some universal class, the class of horses or the class of men. Is the universal man a real thing (as the Realists held) or are we to say (with the Nominalists) that it is a mere name which we apply to many individual things—a name and nothing but a name, or at most a name for an idea in our minds while in nature nothing is

¹ An Address given at Holy Trinity Church, Sloane Street, March 12, 1899.

real but the particular? All through the Dark Ages this controversy—which under altered names and forms is still the great problem of modern Philosophy—had smouldered: and with the advent of the Twelfth Century Renaissance it burst into flame in the great controversies which centre round the name of Abelard. Upon the purely philosophical aspect of these problems I must not linger, but I must say one word about the way in which they affected Religion. During the Dark Ages, i.e. up to the Twelfth Century, men had tended on the whole to keep Religion and Philosophy apart. There had been a Scholastic Philosophy but hardly a Scholastic Theology. Their Philosophy was based upon the old pre-Christian thinkers, Plato and Aristotle. And if they ever thought for themselves, their speculations stopped at the threshold of what is commonly called Revealed Religion. Theological study meant chiefly putting together what had been said by various Fathers. Controversy had taken the shape of merely disputing what the Fathers meant. But when in the Twelfth Century men began to think in earnest, this state of things could not last, they could not help seeing that the Fathers were not always consistent, either with themselves or with one another; they could not help at least disputing over the things which the Fathers had left open, and pitting one authority against another, and thinking on such questions that the Fathers had left open. The great thinker Abelard whose teaching drew thousands of eager students to Paris, and made it for the first time the centre of European education, published a book with the audacious title *Sic et Non*, “Yes and No,” in which he arrayed all the authorities on both sides of every disputable theological question. That book was the beginning of the Scholastic Theology. And this new Theology did not stop at merely filling in the gaps and removing the discrepancies of the traditional teaching of the

Church. It went on to ask what was the ultimate foundation of all Religion, Natural or Revealed. And, adopting the new Scholastic methods, it was not content to give the arguments on one side, but it gave the argument on both sides. To the horror and amazement of old-fashioned Churchmen, the spectacle was now seen in the very schools of the Church (for all schools at this time in Northern Europe were Church Schools) of Christian teachers and Christian scholars exerting their utmost intellectual ingenuity in discovering and making the most of all the arguments that could be urged against the belief which all Christians held most dear. To the question "Does God exist?" they would say: "It appears not" and then follow all the arguments that can be urged against the existence of God, followed by all the arguments that can be urged in its favour. The intention in most cases was to establish, rather than to destroy: the conclusions were in the main those of the received Theology. But not always. When people once begin to think, they cannot always stop just where they themselves would like to stop. Though they might be sincerely attached to the Christian traditions, they could not always succeed in arriving at the same conclusions as the Fathers or in replying to the objector without admitting some part of his case. Even in the attempt to reconcile the very conflicting utterances of different Fathers, many thinkers were naturally landed in what the Church called heresy. Abelard for instance, was twice condemned by councils; and among the doctrines which awakened the fiercest resentment against him on the part of conservative Theologians like St. Bernard was a view of the Atonement which he shared with no less a man than St. Anselm, the saintly Archbishop of Canterbury, a profounder if a less bold thinker than Abelard himself. They were the first thinkers for some hundreds of years who

ventured to deny that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to the Devil ; while Abelard was the first to assert that the Atonement was not an expiation which altered the attitude of God to man, but a revelation of the changeless love of God which altered the attitude of man to God.

And sometimes this dissolving process did not stop at heresy. Towards the end of the Twelfth or the beginning of the Thirteenth Century a great revolution came upon the world of medieval thought through the recovery of the long buried writings of Aristotle. Hitherto the medieval world had known only the Logic of Aristotle : but now the whole of Aristotle's writings on Natural Science, and the whole of his speculations about the Universe and its relations to God, were thrown open in Latin translations to the Western scholar. And Aristotle did not come alone. He came with the comments of Arab philosophers and independent works of Arab thinkers, which laid stress upon just the most unorthodox elements in the teaching of their Master, his assertion to the eternity of the world, his denial of immortality to individual souls, his tendency to reduce God from the righteous and personal will which Christianity holds Him to be, to a merely thinking intelligence or even to a thought which can hardly be called a thinker. All these speculations centred round the mighty name of Averroes, to medieval minds henceforth the dreaded incarnation of all heresy or infidelity, in which capacity you will often see him represented in the pictures of the great Italian Masters.

For a time the Church attempted to deal with the heresy by fire and sword. Many representatives of the new speculations were burned, and the reading of Aristotle was wholly forbidden. But just at this crisis—the second decade of the Thirteenth Century—the whole history of the Western Church was altered by the appearance upon the stage of history

of two great orders—the Order of St. Dominic and the Order of St. Francis, the Friars Preachers and the Friars Minors, who set before themselves a wholly new ideal of monastic perfection. The old monastic orders had degenerated into wealthy corporations of celibate country gentlemen, living comfortable, luxurious and idle lives under Abbots who spent most of their time in hunting and dining with the neighbouring squires. The Franciscans and Dominicans begged their bread from door to door. The ideal of the old Monastic founders had been to retire from a godless world and to save their own souls. The Franciscans and the Dominicans aimed at converting the world instead of forsaking it. The Franciscan Order was originally founded especially for work among the poor. The Dominican Order had for its especial task the suppression of heresy, and the conversion of the intellectual classes. In part no doubt the Dominicans shared the ideas of the age as to the proper way to deal with intellectual doubt. It was part of their function to work that awful engine of cruelty and greed, the Holy Inquisition. And it is impossible to deny that their success in re-establishing the shaken faith of the Middle Ages was largely due to wholesale burnings and imprisonments. But the Dominicans were not wholly obscurantists. They aimed at satisfying the new-born zeal for knowledge, while they gave it an innocent and orthodox direction. They set themselves to study, to comment on, to teach and to explain the great Library of Aristotelian Literature, which had at first been looked upon with so much suspicion. They found that there was much in Aristotle that was quite innocent, and had no tendency to undermine the Christian faith. Much in him they found that was not only innocent and intellectually enlightening, but positively edifying and of the highest moral value—much that was quite in harmony with the teaching of the New Testament,

much that would serve as an excellent basis and preparation for the higher and more spiritual teaching of the Church, much that could well be combined with and absorbed into the hitherto rather incoherent mass of Christian thought which was now gradually under the great Scholastic theologians being codified and solidified into a compact and elaborate body of Christian dogma. Where the new teaching was definitely and obstinately un-Christian, they aimed at refuting, correcting, or supplementing it. It was mainly through the work of the great Dominican Theologians that Theology attained the form of an elaborate and coherent body of doctrine—the system that is still taught in the Seminaries of the Roman Catholic Church, and which has exercised far more influence than most of us suspect upon the traditional Theology in which we ourselves have been brought up, which has a good deal to say to the Theology which is being taught every Sunday by men who would be shocked to hear that they owe anything to the Popish Theology of the Middle Ages. In the building up of this great system the first stones were laid by Albert the Great, and the edifice was completed by his still more famous pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Thomas was born in 1227 at Aquino in Calabria, or at least at one of the princely castles of his family in that region of Southern Italy. He came of a most illustrious family of Counts who took their title from that place. His mother was the sister of the Roman Emperor. Thomas was thus nephew of the Emperors Frederick I and Henry VI and cousin of Frederick II. I will pass over the vision of angels, or as the more rationalistic version says the visit of a hermit to his mother, the predictions of his future career, the crown of glory that hovered over his head, and the other signs which to the medieval biographer appeared the necessary preliminary to the birth of a Saint, the miracles by which his

cradle was surrounded, the mythical stories of his childish tricks, and come straight to historical facts. At the tender age of five he was sent to be educated to the great and wealthy Monastery of Monte Cassino, the head-quarters of the Benedictine Order, and the monastery of which the founder himself had been Abbot. It was intended that he should be a monk : to be a monk at Monte Cassino was a very respectable position for a young Count with a taste for the religious life ; his uncle was Abbot of the Monastery, and the young Thomas would doubtless have succeeded to his position as he grew older. The monks, however, sent him to the University of Naples to prosecute his studies. At Naples he came under the influence of the new Order who were everywhere trying to get into their ranks young men of promise to aid them in the conversion of the world. Under their guidance he soon revolted against the life of useless and indolent routine which would have awaited him in the fashionable monastery, and he joined the new democratic Order in which the young Count would have to beg his bread from door to door, to eat broken meats and wear coarse clothes just like the ploughman's son beside him. The alarming news reached his aristocratic mother. She hastened to Naples to see her son—not to deter him from entering the order, according to the highly improbable account of his biographer, but to encourage his pious purpose. However, knowing the weakness of mothers, the friars dodged her : respect for parents has never been a monastic virtue. The youth was passed about from place to place. His military brothers were sent to pursue him, getting leave of absence for the purpose from the Emperor Frederick with whose army they were serving in Tuscany. At last they caught him reposing beside a fountain with the friars in charge of him. They tried to tear the black and white robes of the then detested Order off his back. He resisted vigorously,

but was captured and sent back to his mother. The family tried to persuade him to leave the Order, but in vain ; whereupon they imprisoned him in one of their castles. The friars, robbed of their prey, complained to their great protector, the Pope. On the Pope's remonstrances, the Emperor had the brothers arrested, but the friars were apparently afraid to provoke the hostility of this powerful family. The brothers were set at liberty and Thomas was kept in prison. For two years the mother attempted to shake his resolution by force and fraud, by hardship and insidious temptation. They tore his coarse friar's robe, but he persisted in wearing the rags. At last his mother gave up the attempt and helped him to escape by the window. The Order sent him to study at Cologne and he afterwards became Doctor of Theology at Paris. At this time there was a great feud going on between the secular teachers of Paris and the friars who were trying to capture the education of the University while they refused to submit to its control. The friars, though supported by king and Pope alike, were fiercely hooted and pelted whenever they appeared in the streets. The feud was so bitter that the troops of St. Louis had to mount guard while St. Thomas took his degree. For many years the energies of the University were chiefly devoted to the attempt to exclude from its ranks the teacher who came to be regarded as its most brilliant ornament, and its most famous Saint. The protection of the Pope enabled the friars to conquer : and the theology of St. Thomas became the dominant theology of the most famous of Medieval Universities. Oxford to some extent held aloof and built up a theology of its own, more original and in some ways more interesting than the cut and dried theology of St. Thomas. But it is the Philosophy of St. Thomas that is to-day the official Philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church, and, though the Roman Church boasts a few dogmas

of which St. Thomas had never dreamed, the bulk of Roman Theology is still the theology of St. Thomas—more than ever (I may add) since the impetus given to the study of him by the present cultivated Thomist Pope.¹

There is little more to be said of the life of our hero. It was passed chiefly at Paris and at Cologne ; it was one continuous round of devotion, study, teaching, preaching, and writing. His Biographer in the *Acta Sanctorum* is of course full of visions, miraculous cures, miraculous elevations during prayers, and stories of his absence of mind, his absorption in speculations (even while dining with the King) and his incredible humility. On this last matter the critical reader may perhaps be allowed to doubt whether the very finest kind of humility really was possessed by the man who boasted that he had never once felt a single emotion of vain-glory while lecturing to the adoring crowds of students who flocked to his chair. But perhaps we ought not attach too much importance to these stories of his biographer ten generations after the event. The most trustworthy record of his life lies in the immense array of his works. They occupy in different editions seventeen, eighteen or twenty-eight folio volumes. The best known of these works, the *Summa Theologiae*, by itself fills eight fat octavo volumes of the closest print, though no doubt this was finished by a disciple. These reveal a mind stored with all the knowledge of his age—an age (be it remembered) in which knowledge had to be gathered from badly written MSS. full of contractions and condensations which the modern expert reads slowly and with difficulty. When one gazes at the monuments of such incredible industry, one can almost believe the story that he was in the habit of dictating to three or even four amanuenses at once.

¹ [Leo. XIII (1878-1903). The reference is particularly to the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* issued in 1879.]—EDD.

On one occasion it is said he even went on dictating while asleep. He died in the Abbey of Fossa Nuova near Faenza as he was on his way to the Council of Lyons in 1274, and was canonised in 1323. After several transportations and many disputes his body eventually found a resting place in the house of his Order at Toulouse, except his right arm which was transferred to Paris.

Thomas Aquinas did a great work for his time by putting Christianity into a shape in which it satisfied, on the whole, the intellect of his day—by combining the truth about God which the world had learned from Christ with all the truth about man and the Universe which it had learned from other sources—and chiefly from ancient Greece. But knowledge and thought go on growing, and the work which St. Thomas did for *his* age wants doing again for ours ; for knowledge increases and thought advances, and Theology, if it is to be a living science, must advance too. The greatest idea that we owe to St. Thomas is his magnificent conception of Theology as a science in which the results of all other sciences, the highest generalisations in all departments of thought, are summed up and harmoniously combined in a great theory about the ultimate meaning of the world—about the relations between God, the World, and man. That ideal is one which we want to keep steadily before our eyes, for it is an ideal still more valuable than any positive doctrine which is to be found in his writings. There are elements in his writings which are of real value even now. You will find very often the traditional doctrines of Christianity presented in a far more intelligent and intelligible form in the writings of St. Thomas than they are in the popular theology of modern times—the doctrine of the Holy Trinity for instance. You will not find in St. Thomas any support for that popular conception of the Trinity which is too often produced in the theological text-books of to-day—

as practically three separate minds, intelligences, wills, i.e. practically three Gods very like one another and in the habit of close co-operation with one another. In the writings of St. Thomas you will find the three persons explained as three "proprieties" or as we might modernise the phrase, three distinguishable and essential attributes: God is Power, and God is Wisdom, and God is Love—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. That is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as you will find it expounded in St. Thomas and you cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas: for on all those matters in which the Reformers did not diverge from the teaching of the medieval Church, it was St. Thomas more than any one else who determined what Orthodoxy was to be.

But for the most part it is not by borrowing from St. Thomas that we shall best follow his example—certainly not by collecting from his writings baseless and phantastic speculations about Angels, discussions as to whether two Angels (being without bodies) can occupy the same space and the like—as one sometimes sees done in silly little manuals of religious teaching. Rather let us try boldly and courageously to grapple with the intellectual difficulties of our age as he did with the intellectual difficulties of *his*. Nay, we must grapple with them more boldly than he did: for though his thinking is vigorous, his conclusions are in great part predetermined. St. Thomas is reactionary even for his own day; he reimposed upon the thought of his age many of the fetters which the bolder thinkers of his time were on the point of breaking through. He secured to his age and incorporated into the very substance of the Church's teaching one-half of the new truths of his age at the cost of stereotyping a great deal that was really out-worn. But still the theologians of our age have much to learn from St. Thomas. Evolution and Darwinism, the results of Old Testament Criticism, and New Testament Criticism, the results of

modern Science and the speculations of modern Philosophy—these things are the new truths of our age, these things are to us what the re-discovery of Aristotle and Averroes was to the Thirteenth Century. We must face them as St. Thomas faced them. All in the new ideas that is true will have to be embodied in the theology of the future: and whatever in the theology of the past is not true will have to disappear. Those who believe most firmly in the imperishable value of Christ's teaching to the world ought to believe most confidently that that deposit of truth will shine forth all the more brightly when the foreign accretions have been removed, and the revelation of God in it is set in its due relation to the revelation of God in the Universe as it is understood by the light of reason.

In some ways the task before us is very like that which St. Thomas accomplished for his age. And in some ways our mode of attacking it must be something like this. We must approach it with his lively faith that all true religion must commend itself to Reason. But in other respects our own method of reconstructing theology must be different from his. I will only mention one of them. He lived in an unhistorical age, whereas the spirit of our age is essentially historical. To the age of St. Thomas Christ had become almost purely a metaphysical being. Men speculated about His nature, about the mode of the Incarnation, about the process of Redemption, and they did so almost without reference to the historical facts of Christ's life and the historical records of his teaching—records which they had not the knowledge to understand aright. That cannot be so with us. The very beginning of the reconstruction which our theology needs must be to paint for ourselves a true and historical picture of what Christ actually was, and what He taught, and what He meant by that teaching. It must not, indeed, be assumed that all Christian thought that

is of later origin—all speculation about God's nature, all ways of describing the nature of the work of Christ, all theories about the work of grace in the soul which cannot be found in the actual teaching of Christ—are of no value. Doctrines which are of later growth may be legitimate deductions from what Christ taught ; they may help us to understand it better : or, when they cannot be directly based upon Christ's teaching, they may represent the independent results of Christian thinkers trained in the philosophical schools of Greece. Christ always taught that the work which He had begun was to be carried on by the working of the Holy Spirit in the minds of His disciples, and we must look for the effects of that perpetual inspiration not only in the practical religious life but also in the thought and the reflection of the Christian Church. Only, if we believe in the inspiration of Christ's Church, we must believe in it thoroughly. We must believe that that inspiration has not ceased, that the Holy Spirit is working in the religious thought of our own day as much as in the religious thought of the past. And we must not look for the results only in the deliberations of ecclesiastical assemblies or in the writings of formal Theologians. The work of reconstruction, or restatement, of theological progress is visibly going on among us. It can be traced in the writings of professional Theologians—alike among those who are reputed orthodox and conservative and among those who are called advanced or even dangerous. And yet it is not always through the work of professional theologians that the new Christian thought of our age—the Christianisation of the new knowledge and the intellectual reconstruction of the old faith—reaches the majority of educated men. Much of the best theology of our age, for instance, is to be found in Poetry. But it would be absurd to say that Tennyson and Browning have done for their age exactly the work which St. Thomas

did for his. We do still want a systematic Theology or Christian philosophy like that of St. Thomas, though it must be a theology or a philosophy of a more modest type, a theology that is content to leave unsolved many of the problems which St. Thomas is prepared to answer with such lawyer-like precision.

And yet it is probable that many will find and have found in the poetry of Tennyson and Browning what they have been unable to find in the writings of the Theologian and the sermons of the Preacher. The study of St. Thomas is now confined almost entirely to the priest and the professional student, but the ideas of St. Thomas still live for the un-theological world of culture in the poetry of Dante.

Even so it is perhaps through the expression it has found in the poetry of Tennyson and Browning that the professed theological teaching of the age that is just passing away will contribute most to that fuller, richer, completer understanding of the Christian faith which is the heritage—let us not doubt it—of ourselves and for our children.

NICHOLAS DE ULTRICURIA, A MEDIEVAL
HUME

Two causes have prevented full justice being done to the philosophical penetration and originality of the Schoolmen. Their acuteness, their subtlety, and their industry have been sufficiently praised. It has even been recognised that beneath a thin veil of orthodoxy—the thinness of which was sometimes appreciated, sometimes not even suspected, by the thinker himself—much bold speculation really went on in the medieval Schools. But it is sometimes forgotten that the acknowledged Doctors of the Church were not the only thinkers who once taught and lectured and disputed in the Rue du Fouarre at Paris or our Oxford School Street: perhaps these were not always the most brilliant or the most original. One cause which has tended to give an exaggerated impression of the orthodoxy and deference to authority prevalent in the medieval Schools is the fact that the heretics, though at one time they often enjoyed considerable vogue, were at length as a rule more or less suppressed, so completely sometimes that nothing remains of their writings but the propositions for which they were condemned and which in most cases, but not always, they eventually retracted. The other is the great advantage which the regular clergy possessed over the seculars in diffusing their teaching throughout Europe and getting them copied, circulated, preserved, and handed on after their deaths—eventually, after the invention of printing, printed and brought within easy reach of the modern scholar. The secular Master of Arts or Doctor of Theology could not so easily transfer himself and his lectures from Oxford to Paris, and from Paris to Prague or Vienna, while it was a regular part of the Mendicant system to transfer their Lecturers from one convent to another.

Every famous Oxford Friar, sooner or later, taught at Paris, and what was known in Paris was soon known to the world. Once accepted and approved by his Order, the Mendicant Doctor was provided with an organised army of disciples, pledged by the spirit of monastic loyalty to diffuse his teaching during his lifetime, and to hand it down to posterity after his death. The great rows of costly folios which represent the Schoolman to the modern historian of Philosophy are for the most part the works of Mendicant Doctors: the works of the secular thinkers, from whom in many cases it is known that these Doctors received their first inspiration, remain unprinted and unexplored in the MS. presses of our University and College Libraries, when their heresies were not conspicuous enough to procure for them the greater distinction of the bonfire.

A most conspicuous instance of the success of well-regulated persecution in condemning thought to oblivion is supplied by the fate of Wycliffe's writings. Wycliffe was, even before the date of his open quarrel with the Church, about the most famous Schoolman of his day: he was famous as a pure Philosopher, a Logician, and a Metaphysician, before he wrote Theology at all; and he was famous as a Theologian before he was famous as a heretic. Yet, in spite of all his fame, his works, with the exception of a few of the most popular, have remained in MS. till the Wycliffe Society began its valuable labours in connexion with the quinquacentenary of his death. Even now that his works occupy a whole shelf in our Libraries, no historian of Philosophy has discovered the existence of such a thinker: even his name does not appear in Prantl or Erdmann or Ueberweg¹ or Hauréau's History of the Scholastic Philosophy.

¹[This is no longer true of the present edition of Ueberweg. Here Wycliffe is coupled with Thomas Bradwardine as a Scotist Formalist. Cf. Ueberweg, *Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie*, 11th edition, Berlin, 1928.]—EDD.

But the most curious instance of this process of inverted natural selection which has come under my notice is the fate of the writer whom I wish to take this opportunity of introducing—perhaps I may venture to say for the first time—to the notice of modern Philosophers. It might seem hardly credible that a writer of the Fourteenth Century should have anticipated the main theses of Berkeley and of Hume, and yet occupy but a line or two in the recognised histories of Philosophy. But such is the fact. The Aristotelian Society exists primarily to promote the study of Philosophy, not of the history of Philosophy;—to say nothing of so antiquarian a department of that history as the Philosophy of the Fourteenth Century. Still, the ideas of this neglected Schoolman are so curious and interesting that I hope I am not mistaken in supposing that the members of this Society might like, by way of diversion from the more actual and present-day controversies which usually claim their attention, to hear a little about a forgotten chapter in the history of thought.

In one of the great folios of du Boulay's history of the University of Paris, there is printed a brief document in which one Nicholas de Ultricurua (elsewhere spelt Autricuria) retracts certain propositions which he had maintained in the Schools of Arts at Paris, and for holding which he was deprived of his Mastership of Arts and declared incapable of proceeding to the degree of Doctor of Theology. The document as there printed is only a fragment: the whole of it now appears in the second volume of the magnificent *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, edited by the late Father Denifle and M. Chatelain. The document even now occupies but ten quarto pages. One letter of his to a philosophical opponent has been printed in D'Argentré's *Collectio Judiciorum de novis erroribus*:¹ two remain in MS. at Paris. This is all that remains of the activity of one who appears

¹T. I, p. 358.

to have felt all the philosophic doubts which, as developed by Berkeley and Hume, all subsequent Philosophy has been seeking either to confirm or to remove. No doubt the ability of a thinker is to be determined not by the theses which he propounds but by the arguments which he uses in defence of them: the arguments used by Nicholas are very inadequately preserved. But what remains makes it clear that if his penetration was not equal to that of Berkeley and Hume, he had fairly entered upon the line of thought which is now associated with their names.

Of the man himself scarcely anything at all is known. He came from Autricourt, in the diocese of Verdun, and may therefore, I suppose, be set down as a German. He performed a disputation for the degree of Doctor of Theology some time before 1342.¹ In 1340, with five others, one of them being an Englishman—Henricus Anglicus, of the Cistercian Order—he was summoned to the Papal Court at Avignon to answer certain charges of heresy; he is now described as a Licentiate of Theology, i.e., he had all but completed the elaborate course which then conducted to the degree of Doctor in that Faculty. Eight years before, being then a Bachelor of Theology, he was "provided" by the Pope to a Canonry at Metz. This, it may be mentioned, was at the time the usual way of securing a maintenance for University Teachers in the Northern Universities. No endowments expressly designed for University Chairs at present existing, Prebends and College Fellowships (which last at Paris ceased when the D.D. degree was taken) were the only means of subsistence available for such Teachers. His case was referred to a Cardinal,² and the affair apparently lingered on, *more Romano*, for six years. It was not till 1346 that judgment was given to the effect

¹*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, T. II, No. 912, note.

²*Ibid.*, No. 1041 and notes; cf. *Auctarium*, T. I, c. 11.

already mentioned. Retractation in a beaten Controversialist at that time involved no disgrace; it was looked upon very much in the same light as the act of a modern politician or newspaper editor who retracts a libel which he has found himself unable to justify to the satisfaction of a Judge or Jury, though he may still retain his private opinion that it is true. Nicholas retracted his errors at Avignon in 1346; on St. Catherine's Day, November 25th, 1347, he publicly recanted them in a sermon at the Dominican Church in Paris, and with his own hand burned the theses and the tractate in which they had been defended. His moderation was not unrewarded. In 1348—two years after his condemnation—he is Dean of Metz, and the friends who had shared his errors seem for the most part to have likewise achieved satisfactory ecclesiastical careers.

There is only one more point which has possibly to be added to this jejune record. A certain MS., supposed to be a discourse of Pope Clement VI., bearing the date 1343, declares that Nicholas had fled to the Court of Louis of Bavaria, the anti-papal claimant of the Imperial crown.¹ Father Denifle appears to doubt the story: yet, if true, it would account for the long delay in pronouncing his condemnation. And the fact would fit in with all that we know of the political and ecclesiastical events of the time. Nicholas was certainly a disciple of William of Occam, who likewise joined the party, and lived at the Court of Louis of Bavaria, and died unreconciled with the Holy See in 1347. The still bolder anti-papalist thinkers Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun and many other more or less suspected Theologians were members of the group which rallied round the enlightened but unfortunate Louis of Bavaria.

However, our interest lies not in the life of Nicholas of Autricourt but in his theses. The first list of errors

¹See the Note in *Chart. Univ. Paris.*, T. II, p. 720.

charged against Nicholas of Autricourt are thirty-two in number. To this is appended a further list of admissions made by him in the presence of Pope Clement VI himself or of the Cardinal to whom the case was committed, together with another schedule sent—no doubt by his enemies—from Paris. I will read, with a few comments, the list of the thirty-two propositions, and then add a few words as to the light that is thrown on them by the subsequent lists and the one printed letter. I think it will probably be best to translate them, adding the words of the original Latin¹:—

(1) “The proposition ‘Man is an animal’ is not necessary according to the faith.”

[“Dixi et scrip(sic) quod) hec propositio : homo est animal, non est necessaria secundum fidem, non attendens pro tunc connexionem necessariam predictorum terminorum.”]

This proposition Nicholas admits that he had laid down “without attending for the moment to the necessary connexion of the aforesaid terms.” This is clearly a piece of Occamistic Empiricism; it asserts that all our knowledge rests upon experience, and that it is not *a priori* unthinkable that there should be men that are not animals.

(2) “From the fact that one thing exists, it cannot by any evidence derived from a first principle be deduced that another thing exists.”

[“Ex eo, quod una res est, non potest evidenter evidētia educta ex primo principio inferri, quod alia res sit.”]

This amounts to Locke’s denial of innate ideas, or, in modern language, of any *a priori* or axiomatic truth, and in particular of the axioms upon which the validity of all reasoning depends. In the language of certain modern friends of ours, axioms—even the principle of contradiction—are only postulates. If this interpretation of him be true, I have

¹Chart. Univ. Paris., T. II, No. 1124.

no doubt our friends the Pragmatists, each of whom is always ready to admit that not he but somebody else invented Pragmatism, will be ready enough to claim Nicholas de Ultricurua as the founder of their School.

(3) "From the fact that one thing is, it cannot evidently, with an evidence deduced from a first principle, be inferred that another thing is not."

["Ex eo, quod una res est, non potest evidenter inferri quod alia res non sit."]

(4) "From the fact that one thing is not, it cannot be evidently inferred that another thing is not."

["Ex eo, quod una res non est, non potest evidenter evidētia deducta ex primo principio inferri, quod alia res non sit."]

(5) "From the fact that one thing is not, it cannot be evidently inferred that another thing is."

["Ex eo, quod una res non est, non potest evidenter inferri, quod alia res sit."]

These three propositions of course imply the same principle as the preceding ones.

(6) "Evident certainty has no degrees."

["Certitudo evidentie non habet gradus."]

This principle would seem to mean that one self-evident proposition cannot be more or less self-evident than another self-evident proposition. It would be perhaps to attribute to Nicholas too much anticipatory insight to suppose that he is denying the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality in the form given it by Mr. Bradley or Mr. Joachim. It is probable that he was thinking of Aristotle's law that some truths were *γνωριμώτερα φύσει* than others.

(7) "Except the certainty of faith there is no other certainty but the certainty of a first principle

or of a proposition which can be resolved into a first principle."

["*Excepta certitudine fidei non erat alia certitudo nisi certitudo primi principii vel que in primum principium potest resolvi.*"]

The exact polemical point of this is obscure ; perhaps it means that propositions which rest for their truth upon induction from experience cannot be certain ; and since Nicholas has already asserted that no proposition about existence is really self-evident or a first principle, it will follow that no proposition whatever is intellectually certain, though Faith may supply the deficiencies of Reason.

(8) "Of the existence of material substance distinct from our own soul we have no evident certainty."

["*De substantia materiali alia ab anima nostra non habemus certitudinem evidentie.*"]

Putting aside the Sceptics who doubted everything, this is, so far as I know, the earliest piece of really thorough-going Idealism before the Idealism of Berkeley and Hume—that is to say, if Idealism means or includes a doubt as to the existence of a material world except in and for mind or some kind of spiritual experience. It might no doubt be said that we have here merely the problematical Idealism of Descartes ; but it does not appear that Nicholas, like Descartes, discovered any indirect way of proving the independent existence of an external world which, as he contended, was not immediately certain.

(9) "The inference from the proposition 'A is and formerly was not' to the proposition 'something different from A is,' is not evident with an evidence deduced from a first principle."

["*Hec consequenti(a : a est et prius non) fuit, igitur alia res ab a est, non est evidens eviden(tia deducta ex primo) principio.*"]

The point of this thesis is much the same as that

of the first five propositions; the only new feature is that the assertion is now apparently limited to things which have a beginning, to events.

(10) "This consequence is not admitted with any evidence deduced from a first principle; 'Fire is brought near to tow and no counteracting cause is present, therefore the tow will be burned.'"

["Hec con(sequentia non est evidens evi)dentia deducta ex primo principio : Ignis est approx(imatus stupe et nullum e)st impedimentum : ergo stupa comburetur."]

Nicholas here proceeds from the denial of necessary connexion in general to an explicit denial of the law of Causality, or rather to what (as I for one should contend) is quite a different thing, a denial of the necessary or self-evident character of the Uniformity of Nature; and consequently of the self-evident certainty of the inductive inferences based upon that assumption. We shall see from the next proposition that he does not here deny the law of Causality itself; what he denies is that a phenomenon must necessarily be followed by another phenomenon which has been observed usually to follow it, or, in Berkeleyan language, that an idea cannot be the cause of another idea.

(11) "We have no evident knowledge that there can be any cause of any event other than God."

["Nescimus evidenter, quod ali(a a Deo possint)esse causa alicujus effectus."]

(12) "We do not know evidently that any cause which is not God exercises efficient causality."

["Nescimus evidenter, quod aliqua causa causet efficienter que non sit Deus."]

Here, no doubt, he goes beyond Berkeley in denying the causality of the human will. From this and other evidence it would appear that Nicholas

was influenced by the strongly predestinarian ideas of Thomas Bradwardine ; what he meant was " God must be the sole and ultimate cause even of our voluntary acts."

(13) " We have no evident knowledge that there can be or is any efficient natural cause."

[*" Nescimus evidenter, quod aliqua causa efficiens naturalis sit vel esse possit."*]

This is another assertion of the same principle : " We know nothing of real efficient causes in the material world ; God is the sole cause of every event."

(14) " We have no necessary knowledge whether any effect is or can be naturally produced."

[*" Nescimus evidenter, utrum aliquis effectus sit vel esse possit naturaliter productus."*]

(15) " Whatever conditions we take to be the cause of any effect, we do not evidently know that, those conditions being posited, it follows that the effect must be posited also."

[*" Quibuscunque acceptis, que possunt esse causa alicujus effectus, nescimus evidenter quod ad positionem eorum sequatur effectus positio."*]

A logical deduction from the preceding ; there is no absolute certainty in scientific prediction.

(16) " We do not evidently know that the subject concurs in the production of any effect."

[*" Nescimus evidenter, quod in aliqua productione concurrat subjectum."*]

The human will is (so far as we know) not only not the cause, but not even a concurrent, or, as we might say in modern language, a derived cause of any effect.

(17) " There cannot be any demonstration simply

by which through the mere existence of anything the existence of an effect is demonstrated."

["Quod nulla potest esse simpliciter demonstratio, qua existentia tantum demonstraretur existentia effectus."]

(18) "It is not evidently known to us that there can be any demonstration from any prior position which is really different from itself."

["Non est nobis evidenter notum, quod possit esse aliqua demonstratio a priori differenti realiter."]

In the last two propositions the denial of the validity of inference seems to be extended not merely to demonstrations which postulate the uniformity of nature, but to all inference whatever. Here Nicholas seems to go beyond Hume, though not perhaps beyond the logical requirements of Hume's position.

(19) "The nobility of one thing above another cannot be evidently shown."

["Non potest evidenter ostendi nobilitas unius rei super aliam."]

Here the scepticism is pushed into the moral region. The way for this development had been prepared by Duns Scotus, who denied the intrinsic truth or obligation of the second table in the Decalogue but not of the first. God might have commanded man to lie and steal, and that would have made lying and stealing moral; but He could not have commanded them to hate Himself or to take His name in vain. Occam and his followers were more logical, and denied the "perseitas boni" altogether.

(20) "Whatever thing is proved to exist, no one knows evidently that it does not exceed in nobility all other things."

["Quacunque re demonstrata nullus scit evidenter, qui(n) excedat nobilitate omnes alias."]

(21) "Whatever thing is known to exist, no one knows evidently that it is not God, if by God we understand the most noble being."

[“(Quacun)que re demonstrata nullus scit evidenter, quin ipsa sit D(eus, si per Deum int)elligamus ens nobilissimum.”]

Nicholas is logical enough to recognise, as others who have made Morality depend upon the arbitrary will of God have not always done, that on his premises he had no right, as far as Reason is concerned, to attribute moral qualities to God. This is one part of his meaning, but the proposition further seems to imply “the existence of God, if by God is meant anything more than the unknowable cause of all phenomena, cannot be demonstrated.” Since we cannot assert that one thing is intrinsically nobler than another, for all we know any existing thing may be the noblest being in the world, and so, in the sense defined, God.

(22) “No one evidently knows that one thing is the end (or final cause) of another.”

[“Aliquis nescit evidenter, quod una res sit finis a(lterius).”]

Here even modern Philosophers of great distinction have shown less penetration than Nicholas. They have not always seen that, if the authority and objectivity of the moral consciousness be denied and God be declared to be super-moral we have no ground for any Teleology whatever. The idea of value is derived from the moral consciousness, and the distinction between means and end is a distinction of values. The end for which an event happens is not distinguished from the means merely by being posterior to it, but by being good, while the means is not in itself good or is less good. This idea of good is derived from our moral judgments, and from no other source: deny the validity of those judgments, and we can attach no meaning to the distinction between means and ends.

(23) "No one knows evidently that, anything being proved to exist, it may not be right to bestow upon it the highest honour."

["(Nul)lus scit evidenter qualibet re ostensa, quin sibi debea(t) impendere maximum ho)norem."]

In other words, it is impossible to construct an *a priori* rational argument against any form of idolatry. Any form of idolatry might be plausibly defended on Pantheistic grounds. Here, once more, our Schoolman perhaps compares favourably with some of our modern thinkers, who assert that God is everything, and yet would agree with the official scribe who has appended to this proposition the words "false, heretical, and blasphemous." And yet, if anything that exists is perfectly good, why not worship one thing as well or as much as anything else? Mr. Bradley has ridiculed Herbert Spencer in a famous note: "[Mr. Spencer proposes] to take something for God simply and solely because we do not know what the devil it can be";¹ but he might, perhaps, find it difficult to give any better reason for the religious reverence with which he himself regards his own Absolute, if once it is admitted that (in his words) "the Reality is our criterion of worse and better, of ugliness and beauty, of true and false, and of real and unreal."² It is true that the Reality is not its appearances, and that in the appearances there are "degrees of Reality," but philosophic Brahminism and some other creeds will be prepared to supply a corresponding number of degrees of worship. I may be pardoned this little digression, because I think it really brings out the drift of Nicholas' thought.

(24) "No one knows evidently, but that this proposition can reasonably be conceded: if anything whatever is produced, God is produced."

["Aliquis nescit evidenter, quin ista possit rationabiliter

¹*Appearance and Reality*, p. 128.

²*Ibid.*, p. 552.

conce(di : si aliq)ua res est producta, Deus est productus." Cf. a later thesis : "Corruptibile includit repugnantiam et contradictionem."]

It is difficult to give a meaning to this proposition if we take "produce" literally—to imply a beginning in time. Perhaps it means simply, "It cannot be proved, but that, given the existence of anything, the existence of God is proved." We should then have to see in it simply an assertion of the classical argument for a necessary Being: "If anything exists, an absolutely necessary Being exists: now I, at least, exist: therefore an absolutely necessary Being exists." If we take the "is produced" literally, we may suppose it to mean that, if you once admit the real beginning of anything, a being such as God is commonly supposed to be, might have a beginning, and you could not prove the necessity of any eternal, uncreated Being. Nothing that really is can possibly have a beginning. Nicholas is here denying the Aristotelian doctrine of corruption. Or it is just possible (as my friend Mr. Webb suggests) that the argument relied on was the following sophism: "Aliqua res est producta, Deus est aliqua res, ergo Deus est productus." But Nicholas' tone does not suggest that he was indulging in mere logical trifling of this kind.

(25) "It cannot evidently be shown but that anything you like is eternal."

["Non potest evidenter ostendi, quin quolibet res sit eterna."]

Here, again, Nicholas is denying the Aristotelian, or what he takes to be the Aristotelian, doctrine of corruption. Nothing that really exists can begin or cease to be.

(26) "If bread be proved to exist, it cannot evidently be shown that there is anything there which is not an accident."

["Pane demonstrato non potest evidenter ostendi, quod ibi sit aliqua res, que non sit accidens."]

We might see in these words merely a continuation of the former line of thought: a denial of any substance in material things—of either the permanent *εἶδος* or the permanent *ὑλη* in material things. But it is possible that there is a more special and subtle reference to the dogma of Transubstantiation. The orthodox doctrine was, of course, that the substance of the body and blood of Christ took the place of the substance of the bread and wine, which last was destroyed by consecration, the accidents of the bread remaining unchanged. Nicholas objects—“You admit that after consecration there is no substance beneath the accidents of bread: how do you know there was any before: why may there not have been nothing but accidents?” It is significant that this speculation is tenderly dealt with, being only revoked as false, not as blasphemous or even heretical: there is no denial of a miraculous change, but merely the assertion that the body and blood of Christ present in the Eucharist may, after all, be only accidents, like the accidents of bread and wine. At all events, this possible application of Nicholas’ thesis to the Sacrament of the altar may be a reason for its condemnation: if you deny Substance, you necessarily deny change of Substance.

(27) “It cannot be said without a self-contradiction, which the propounder of such a proposition may be driven to admit, that everything in the world is produced,” i.e., the fact of creation cannot be proved, and even involves self-contradiction.

[“Potest dici sine contradictione, ad quam quis possit duci, quod omnis res de mundo est producta.”]

Here it is scarcely possible to doubt that a “non” has dropped out before “potest”: if we take the words as they stand, they must mean “if you insist that anything has a real beginning, everything may have had such a beginning.”

(28) “This consequence is not evident: ‘A is

produced, therefore there is or was someone who produced A,' " i.e. if creation or a beginning of the world is admitted, that does not prove a Creator.

[" *Hec consequentia non est evidens : a est productum, igitur aliquis producens a est vel fuit.*"]

(29) " These consequences are not evident : ' The act of understanding exists : therefore the Understanding (" intellectus ") exists. The act of volition exists : therefore the Will exists.' "

[" *Iste consequentie non sunt evidentes : actus intelligendi est : ergo intellectus est. Actus volendi est : igitur voluntas est.*"]

Here, once more, I need hardly stop to point out the parallels in Hume—in Hume and all his naturalistic followers, and in some who are not Naturalists.

(30) " The proposition cannot be disproved that all things which appear are true."

[" *Non potest evidenter ostendi, quin omnia, que apparent, sint vera.*"]

If we suppose that by " true " he means " that which may truly be said to exist," Nicholas might secure the august support of Mr. Bradley, though both Mr. Bradley and Nicholas might perhaps both of them have found it a little difficult to explain the difference between a Reality which exists only in its appearances and an appearance which exists only in Reality.

(31) " Contradictories mean the same thing."

[" *Contradictoria ad invicem idem significant.*"]

In this case I will not even venture to name the real or apparent modern parallel. I will only say that in Nicholas this must be, I suppose, pure scepticism. There is no " higher unity " in the background to justify human Reason of its children in the last resort.

(32) "God and the creature (or created world) are not anything."

["Deus et creatura (non sunt ali)quid."]

Here I don't pretend to catch the exact meaning. As the official censor's description is merely "false and scandalous according to the sound of the words," I suppose they cannot have meant quite what they sound. They cannot have meant a flat denial of God's existence in the popular sense of the words. Possibly the meaning is something like the famous "If God existed, he would not be God." God is *ὑπὲρ οὐσίας*, an idea which Nicholas may very well have got from the pseudo-Dionysius. The doctrine is probably the same which he elsewhere expresses by saying "'God is' and 'God is not' mean the same, though in a different manner or sense." God and the creature both have being, but they have it in different senses (not *univoce* but *equivoco*), so that in the sense in which you assert it of the creature it cannot be asserted of God, and *vice versa*. There is, then, no one thing which each of them can be said to be.¹

On examination before the Cardinal, Nicholas made an admission which throws a further light on the general drift of his opinions. He is accused of saying that "concerning things almost no certainty can be had through natural appearances; yet moderate certainty could in a short time be secured if men would turn their mind to things, and not to the understanding of Aristotle and the commentator," i.e. of course, Averroes. Averroes the Commentator was, it must be remembered, in the medieval Schools, as much the officially recognised and prescribed authority as Averroes the original thinker, and the Averroism which he produced, were the typical representatives of all heresy and infidelity. The movement which Occam inaugurated, and of

¹Deus est, Deus non est, penitus idem significant, licet [alio modo].

which Nicholas represents (we may say) the extremest development, was a great revolt against Aristotle and the systems of Philosophy and Theology which the great Dominican Doctors, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, had built upon the foundation of his teaching with such modifications, of course, as the requirements of medieval orthodoxy demanded. I may remark, in passing, that the germs of the movement were undoubtedly to be found in the teaching of Roger Bacon, like Occam a member of the Franciscan Order and of the University of Oxford. Many of the supplementary charges against Nicholas are simply directed against his rejection of various features of the Aristotelian or Thomist Philosophy; but it is to be observed that these he did not, like the former, admit in all cases to be correctly reported. There is a general charge of maintaining that the arguments of Aristotle could be met by arguments of equal probability; a general accusation of disparaging those who studied Aristotle "to decrepit old age," and "to such an extent that, when a friend of truth like himself came and made his trumpet to sound so to awake sleepers from their sleep, they were much aggrieved, and rushed upon him, as it were, armed for a mortal fray." (This is mildly condemned as "presumptuous.") He is charged with denying that "things" could be generated or corrupted,¹ and with declaring that the idea of corruption involved a contradiction. All change in natural things was, he held, merely due to local motion, to aggregation or dispersal of atoms—a doctrine which was probably objected to, not so much on account of its materialistic tendency, difficult to reconcile with the sceptical Idealism of other theses, as because it denied that corruption was the putting on and off by matter of the "forms" which really, according to Aristotelian orthodoxy, made

¹Res absolute permanentes, de quibus dicitur communiter quod generantur et corrumpuntur, sunt eterne sive sint substantie sive accidentia.

things what they were. Another charge against Nicholas is his anticipation of the corpuscular theory of light, and his assertion that light has velocity¹—another trace of the influence of Roger Bacon. He is also accused of denying the Thomist doctrine of Perception, the idea of “visible and intelligible species.” Moreover, he had issued a presumptuous notice that he would lecture on the Politics of Aristotle, and would correct whatever needed correction in his account of the just and the unjust. One of the things in Aristotle apparently which needed such correction was the idea that theft was always wrong. The negative instance which he produced was the case of a well-born youth who finds someone willing to instruct him “in all the speculative Science that can be had about created things” for a consideration of a hundred pounds, which the youth could not obtain without theft. It being always right to do whatever is well pleasing to God, and it being well pleasing to God for a man to acquire his own perfection, theft might be in this case permitted. It was unfortunate for Nicholas that he lived before the great days of Probabilist Casuistry, when perhaps such a doctrine might have passed for orthodox. But, in spite of his attacks on Aristotle, it is pretty clear that Nicholas, like most independent thinkers of the Middle Ages, was himself a good deal influenced by Aristotle or the Averroistic interpretation of him, a much more genuine Aristotle in some ways than the Averroism of the Thomists. Although among his comprehensive doubts is to be found the doubt whether anything material existed from all eternity, he is also accused of asserting in several forms the eternity of the world.² In the assertion that the

¹Lumen nichil aliud est quam quedam corpora (que nata) sunt sequi motum solis, seu etiam alterius corporis luminosi, ita quod fit per motum localem talium corporum advenientium ad presentiam corporis luminosi. Et si dicatur quod non potest fieri per motum localem, quia in instanti fit, respondet, quod ymo fit in tempore sicut sonus, licet non percipiamus quod fit subito.

²Isti conclusioni, quod res permanentes sunt eterne, magis est assentientium quam, etc.

acts of our soul are eternal ¹ it is impossible not to recognise the characteristic Averroist doctrine of the Unity of the active intellect, which carried with it a denial of personal Immortality which was, of course, the genuine Aristotelian doctrine, though all the energies of the orthodox Aristotelians were concentrated upon the refutation of it. The accuser goes on to interpret this as meaning that he held the individual intellect to be always active, that the individual's thought is always actual, never potential, adding that by that position the whole third book of Aristotle's "De Anima" is undermined (*cessat*). What he probably meant to assert was that there is no real difference between the Divine and the human intellect. It was admitted that the Divine intellect was always ἐνέργεια, *actus purus*, and Nicholas asserted that the same might be said of the human intellect, since there was no intellect in man which was not identical with that one actual Intellect. Nicholas' accusers were, perhaps, not far wrong in saying that this involved the virtual denial of that most difficult of Aristotle's conceptions, the "passive intellect," which is mortal and merely human, as contrasted with the active intellect which is eternal and impersonal, and yet is never by Aristotle himself explicitly identified with the Divine νοῦς which dwells outside the spheres. Another thesis imputed to him bears out my interpretation; it runs: "The intellect which is now present to me, will afterwards be present to another subject;" in other words, "Intellect, the higher active intellect is always one and the same, is impersonal, the same in one individual and another." Another rather obscure article seems directed against the Thomist doctrine that the *principium individuationis* is in matter, in rejecting which Nicholas follows the Scotists. The assertion that the Universe is perfect, alike as a whole and in all its parts and therefore

¹Actus anime nostre sunt eterni.

there can be no real passing from being to not being seems to be also Averroistic.

Averroism, as has been suggested, carried with it the denial of personal Immortality, but our Philosopher seems to have made an attempt to reconcile the doctrine with a rationalised version of future rewards and punishments. "When the atomic corpuscles (i.e. of the individual's material organism) are segregated at death, there remains a certain spirit, which is called intellect, and another which is called sense, and these spirits, as in the good men they were in the best possible disposition, will be for infinite time (*infinities*) according as those individual corpuscles shall be congregated, and thus in this the good man will be rewarded, and the bad man punished, because for all eternity, when the congregation of its atoms is repeated, it will always have its own good or bad disposition. Or (he says) it may be otherwise put thus—that these two spirits of good men, when their subject is said to be corrupted, are made present to another subject composed of more perfect atoms. And thus, since such a subject is of greater flexibility and perfection, therefore intelligibles come more frequently than formerly to them."¹ This is obscure; the text is perhaps a corrupt version of a not wholly fair or intelligent report of a difficult speculation; but I would suggest that the idea is that, though the individual body perishes, another body arises in which the particular combination of atoms is repeated and thereby a new human spirit (or new manifestation of the one eternal and divine

¹(Premiatio) bonorum et punitio malorum per hoc fit, quia quando corpo(ra athomalia) segregantur, remanet quidam spiritus, qui dicitur in(tellectus, et alius) qui dicitur sensus, et isti spiritus sicut in bono s(e habebant in optima) dispositione, sic se habebunt infinities secundum quod (illa individua in)finities congregabuntur, et sic in hoc bonus premia(bitur, malus autem) punietur, quia infinities quando iterabitur congreg(atio suorum atho)malium habebit semper suam malam dispositionem. Vel (potest), dicit, aliter poni, quia illi duo spiritus bonorum, quando dicitur corrumpi suppositum eorum, fiunt presentes alteri supposito constituto ex athomis perfectionibus. Et tunc, cum tale suppositum sit majoris flexionis et perfectionis, idcirco intelligibilia magis quam prius veniunt ad eos.

Spirit) comes into existence which is yet in a sense continuous with the former, and which enjoys superior intellectual insight, a nearer approach to the beatific vision, in consequence of the spiritual improvement effected in the life of that former body. There seems to be an attempt to combine the assertion of the denial of personal Immortality in the strict metaphysical sense with a virtual assertion of it sufficient for ethical purposes—reminding one very much of what we are told is the really orthodox interpretation of the Buddhistic doctrine known as Karma. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the thesis that “subjects return in the same number in consequence of the return of the super-celestial bodies to the same position.”¹ When the heavenly bodies return to the same positions, souls return to the re-collected atoms of their former bodies. The expression seems to point to something like the wild theory that history repeats itself at intervals, which is, after all, only an exaggeration of the genuinely Aristotelian doctrine that the human race (like every other species) is eternal, and that periods of civilisation and of barbarism have gone on succeeding one another from all eternity. Nicholas’ speculation seems to be a crude attempt to account for the different characters of men by a sort of semi-physical attraction which nobler souls exert upon the noble examples or ideals (*exemplaria*): it is an attempt to reconcile a rather materialistic predestinarianism with a real and intrinsic difference between different characters; the soul is necessarily determined to act by its *φαντασία* of the end, but the *φαντασία* of a noble end comes by necessity to the noble soul. Here is the strange passage: “Just as the vile elements go to the centre, and earthly elements to the earth on account of homogeneity, while fire gravitates to fire and so with other like

¹Supposita redeunt eodem numero per re(ditum corporum) super-celestium ad eundem situm.

noble bodies ; so it appears that to noble souls there come noble examples, to vile ones vile examples, and those which are of the earth speak earthly things. Whence such an advent of noble or vile examples (I read 'exemplarium' for 'exemplaris') seems to testify to the perfection or imperfection of the souls, for such examples, as he says, do not come except on account of homogeneity." I have translated "unigeneitas" by homogeneity, because in English "unigeneity" would hardly sound intelligible, but it is probable that the Philosopher is trying to reconcile the absolute Unity or Identity of the active intellect in all with the existence of different characters in different men by speaking of an attraction exercised by the animal and mortal soul in the nobler individuals upon the forms eternally present in the universal *νοῦς* or God. "Exemplaria" is not, of course, the usual scholastic Latin for the Platonic Ideas, but I think this must be the meaning here.

I will not weary you with the remaining theses, most of which are a repetition in various forms of those already examined, but will just mention two ethical tenets which appear in the supplementary list of articles sent from Paris. One is that a man ought to love more than himself a neighbour who is better than himself ;¹ the other that God may command a rational creature to hate Himself, and that the creature, if he obeyed, would earn more merit than if he loved God, since he would do this with greater effort and with more contrariety to his own inclination. Here the Ethics which make all Morality lie in obedience to the arbitrary will of God seem oddly combined with a theory that merit lies in self-sacrifice—pushed, it would seem, to the point of violating one's own higher nature. The doctrine, so understood, may be regarded as a sort of *reductio ad absurdum* of Kant, if we substitute the Practical

¹Quilibet plus tene(tur diligere proxim)um meliorem se quam seipsum.

Reason for God, and some of the commandments of Kant's Practical Reason are perhaps scarcely more eccentric than those which Nicholas speculatively regards as possible in God. Perhaps it is not fanciful to see in this an extravagant antagonism to Aristotle's doctrine of the true *φιλαντία*.

How much did Nicholas really believe of all these sceptical suggestions? We began by comparing him to Berkeley; we soon found that he had anticipated Hume's extension of Berkeley's doubts from the unthinking to the thinking substance (so far as the individual soul is concerned); and eventually we found that some of his doubts almost carried him beyond the position of the great sceptic. His scepticism reaches its culmination in the article "This is a first principle, and there is no other: 'If something is, something is.'"¹ It will be observed that all that he generally asserts is that this or that cannot be proved: and some of his problematical suggestions are scarcely consistent with others. Some of them, again, are inferences deduced from the propositions of his opponent, Friar Bernard of Arezzo. It is, however, clear enough that Nicholas' speculation is a development of the Nominalism of Occam; the condemnation of Nicholas was accompanied by a general condemnation of the whole Nominalist school, a school which flourished especially in Oxford, in the Franciscan Order, and among the English and Germans who formed the English nation at Paris—a school whose political tendencies, as exhibited by Occam and John of Jandun (to whom we must add the Italian Marsilius of Padua) made it particularly obnoxious to the Roman Curia. But the School of Occam was not sceptical in the religious sense of the word. If reason was discredited, it was only to make way for faith. Occam was not even in a theological sense a particularly enlightened or progressive thinker; he was a Franciscan Friar, and

¹Hoc est primum principium et non aliud: si aliquid est, aliquid est.

a supporter or originator of many theological ideas less enlightened than the Aristotelian orthodoxy of the great Dominican School. With regard, therefore, to the more theologically destructive of Nicholas' theses, there is no reason to suppose that Nicholas meant any more than is meant by those modern champions of Religion who seek—to my own mind suicidally—to disparage Reason in the interests of Faith. He is nearer to the position of Mr. Balfour than to that of either Hume or Berkeley. In so far as he attacks the Thomist dogmatism—the intermediaries of sensation, the Thomist doctrine of form and matter, generation and corruption—his doubts probably represent deliberate convictions. He shared the Occamist tendency to Empiricism, to Nominalism, to Sensationalism, to Utilitarianism, and thought that there was nothing dangerous to the Faith in these tendencies. But there is no reason to doubt that the Canon and Dean of Metz was a sincere Theist and Christian. At the same time there are indications that in some directions his doubts carried him beyond the position of his Master, and that he was really seeking his way to a position which would have been difficult to reconcile even with the more fundamental requirements of medieval Orthodoxy. His Predestinarianism, a point on which he differed from Occam, was no doubt got from Bradwardine, who was implicitly hit by several of Clement's anathemas—a fact, however, which did not stand in the way of his consecration as Primate of all England two years later by the same Pontiff. But there are traces of an Averroism which goes beyond mere theological Predestinarianism, and which is suggestive of the thinly-veiled Naturalism or Materialism of the Italian Averroists, who flourished especially at Padua. Yet, the obscure speculation about future punishment shows that he had not consciously acquiesced in the Pantheistic Weltanschauung of the avowed Averroists, but was struggling to recon-

cile a Theistic and Christian view of the Universe with tendencies of thought which would, if freely indulged, have carried him in a very different direction. With regard to the most interesting point of all—his suggestion that matter may have no independent existence, it is difficult to be sure whether it really means “the independent existence of matter cannot be proved, although every sensible man believes in it,” or “the independent existence of matter is a gratuitous, unreasonable, and indeed unintelligible and self-contradictory hypothesis.” After all, the same doubt attaches to the enquiry about the private *Weltanschauung* of Hume himself. On the whole it is difficult to suppose that the strong tendency to explain everything by changes of position in material particles could co-exist with a thorough-going Idealism. Modern Idealism may accept an atomic explanation of the Universe as a convenient methodological assumption of Physics; but it is doubtful whether a Medieval would have succeeded in being at once an Atomist in Physics and an Idealist in Metaphysics. It is more probable that his state of mind was “You can’t prove the existence of Matter, and yet we all believe it; in the same way it is impossible to prove the creation of the world and many other distinctively Christian doctrines, and yet we may accept them on the testimony of the Bible or of the Church or of subjective religious emotion.” The probability of this interpretation is increased by the fact that Nicholas’ position on this matter was an inference from positions of his opponent.¹

Friar Bernard had, it appears, maintained that “though from the fact of vision it cannot be inferred that the object seen exists, because the vision may be brought into being by a supernatural cause, or preserved by it, nevertheless because an object has

¹ “In lumine naturali non possumus esse certi, cum apparentia nostra de existentia objectorum extra, est vera vel falsa, quia uniformiter, ut dicitis, representat rem esse, sive sit, sive non sit” (*d’Argentré*, I, p. 358).

been placed there by natural causes, the general influence of the first cause (*primi agentis*) expressly concurring, such an inference may be drawn."¹ Nicholas argues very reasonably that if it is admitted that a supernatural cause might produce an appearance of whiteness without a white object being there, no knowledge of the laws of Nature can tell us for certain that on a particular occasion this was not the case. Nicholas here champions the certainty of immediate perception which his opponent had denied; he had defended in the Hall of the Sorbonne the proposition that "I am evidently certain concerning the objects of the five senses and about my own acts." In what sense he used the word "objects" must remain doubtful. In any case his scepticism subsequently went further.

Two passages in the record of Nicholas' examination before the Cardinal throw some light upon the spirit in which their theses were maintained. The whole discussion, he tells us, grew out of an agreement to dispute with the Minorite Friar Bernard of Arezzo, upon the basis of the principle of contradiction as formulated by Aristotle, how much we could be certain of, and he pleads that all he had contended was that these startling assertions of his could not be shown to involve any contradiction; and in another place he is accused of inventing a "vulpine" excuse, and saying that his speculation about the future judgment was put forward as a mere possibility, and that it was, after all, less probable than the received view, "and so, he says" (runs the document) "that we should adhere to the law of Christ, and believe that reward and punishment take place in the way in which it is expressed in the sacred law." In another place, however, Nicholas declares that he wrote his tractate under a sense of duty, under the belief that "further delay was dis-

¹Ibid., p. 358. I read "quia" for "quin." Bernard's position reminds us of Descartes, who inferred the existence of Matter from the veracity of God.

pleasing to God," from which the official scribe draws the inference that he claimed divine inspiration—a claim which is made into a distinct article of condemnation and marked "*presumptuosum in se, suspectum, quoad dicentem periculosum et revocandum.*" As this claim was not particularly calculated to propitiate his judges, we may infer that in Nicholas we have to do not with a mere spinner of ingenious metaphysical cobwebs designed to startle and attract attention, but with a sincere religious thinker who really did anticipate lines of thought which, followed out in different directions, have constituted the principal subject of discussion among modern Philosophers. If he did not actually anticipate the positions of Berkeley or of Hume or of Spinoza, he saw that such positions were possible, and saw the difficulty of meeting any of them, and that is a considerable achievement for a Parisian Doctor of the Fourteenth Century. I trust I shall have convinced my audience that Nicholas of Ultricuria is at least deserving of the passing notice which he has so far failed to attain at the hands of historians of Philosophy.

BISHOP BUTLER¹

UP till a few years ago Butler's *Analogy* still held its place among the few books usually prescribed for Ordination Examinations. It has certainly begun most rightly to disappear. To set before candidates for the ministry Butler's *Analogy* as a treasure-house of answers to the modern sceptic is really like bringing up a medical student upon the works of Hippocrates or of Galen. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the obsolescence of Butler in many ways—especially of that second part of the *Analogy* in which he deals with Revealed Religion. Why, then, read a paper on Butler if he be dead? Had he not better be decently buried too? I reply that I have chosen him for two reasons: (1) I thought it would be interesting to ask the question "Why does Butler's Apologetic strike the modern reader as so thoroughly out of date?" and I thought that the mere statement of these reasons would help to suggest the sort of apologetic by which it must be replaced. (2) Though Butler as a whole is out of date, there are elements in his thought which are still of real value, and I should like to call attention to them. I should be far from saying that Bishop Butler is no longer worth reading, or even that his works are of purely historical interest. For the young student who has perhaps hardly read another work of Christian Apologetic or Christian Philosophy, it is worse than useless to put into his hands a collection of good replies to objections which are not now made and untenable replies to those that are still urged. But such a book may be very instructive to the student sufficiently acquainted with more modern modes of thought to be able to recognise where the old apologist's arguments are, and where they are not, still available.

¹ Reprinted from the *Modern Churchman*, Vol. XVI, pp. 678-694 (March, 1927).

Butler's contribution to Theology may be studied under three heads. (1) There is the first part of the *Analogy* dealing with Natural Theology ; (2) there is the second part dealing with Revealed Theology ; and (3) there are the *Fifteen Sermons* which are chiefly concerned with Moral Philosophy.

I will deal with these three parts in order. But first I must say a word as to the argument of the *Analogy* as a whole. This is often misconceived. People vaguely suppose that Butler aimed at pointing out analogies between Natural and Revealed Religion. This mistake is sufficiently corrected by an attentive reading of the title-page. The work is styled : *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature*. Butler is not seeking to prove Revealed Religion by showing the analogies which it exhibits to Natural Religion. Both Natural Religion and Revealed Religion are treated as things to be proved : and Butler proposes to prove them by showing that what were urged as objections both to Natural and Revealed Religion might equally be made to what nobody denied—the constitution and course of Nature. Now of course if by the constitution and course of Nature Butler had meant nothing but the actual facts of the Universe apprehended by the senses, such a line of argument would be worth nothing. If, for instance, it is objected that there is a certain injustice or inequality or arbitrariness in the Christian scheme of salvation, it is no answer to say that similar injustices are included in the course of nature, in the actual distribution of happiness and misery, in our liability to undeserved injury or unmerited help from our fellows and so on. The modern doubter would of course reply : “ Precisely so, and that is why I do not believe either that your scheme of salvation or that the course of nature comes from a just and perfect God, or indeed from

any God at all." But in Butler's time no one denied that Nature implied a creative Mind—an "intelligent author of Nature," as it was called. It was thought obviously impossible that the world could start itself. Given a Creator to start it, it could (as some supposed) go on very well of itself, though it was generally held further that the appearances of design in human organisms pointed to the exertion of occasional interference with the world-machine at later periods. And particularly the appearance of new species was held to be something that could not possibly be accounted for by the laws of nature at all. Butler was able to assume that the existence of a creative and intelligent mind was something universally admitted. His opponents were not Atheists or Agnostics, but Deists. Deism was a mode of thought which was introduced by certain English writers in the later half of the seventeenth century. Lord Herbert of Cherbury is often spoken of as the first of the Deists; but the real impulse, I imagine, came from the much more anti-religious Thomas Hobbes, though his view of the omnipotence of the State compelled him to profess attachment to the principles of the Church of England as by law established, and so made it impossible for him formally to deny either the special truths of Christianity or the more fundamental principles of Natural Religion. Hobbes attended church because the law required him to do so, but took the liberty to absent himself from the sermon. But the whole tendency of his thought was profoundly sceptical and anti-Christian.

It may be suggested that, if the existence of God was admitted, nothing remained to be proved as regards what was called at the time Natural Religion. But that was not the case with at least some of the Deists. Most of their leading writers, indeed—men like Collins, Toland and Chubb—were professed believers in the righteousness of God, in the

providential government of the world, and in future rewards and punishments. What they denied was the miraculous interference with the course of Nature, the special revelation of God in the Old and New Testaments, and the special doctrines of Christianity. But there were others who went further and denied that there was any reason to think of God as righteous, that there could be any communication between the divine and the human mind even in the voice of conscience, any meaning in worship, any grounds for belief in a future life. It must be remembered that, though the objections to established religious ideas found expression in the little group of deistical writers, Deism was a mode of thought which was propagated rather in conversation than by formal treatises, among more or less cultivated men of fashion than among philosophers and professed students, in coffee-houses and drawing-rooms rather than in universities or the studies of serious thinkers. Even the deistical writers were not academical teachers or men of great learning, but laymen—sometimes cultivated laymen, at other times quite self-taught.

The situation is amusingly expressed by Bishop Berkeley :

“ Lysicles smiled and said he believed Euphranor had figured to himself philosophers in square caps and long gowns, but thanks to these happy times the reign of pedantry was over. Our philosophers are of a different kind from those awkward students who think to come at knowledge by poring on dead languages and old authors, or by sequestering themselves from the cares of the world to meditate in solitude and retirement. They are the best-bred men of the age, men who know the world, men of pleasure, men of fashion, and fine gentlemen.

“ *Euph.* I have some small notion of the people you mention, but should never have taken them for philosophers.

“*Cri.* Nor would anyone else till of late. The world was long under a mistake about the way to knowledge, thinking it lay through a tedious course of academical education and study. But among the discoveries of the present age one of the principal is the finding out that such a method doth rather retard and obstruct than promote knowledge.

“*Lys.* I will undertake that a lad of fourteen, bred in the modern way, shall make a better figure, and be more considered in any drawing-room or assembly of polite people, than one at four-and-twenty, who hath lain by a long time at school and college. He shall say better things, in a better manner, and be more liked by good judges.

“*Euph.* Where doth he pick up this improvement?

“*Cri.* Where our grave ancestors would never have looked for it, in a drawing-room, a coffee-house, a chocolate-house, at the tavern, or groom-porter’s. In these and like fashionable places of resort it is the custom for polite persons to speak freely on all subjects, religious, moral or political. So that a young gentleman who frequents them is in the way of hearing many instructive lectures, seasoned with wit and raillery, and uttered with spirit.”¹

It was objections that passed current in circles of this kind rather than in solemn philosophical assemblies that Butler and the long line of Apologists of which he has become the most classical had really to deal with. And in these circles it is probable that the more destructive kind of attack upon Christianity was more frequent than in the guarded pages of the Deistical writers. These assailants, so far as they had any philosophical position at all, based themselves upon Hobbes’ doctrine of universal selfishness. Unlike the kinds of modern anti-Christianity with

¹ *Alciphron*, Dial. I and II.

which we are most familiar, much of this fashionable scepticism of George II's time was frankly anti-moral too. It was deliberately maintained that there was no reason why a man should not gratify all his selfish passions and inclinations except in so far as the community for its own purposes found it necessary to create, by means of punishment, selfish inducements to restrain them. The Deity which this sort of Deism admitted was (as Carlyle expressed it) very much of an "absentee Deity." For these reasons that perfunctory admission of an "intelligent author of Nature" which Butler was able to assume did not always establish anything which he or we could regard as amounting to a Natural Theology or Natural Religion. But his plan is to start with simply this admission, and to argue that the admitted and undeniable behaviour of this external rule of the Universe, as exhibited by the course of nature, exhibits analogies to the action which was attributed to Him by the scheme both of Natural and Revealed Religion. Upon the premisses of Butler's opponents much of the argument is good. But the mode of thought to which it is a reply has completely passed away. The writings of the English Deists, it must be remembered, were the real source of the French "Illumination," of the ideas of the Encyclopædists. The mere negations of Deism exercised more influence on the Continent than in the British Isles. Voltaire was very much the kind of Deist whom Butler attacks. The Deism which can recognise so very personal a Deity as is implied in the sudden creation of man by a divine fiat, and yet scoffs at the notion of His benevolence or His justice, at the idea of moral obligation or of a future life, is practically non-existent at the present day. The tendency of modern philosophy is towards the opposite pole of religious thought; some form of Pantheism, not Deism, is now the alternative to the Christian conception of God. So far as the Deistic conception

of God exists, it is among orthodox Christians who are often accused by philosophers of Deism on account of their too anthropomorphic conception of God and their too external a view of the relation between God and the world : but the Deism of the Voltairian type—the belief in a non-moral starter of a clock-work Universe—is an unknown variety of opinion, at least in cultivated and philosophical circles. You might possibly find something a little like it in the vague, inarticulate theological systems which lurk at the bottom of but slightly educated minds alienated from all recognised forms of religious thought and yet not deliberately atheistic or agnostic. In meeting any higher level of non-theistic thought than this, Butler's formal argument is now completely unavailable. What Butler assumes as beyond the region of controversy is just what to modern doubters requires to be proved.

Nevertheless it must not be supposed that the first part of the *Analogy* is worthless. It is a piece of very serious thinking. Much of Butler's line of thought is still valuable against the opposite tendency towards a non-moral, non-religious Pantheism. For a mind which has once accepted, or which is at least inclined to accept, the notion that the ultimate principle of things must be spiritual, the fundamental difficulty of accepting the Christian conception of God lies largely in the old problem of the existence of evil. At the present day anyone who is disposed to believe that the Universe may best be thought of in terms of Mind, will almost certainly be disposed to assume that, if God is the ultimate source or ground both of the physical Universe and of the human mind, He must be the source also of our moral ideas, and that therefore we are justified in attributing to Him those moral qualities which are approved by our moral consciousness, and to argue further that the purpose of the Universe must be one which commends itself to that moral consciousness.

To put it more simply, those who are disposed to believe in God at all, will naturally feel impelled to think of Him as righteous, benevolent, loving. The great obstacle to such a belief now, quite as much as in Butler's day, is the existence of evil. If Theism cannot in some sense account for the existence of evil, either the modern man will reject the arguments which would otherwise incline him to the theistic view and fall back upon Agnosticism, or (if he is too much of a metaphysician to acquiesce in such intellectual bankruptcy) he will feel driven to believe in an Absolute—a universal Being who is thought of in some sense as spiritual, but not as personal or moral : he will declare that our moral distinctions do not exist from the point of view of the Absolute, that He or it (for some of the believers in a non-moral Absolute prefer to speak of this ultimate principle in the neuter) is “beyond good and evil,” that the Absolute of Philosophy is not the God of Religion, and so will treat the whole Christian conception of God and His relation to the Universe either with the hostility of a Nietzsche or with contemptuous patronage as a crude, childish, popular presentation of things—perhaps inevitable, perhaps useful, for emotional and devotional purposes, perhaps even as having a sort of intellectual justification on the level of popular thought but which cannot be seriously accepted as a representation of objective truth. And in dealing with this difficulty Butler may still give us some help. The most valuable and still living part of the *Analogy* is in the chapter on “A State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement.” Although in the *Sermons* Butler was very much inclined to speak in the ordinary utilitarian way, to treat virtue as consisting certainly in the promotion of happiness practically identified with pleasure, in the *Analogy* he sees the difficulty of vindicating the ways of God to man on such a basis :

“Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons’ behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved.”¹

Full as he still is of the Eighteenth Century respect for the cold pursuit of self-interest, he does now distinctly think of goodness as an end-in-itself, and at bottom he explains the presence of evil by the fact that it must be supposed in ways only partially intelligible to us to be a necessary means to the supreme purpose of creation, i.e. the production of the greatest possible amount of human well-being—a well-being which includes the training and discipline of character as well as happiness.

The greatest *possible* amount. This logically implies a limit to the omnipotence of God, as popularly understood. If God can only secure His good ends by causing some evil, it is clear that He is not omnipotent in the popular sense of being able to do anything and everything that we take it into our heads to imagine. On the whole Butler recognises this implication, though we could wish that he had done so a little more boldly. One of Butler’s characteristic and ever-present thoughts is the ignorance of man—a thought so strongly held that it very seriously clips the wings of philosophical speculations, and might have the unintended effect of driving a sceptically inclined reader into sheer agnosticism. But Butler has much to say against the irrationality

¹ Bk. I, ch. iii, § 3, p. 54. The pagination given is that of Gladstone’s edition.

of not following our reason as far as it will carry us because it will not carry us farther. He insists upon the fact that God governs the world through general laws—that we must not judge of each particular piece of divine action as if it had no relation to other acts: the world is a system or constitution in which every part is constructed with some reference to other parts. At the present day he would have called it an “organic whole.” But this being so, we must suppose that “there may be the wisest and best reasons why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution (of happiness and misery) perhaps must follow” (p. 66). Among the consequences which would follow from a juster distribution of good and evil in this life would be that we could not foresee the consequences of our own acts, and as most of our enjoyments are such as “we are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves,” and “this foresight could not be at all, were not the government of the world carried on by general laws”: and “to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things” (p. 140). And then he explicitly recognises that “Perhaps (perhaps is a very favourite word with Butler) there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with” (p. 42). It is presumptuous “to imagine that the world might have been so constituted as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil” (p. 210). All this really implies that there is a limit to the omnipotence of God in the popular sense, and in the true sense if omnipotence is, in the words used by Thomas Aquinas, “the power of doing *all possible* things.”

I may add that the impossibility of the true end of creation being secured without the permission of evil is largely dependent, in Butler’s view, upon the necessity of free-will to virtue—a free-will which he

interprets in the popular sense of indeterminism pushed to a point to which few modern philosophers would follow him. In dealing with this subject he shows absolutely no appreciation of the deterministic case. The idea of determinism or universal necessity is to Butler simply absurd. Philosophers have differed, and perhaps will always differ, on this question ; but a writer who thinks that determinism can be easily answered shows that he is not a philosopher of the first or even the second rank.

With all its defects, the argument of the first part is a deeply impressive piece of writing. It is when we come to the second part of the *Analogy*—the part which deals with Revelation—that we feel how completely the whole situation has changed since Butler's day. And indeed the greatest difference between Butler's position and any which could possibly be adopted at the present day by any philosophical mind lies in this hard and fast distinction between "Natural" and "Revealed Religion." Butler assumes that all that he calls natural religion, all the knowledge which man can obtain by reason or reflection, all the knowledge that ever was gained, whether by ancient philosophers or by the prophets or the collective religious mind of religions other than the Jewish and the Christian, involved no sort of measure of revelation or self-communication of the Divine Mind at all. There is, indeed, one exception to this, for Butler was of course a great champion of Conscience, and he does recognise that Conscience is the will of God. But when he is contrasting Natural and Revealed Religion even this is commonly forgotten. On the other hand, when he turns to the Jewish and the Christian scriptures, he talks as if in their contents nothing whatever was due to the natural workings of the human minds, whether to any sort of intuition or any sort of reflection or inference—nothing, again, to the influence of religious

or social emotion, of tradition or environment or any other of the forces which a modern philosopher would recognise as psychological causes, as distinct from logical reasons, for religious belief. He does not, indeed, formulate any strong theory as to the infallibility of scriptural writers on matters of fact, though he will never admit that they were actually mistaken; but as regards the religious content of their message—as regards the words of prophecy, for instance—he assumes that they were dictated by God in the most direct, the most external, apparently the most mechanical, manner conceivable. By revelation he means the direct communication of truth from the divine to the human mind under the guarantee of miracles. To a large extent this supernatural communication of knowledge was a “republication of the religion of Nature”—of the truths which, partly as the result of a supposed original revelation made in the infancy of the human race, and partly as the result of independent thought and reflection man might have discovered, and to some extent did discover, for himself by the use of his natural faculties—such truths as the existence and the goodness of God, the contents of the moral law, the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. But this Revelation did also contain the promulgation of new truths and new commands not otherwise discoverable—as, for instance, that duty imposed upon the Israelites of exterminating the Canaanites, or the necessity of faith and baptism for salvation revealed in the New Testament. Up to a point, he does indeed insist strongly upon the rights of Reason: he is very clear that we have no means of judging of the truth of anything whatever except by means of our Reason. Reason must judge of the fact that a revelation has been made, i.e. that the alleged miracles in fact occurred, and that they prove the truth of all that was taught by any person by whom the miracle was wrought. And even so, no alleged

matter of revelation could be accepted if it involved a contradiction or was opposed to some truth otherwise sanctioned by Reason or by Conscience. But practically this last admission is of very little value, because any particular command, no matter how shocking to the moral feelings of mankind or opposed to the general rule affirmed by Conscience, may nevertheless be a real command of God and must be obeyed. "If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit, of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case, or of the action." But a particular act, no matter how much condemned by Conscience, may be commanded because in the particular case an exception to the principles of action approved by Conscience may in ways unknown to us be conducive to the ends of Divine Providence. For Samuel to have hated Agag we might suppose would have been wrong: but it was his duty to hew him in pieces before the Lord, loving him all the time. Moreover, Butler supposes "men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God." Consequently (the illustration is not Butler's; I observe that he always tactfully refrains from illustrations) the Israelites were quite justified in cheating the Egyptians out of their jewellery, and in slaughtering the inhabitants of Canaan.

I need hardly say how completely this mode of thinking is opposed to the best religious thought and the best religious instincts of the average Christian at the present day. Butler was as coldly rationalistic—I use the word in a rather popular sense—as any of the Deists whom he opposed. In his mode of thinking, God never spoke to anyone but a Jew or a Christian of the First Century. To suggest that something of the spirit of God moved in Socrates or in Gautama (though men like Justin or Origen would heartily have admitted it), or for Wesley to think of

himself as divinely commissioned to take the world for his parish, would have been to Butler sheer "enthusiasm." Everything turns upon the evidence of miracles. Without miracles, no voice of God: when miracles can be appealed to, there is Revelation, no matter how improbable, absurd or immoral the particular matter revealed, if only it escape formal contradiction or opposition to the moral law as regards inward principle or motive. When he comes to the evidence for miracles, the tests which he proposes are of the most childishly inadequate description. If a miracle is recorded by a historian whom we have no positive reason to regard as dishonest, and we have no positive evidence against it, we must accept the statement. It is presumptuous, apparently, to ask when the writer lived, whether he had any means of knowing the truth, or whether his age was one in which there was a general disposition to accept miracles on little or no evidence. Butler's principles of historical evidence would compel him to accept all the miracles in Herodotus or in the *Acta Sanctorum*. He has no knowledge whatever as to the causes which tend to produce belief in miracles. The only causes he recognises are enthusiasm or sheer lying. And enthusiasm is understood in a way which makes it hardly compatible with common sanity or common honesty. Butler has no conception of the way in which stories of miracles actually got believed and accepted by ancient chroniclers. He has no conception of the large extent to which so-called miracles, through the influence of mind on body in ways now obscurely understood, and many other events commonly called miraculous, may have actually occurred without any violation of the laws of nature. When miracles broke out in Butler's own diocese of Bristol, he sent for John Wesley. We are told little of that memorable interview between those typical representatives of the Eighteenth Century—the Bishop

who represented the rationalism which had hitherto been dominant, and the Priest who represented the enthusiasm (as Butler would have called it) which was to usher in a new period in the history of religion. Butler's remark to Wesley is significant :

“ Sir, the pretending to extraordinary revelations and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing—a very horrid thing.”

Butler's way of dealing with the matter was entirely opposed to our modern canons of historical evidence. We are not told that he instituted any enquiry whatever into the truth of these reported cases. Because they could not be accounted for by the current accepted psychology and physiology of the day, they must be rejected without enquiry, and put down to “ enthusiasm ” or dishonesty. Since enthusiasm, though a regrettable aberration of the human mind, could hardly be regarded as “ horrid,” we must presume that he accounted for them by imposture on the part of others, and perhaps by self-deception (such as that to which in one of his sermons he attributes the conduct of Balaam) on the part of John Wesley himself. If the miracle had been revealed as having happened a few hundred years after the event by an unknown writer who wrote in Hebrew, he would have regarded it as “ presumptuous ” to question it. Butler could have given no rational account of the difference of his procedure in the two cases.

I have left myself hardly time to speak of Butler's *Fifteen Sermons* on Christian Ethics. And yet this is really his most important work. I have suggested that to put Butler's *Analogy* into the hands of the young student of theology is worse than useless. On the other hand, when I taught Moral Philosophy in Oxford, I always recommended men to begin by reading Butler's *Sermons*, or some of them, and

Mill's *Utilitarianism* as the typical representatives of the two classical schools of Moral Philosophy. Butler is the typical champion of the authority of Conscience—the typical “Intuitionist.” In many respects Paley, though still essentially an Eighteenth-Century theologian, was much in advance of Butler : his ideas of historical evidence, for instance, are much better. But Butler's great superiority to him lies in the fact that he does recognise, as Paley does not, the authority of Conscience. The best part of the *Sermons*, indeed, is to my mind not so much the ethics proper as the psychology. His refutation of the hedonistic psychology of Hobbes—of the doctrine that every action is inspired by selfish or interested motives—represents a real advance in this region of thought. Even to this day it is hardly possible to point to anything better. His positive argument in favour of the existence and authority of Conscience is also powerful and convincing ; but his conception of Conscience makes it too much of a piece of magic or miracle. He does not merely recognise that the idea of duty, the idea of right and wrong in general, is one of the fundamental categories of human thought, which can as little be explained by experience or the calculations of self-interest, or by mere emotions or by the mere influence of education and environment, as we can explain in such ways the genesis of our knowledge of the mathematical axioms or the laws of thought. He seems to think that every particular question of right or wrong has to be decided absolutely without any thought or calculation of consequences “by almost any fair man under almost any circumstances” (the slight hesitation and reserve are very characteristic of Butler). In the development of the individual's ideas about right and wrong absolutely nothing is allowed for the influence of custom, tradition, environment, education. He supposes that, because our fundamental moral ideas are self-evident or intuitive, each and

every individual can claim absolute infallibility for his own ideas of right and wrong in each particular case, and that the moral ideas of all fair men at all times in the world's history have always been the same. The only possible causes of wrong ethical judgments which he allows are superstition and "self-deception," which last is, as he says, no real exception. In Butler's time not so much was known as to the actual variations of the moral standard as in our own, but it is difficult to understand how such a view could have survived the reading of Homer and the Old Testament. Here again, as in his dealing with revelation, we have to notice an entire absence of the historical sense. He had no notion of evolution or development, whether in the sphere of religion or of ethics. No doubt here the deficiencies of Butler's thoughts were largely those of his age—of the sceptic no less than the orthodox.

Butler is also inclined to assume that our moral judgments are quite independent of any calculation as to the social consequences of our actions. This is more conspicuously so in the Dissertation entitled "The Nature of Virtue," appended to the *Analogy*, than in the earlier *Sermons*. In the *Sermons* he is so far a utilitarian that he can say "that there is a common end and interest of Society which each particular is bound to promote in the sum of morals." But he seems to think that by a kind of pre-established harmony the judgments of Conscience will always coincide with the dictates of utility. In the Dissertation he is a more decided intuitionist, and contends that some acts are pronounced right or wrong by Conscience although it cannot be shown that they must necessarily increase happiness. He assumes (1) that if there is such a thing as Conscience the judgment of the individual is always infallible, and (2) that Conscience pronounces what particular course of action is right or wrong without any reference to its probable consequences. He assumes

that our first intuitive, half-instinctive judgment upon the most complicated problem of conduct—prior to any reflection upon probable consequences—will be infallibly true. He is disposed to look upon Conscience as a sort of penny-in-the-slot machine. Not a moment's thought is necessary. Put in your question: out jumps the answer ready-made, complete, cut and dried. Here he is obviously wrong. In *some* cases it is obvious that we must think of the consequences of an action before we can pronounce it right or wrong. Whether this is so in all cases is still one of the most disputed points of moral philosophy. That is a question which it would take too long to discuss now. My own solution of the problem would be briefly this. I should myself be disposed to say that in all cases it is a duty to do what will best promote true human well-being, but that true human well-being does not mean the greatest possible proportion of pleasure. The Utilitarian is right in saying "Acts are right in proportion as they promote universal good": he is wrong in thinking that universal good means universal pleasure. There are other goods besides pleasure, and pleasures differ in kind.

To ascertain what the consequences of an act are likely to be we must appeal to experience; but whether those consequences are truly good or not must be judged by the moral consciousness, or (as Butler would say) by Conscience, directly, immediately, intuitively. This is the true function of that faculty in every man which, in Butler's impressive language, "distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer

of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own." It is not on the morality of particular acts detached from their consequences, but on the value of goods or ends of acts that it was the true function of Conscience to pronounce. Conscience is no less magisterial because for its effectual exercise we must enquire into what are the probable consequences of a proposed action and how far it will or will not tend to bring about that which conscience itself determines to be the true good, the true end or ideal, of human society. But I must not enter further into these questions of Moral Philosophy.

It is time for me to attempt to answer the question upon which I promised to say something—what light does a study of Butler throw upon the Apologetics which the needs of our day demand? I trust that question has been partly answered incidentally in the course of my criticism upon Butler. Lack of time forbids me to do more than summarise in a very hasty and dogmatic manner the lessons which I think we ought to learn from him.

(1) Butler was right in supposing that the special Theology of the Christian Religion presupposes a Natural Theology—a Theology which commends itself to the Reason and Conscience of man apart from the authority of Christ or of the Old and New Testaments. The first part of his *Analogy*—especially his whole view of life as a state of discipline—may help us to construct that Natural Theology, though we shall have to begin by giving reasons for that belief in "an intelligent author of Nature" which he for the most part assumes.

(2) We cannot in Butler's fashion draw a hard and fast distinction between Revealed Religion and Natural Religion. We shall have to recognise that

there are degrees of Revelation. God can never be known to man except in so far as He reveals Himself. Revelation does not exclude the use of Reason. There is a measure of revelation in the teaching of ancient philosophers and of religions other than the Jewish or Christian ; and, on the other hand, we cannot treat everything in the Old or New Testament as infallible truth. We shall look upon the religious history of the world as a progressive self-revelation of God to the human mind, culminating in the revelation through Christ—a revelation which requires to be itself developed and continued by the work of the Holy Spirit in human souls, and in particular in the society of Christ's followers.

(3) Whatever view we take of miracles, it is impossible to vest the claims of Christ and of Christianity wholly or even primarily upon the attestation of miracles. In the present state of criticism it is only when we have already accepted Christ as in a unique and supreme sense the Revelation of God that the question can even be raised whether the abnormal events which accompanied that life are attested by sufficient historical evidence, and whether, so far as that is so, they must be looked upon as actual interferences with the course of nature by the fiat of Divine power, or whether they may be regarded as extraordinary instances of a control of the processes of physical nature which, though in some sense abnormal, does not involve any interference with law. However we answer this question, the whole problem of miracles has become to us from an evidential point of view of secondary importance. The modern theologian, if he believes in miracles, will do so because he already believes in Christ. And he may still believe in Christ even if he does not believe in miracles. Those internal evidences of the truth of Christianity which the older Apologists were inclined to regard as secondary will become to us primary. The chief ground for

our belief in Christ, and in the exceptional and unique Incarnation of God in Christ, must lie in the appeal which His teaching makes to the reason, the conscience and the heart.

(4) Like Butler, or rather still more than Butler, we must put the appeal to the authority of Conscience in the forefront of our Apologetic. There are many other lines of thought which lead up to the belief in what Butler calls an "intelligent author of Nature," though His relation to the world will be thought of in a way somewhat different from that either of the orthodox or of the Deists of the Eighteenth Century. But none of these lines of thought throws any light upon His character except the argument from Conscience. Our moral judgments supply the only valid ground for thinking of God as righteous, just, loving; and, I may add, it is only by assuming that our moral judgments are as much a revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality as the judgments of Natural Science that we can justify the belief that because His ideal commends itself in a supreme way to the Conscience of Mankind, we may regard Christ as in a supreme sense the Revealer of God.

(5) This same authority of Conscience must be the chief ground of our belief in immortality. Butler was not wrong in the importance which he assigned to this belief, but we shall think of the future life somewhat differently from him. All Eighteenth-Century Theology—Butler's included—strikes us as savouring too much of the Old Bailey. We need not scruple to think of the future life as a state of reward or punishment, but we shall avoid the Eighteenth-Century tendency to look upon Religion chiefly as a powerful assistance to the police. We shall think of the highest life as something which begins here and now, as worth having for its own sake ("he that hath the Son hath life"): we shall set before men as their primary aim and object the

promotion of the Kingdom of God in present human society, while we shall look forward to the future life as continuing the process of divine education for human character which is begun by the struggles and efforts, the joys and the sorrows, of the present.

THE GREATEST NEED OF THE CHURCH¹

"Add to your faith virtue; and to virtue knowledge."
—2 PETER i. 5.

It is being very generally said that the Church is losing, or at least is in great danger of losing, its hold upon the nation. The most enthusiastic friends of the Church seem as eager to proclaim that fact as its most contemptuous foes. Among the friends the only difference lies in their diagnoses of the disease and in the remedies which they would prescribe. I am not at all disposed to swell the chorus of criticism. Many of the complaints against the Church, both those which come from friends and those which come from foes, are, I venture to think, exaggerated and overdone.

And in particular there has been far too much abuse of the clergy. In all ages the Church and the clergy have more or less fallen below their magnificent ideals. That is inevitable. But after all it may, I believe, fairly be said that the standard of devotion and self-sacrifice on the part of the parochial clergy (as one who has never borne the burdens of the parochial clergyman, I may be allowed to say it) has never been higher—at least since the days of persecution.

But there is one respect in which the criticism has hardly been overdone. The Church has not been bold enough in meeting the intellectual difficulties of the age; and that failure has more to do with other kinds of inefficiency than is sometimes supposed. It is possible to exaggerate the Church's lack of influence in other directions: all that we heard during the War about the unconscious Christianity of the average soldier is so much testimony to the direct or indirect effects of the Church's work. The

¹ Preached in Solihull Church, October 9, 1921. Reprinted with modifications from *Jesus, Human and Divine*, pp. 71-93.

unconscious Christianity of the many must be the outcome of conscious or half-conscious Christianity in the comparatively few.

But that the Church has not the hold that we should like it to have over the intellectual life of the age is a proposition which few will dispute. The ideas about the universe which find expression not merely in the works of philosophers and professed scholars, but in those of popular novelists and men of letters and cultivated journalists, are rarely the same as those which we most often hear assumed in the pulpit, the Diocesan Conference, and the religious newspaper. It is just the most religious people who are most eager to proclaim, and even to exaggerate, this discord. Do they not almost expect a man of science to be an agnostic, and a layman of learning to be at all events not a very orthodox Christian? Is it not almost enough to discredit a man's opinion in many religious circles to call him a Professor—even though he may chance to be also in Holy Orders?

And it would be a great mistake to suppose that this failure to hold the mind of the age is to be observed only among more or less academic people. Our army chaplains and ex-chaplains know better. Here are the words of Mr. Studdert-Kennedy, better known to the soldier as "Woodbine Willie":

"It is awful to realise that when one stands up to preach Christ the soldier feels that you are defending a whole ruck of obsolete theories and antiquated muddles."

And this discord between average Church teaching and average lay opinion is not confined to those who have absolutely turned their back upon the Churches and their ordinances. A very large proportion of those who still come to church do not expect to have their doubts and difficulties met in the Church's official teaching. They go to church to satisfy their

THE GREATEST NEED OF THE CHURCH
devotional needs, and to get practical help for right living, but for intellectual guidance they look elsewhere.

Now I am by no means assuming that, when there is this collision between the ideas of the official Church on the one hand and the more intellectual, the more educated, or more thoughtful laity on the other, the truth must lie wholly with those who are most alienated from the Church's point of view. Far from it. At a time when knowledge is advancing by enormous strides, when specialism is carried so far that the students of any one branch of knowledge have little time to acquaint themselves with any other, it is quite natural that there should be much one-sided intellectual development ; that those whose studies are concerned with matter should often be blind to the spiritual side of our nature and its needs ; that, when in so many directions old beliefs are breaking down, the truths which were enshrined in or associated with those beliefs should be overlooked.

The ideas on such subjects of the " man in the street," or even of the man of science or the man of letters with no special interest in theology or philosophy, are often as crude and ill-informed as those of the uninstructed religious person. The mere existence of doubt or anti-religious opinion is not necessarily to the Church's discredit. But surely the existence of this discord should be a matter of grave concern to the Churches and to every individual Christian, and all efforts to put an end to it welcomed and encouraged, whatever mistakes may be made, whether in the direction of excessive conservatism or of excessive liberalism.

Can it seriously be said that the Church is doing its duty in this matter ? Can it be said that there is in the Church of to-day a passionate love of truth, a desire to pursue truth to the uttermost, a profound respect for honest thought and inquiry ? Would a

visitor from Mars who attended our Church Assemblies, or dipped into our religious newspapers, or into the letters and articles written from the Church point of view in secular newspapers, be likely to conclude that an eager disposition to welcome new truth from whatever quarter it comes, to enquire into new opinions or alleged discoveries, to be scrupulously fair to opponents—would such a visitor be likely to note these qualities as conspicuous features in the average religious mind of our age? Would he not probably carry away the impression that doubt and intellectual open-mindedness, the patient search for truth and the willingness to face truth when found, were regarded by too many religious persons as extremely dangerous things, if not as deadly sins?

What is the education which we give to our clergy? Even when their previous general education has been good, what professional education do they get? Are the great problems which a clergyman has to face so easy that, whereas a doctor requires five years' professional education at the very least, two years' or, in the case of graduates, one year's study at a theological college is sufficient to fit a man even for meeting the difficulties which any intelligent artisan at the present day would be capable of suggesting to him? And what is the standard of competency secured by the examination for Holy Orders? I think I could give you a fairly correct idea of the amount of knowledge insisted on for the clergy—of course I am only speaking of the indispensable minimum—by saying that it is probably equivalent to the knowledge of Science and Medicine expected of a trained nurse, with the difference that the nurse's information is tolerably up to date as far as it goes, while the parson's is by no means always so. Happily many of us go on reading and thinking after we are ordained; but it cannot be assumed that the majority in any profession will succeed in

making up by private effort for the defects of their professional training.

I do not hesitate to say that one of the greatest needs—perhaps the greatest need—of the Church to-day is an improvement in the education of the clergy, and a changed attitude towards intellectual questions on the part, not only of the clergy, but of the religious laity. Without that, not all the devotion of the laborious parochial clergy, not all the subscriptions of the benevolent laity, not all the new organisations and machineries—Assemblies, Finance Boards, new dioceses, and the rest—will avail to enable the Church to hold its own and do its work in the world of to-day. And observe, there is no safer historical generalisation than this—that the opinions which are accepted by the more intellectual people sooner or later spread to the population generally. A Church that has lost its hold over the intellect of the age will not long retain its hold over its emotional life or its practical activities.

I know that there will be some people who will meet these suggestions with a simple negative. There are a few people who will say “The teaching of the Church has always been and must always be the same. If the world will not accept the Church’s message, so much the worse for the world. The clergy are not to be blamed because they refuse to water down their teaching to suit the infidelity of the age; and this infidelity, it will further be suggested, is only the outcome of the peculiar and exceptional wickedness which distinguishes this period of the world’s history from all others.” Or perhaps the whole matter will be summarily disposed of by the suggestion that all new ideas in theology were made in Germany, and therefore must be wrong.

As regards certain things, of course every Christian must admit that there is an unchangeable basis of the Church’s teaching. “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.” But unfortunately

the Church is constantly mistaking for the essentials of its faith things which are mere accidents of it. It is a profound historical mistake—a pure mistake of fact—to suppose that the Church's teaching has always been the same on all subjects. The Church would have been dead long ago if it had been, and the promise that the Holy Spirit would ever lead the Church on to new truth would have failed. The Church has always—and most of all in the ages in which its influence has been most profound and most vital—been adapting its teaching to meet the advance of knowledge in other directions. I could easily show you, had I the time, that the Church's teaching has never been exactly the same during any two centuries of its existence—except perhaps in the very darkest of the dark ages.

I will not attempt to illustrate that proposition from the Church's earlier history. But I should like to remind you of the changes which have taken place in average religious teaching within the memory of men who are not yet very old. The most fundamental of all these changes has been an altered way of looking at the Bible. Many of us were brought up to believe that every word of the Bible was true from the first chapter of Genesis to the last of Revelation.

Where is the instructed theologian of any school who teaches that now? The most conservative scholarly theologian of the present day is, I suppose, Dr. Wace, the aged Dean of Canterbury. What does he say about the Bible? I heard him speak on the subject at a Diocesan Conference at Birmingham some few years ago. He told us that the Bible is *substantially* true from cover to cover. Substantially true. There is a great difference between “substantially true” and “literally true, every word of it, equally in all its parts,” in matters of Science and of History as well as in matters of Spiritual Truth. And if the Dean were to have set forth these particulars—the unscientific account of Creation, details

of history, minor contradictions, and the like—which he would probably admit, the applause with which that utterance was greeted would perhaps have been a little qualified.

At all events, even such admissions would probably have seemed startling enough to our grandfathers. We used to be told that, if you admit one mistake, if you admit that the world took more than six days to make, and that the fossils do not lie, or that the story of Jonah is only a parable, you will have no ground left for believing in the Divinity of our Lord. Who would talk like that now?

And of course everyone knows that the great majority of modern scholars—whether they call themselves High-Churchmen or Evangelicals, Moderates or Liberals—go much further than the venerable Dean of Canterbury would go in accepting the conclusions of modern Biblical criticism. The imperfect and progressive character of the Old Testament revelation is very widely admitted. Instead of being a book equally authoritative in all its parts, the Bible is regarded as the record of God's gradual self-revelation of Himself to the soul of man—a gradual self-revelation leading up to and culminating in that full, sufficient, and (in a sense) final Revelation of Himself which God has made to the world in our Lord Jesus Christ.

And this change of attitude towards the Bible has brought with it another. No modern theologian has done more to help men of this age to retain their belief in the fundamental truths of Christianity in spite of our changed attitude towards the Bible than Dr. Charles Gore, at one time Bishop of Birmingham. And when in the book of essays called *Lux Mundi*, which appeared twenty-eight years ago, he attempted to show how it was possible to accept the views of modern scholars as to the date and authorship of Scriptural books, without giving up his firm belief in the Catholic faith, he found himself met with the

difficulty that our Lord Himself apparently sanctions the traditional views. Our Lord treats David as the author of the 110th Psalm, which modern critics assign to a much later date, and possibly assumes that the Pentateuch was written by Moses. And therefore Dr. Gore felt driven to revive the ancient view as to the limitation in our Lord's human knowledge, which had practically been forgotten by most religious people, though it had never been formally condemned.

The moment we come seriously to think of it, we must surely recognise that the idea of the incarnation of God in a human soul really implies that the Incarnate submitted to those limitations which are inherent in the nature of humanity. That was no new doctrine. It is asserted by some of the great Fathers of the Church. It is one that can only be denied by contradicting our Lord's own assertion that He did not know the day or the hour of the Judgment, and the Gospel statement that He increased in wisdom. The doctrine was old enough, and orthodox enough, but that did not prevent violent attacks in the Church papers upon the orthodoxy and the honesty of Dr. Gore. By many he was told that his plain duty was to resign his position as a clergyman, and so on. At the present day there are probably very few bishops and still fewer theologians who do not agree with him on this subject.

Let me take one more illustration of the change that has already taken place in average clerical opinion. I can remember the time when any doubt about the eternity of future punishment—of literal endless torture—was something that could only be whispered or hinted at. To avow such doubts was the note of the thorough-going Broad-Churchman. Maurice lost his professorship for it in 1853. Dean Farrar was fiercely attacked for boldly preaching against the old view in 1877. At the present day I

find that in any ordinary clerical gathering you may assume the gospel of eternal hope with general agreement ; or at all events it is treated as a perfectly allowable opinion.

Now in the face of such changes it is too late to contend that the Church has always taught the same things, and that the clergyman who departs one hair's breadth from this or that ancient formula has no place in the ministry of the Church. We do wrong to think of Christianity as a fixed, stereotyped body of doctrine. It is, and has always been, a living, growing, evolving thing, ever reaching out after and absorbing new truth and pushing on to higher and higher conceptions of God, and fuller and wider insight into the true and eternal meaning of the full revelation of Himself which God once for all made of Himself in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But someone will say, " If the Church has already so far remodelled and adapted its teaching to the new light which God has given us, why do you complain that she is not facing the difficulties of the age ? Why is there still this discrepancy between the teaching of the pulpit and the mind of the age ? "

In answer to this suggestion I would say two things :

(1) Though these ideas which are most clearly opposed to modern science and modern Biblical scholarship have been silently dropped, the contrary views are very seldom preached with any distinctness. It is only in rather limited circles that the new ideas have spread. Thousands are kept back from Christianity because they still suppose that the clergy teach that every word of the Bible is historically true, and that all the miracles of the Old Testament must be accepted just as they stand, that the morality of the Old Testament is as perfect as that of the New, and that you cannot be a Christian without thinking so. That is still assumed in nearly

all the more popular attacks upon Christianity and in some of the more educated ones. When by some accident some view long quite familiar to scholars finds its way into the newspapers and becomes the subject of popular controversy, it soon becomes evident that the ideas even of the most orthodox and conservative scholars are still not accepted by many clergymen, and are quite unknown to the letter-writers and leader-writers in newspapers, who come forward on such occasions as the champions of the Church.

(2) And then we cannot assume that the process of development by which we have all been influenced to a greater or a lesser extent must cease at the point where our own personal difficulties may chance to end. Historical research and theological thought are continually going on. New problems must be faced as well as old ones. Younger people will ask questions which their fathers were contented not to ask. And their difficulties cannot be met, if every fresh attempt to explain an ancient formulary, every departure from conventional opinion, is to be met by yells of condemnation from a thousand pulpits and a hundred local newspapers. You will observe I say "departure from conventional opinion." For very often the opinion attacked is not opposed even to the letter of the Church's formularies. Sometimes it is really part of the orthodox teaching of the Church, and those who attack it are the real heretics. When, for instance, people are shocked at being told that our Lord had a human soul and a human will, they only show that they do not know the Church's own doctrine. The favourite document of the dogmatists, the Athanasian Creed, could teach them better. "Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting."

A reasonable soul means, of course, a reasonable human soul.

But I do not wish to get into the discussion of any

particular opinions. The great obstacle to a readjustment of the relations between theological dogma and modern knowledge is not so much any particular difference of opinion as the existence in too many Christians of a wholly wrong attitude towards thought and knowledge, a fierce antagonism to new opinions—that is to say, to any opinions of which they do not happen to have heard—a fixed conviction that all theological ideas other than the conventional ones are due to conceit or personal vanity or gross unspirituality of mind in those who suggest them, and a disposition to cry out for some sort of vengeance against them, even before it is known what the poor men have actually said.

In the moderate words of one of our most prominent Assistant Chaplains-General during the war, Dr. Neville Talbot, now Bishop of Pretoria :

“ There is a great danger to-day in the exaltation of religious devotion and activity over love of the truth. During the last sixty years so much of the best and most intense achievements, whether Evangelical or Catholic, have been reared on a basis of reactionary thought.”

That this should be altered is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, need of our Church to-day.

And here, perhaps, I may be asked : “ How does all this concern *us* ? You have been preaching upon the duties of the clergy, and we can't reform the clergy, even if they want reforming.” It is a very great mistake to suppose that these matters concern the clergy only. Each of you has something to do to bring his own belief into harmony with whatever he possesses of modern knowledge. There are many people whose practical Christian faith would be immensely strengthened, and its influence over their lives intensified, if they were to take the trouble to read and inquire a little more about the Bible and the truth which it contains. A vague consciousness

of difficulties felt, but not faced, is often a great source of religious indecision and practical inefficiency.

And especially is this duty incumbent upon those who have in any way to teach others. I am afraid that the new light has influenced the ordinary currents of religious teaching in the Christian home, the Sunday-school, the day-school, the Bible-class, less even than it has affected the teaching of the pulpit. Children are still too often taught antiquated views, the denunciation of which gives an easy triumph to Mr. Blatchford and the Rationalist Press Association. Many parents go on teaching children what they do not quite believe themselves; or they teach them nothing at all about religion, because they are not quite sure what they do believe themselves. The more boldly we face difficulties, the more, I believe, we shall discover the unique and imperishable value of that supreme revelation of God's nature which has been made to us in our Lord Jesus Christ.

The revelation is, in a sense, always the same; but the apprehension of it is gradual and progressive. Over and over again it has been discovered that the true meaning and significance of Christ's teaching and work become all the clearer and all the more life-giving when the incrustations of human traditions have been stripped off. Let us try to take seriously the doctrine that the Holy Spirit is teaching something—something important and something new—to the Church of our own generation; and let us—each in proportion to his leisure, his vocation, and his opportunities—try to discover what it is, and to do what we can to communicate to others whatever measure of truth God has revealed to us and to the Church of our day. Now, as in former times, the Holy Spirit of God is saying to us: "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the Churches."

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